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Preface
The economic integration of countries has always been at the heart of economic analy-
sis. For more than a century and a half, the aim was to explain the emergence of trade
patterns between countries as well as to study their impact on production structures and
welfare. Within the last decades, the economic integration of countries and the analysis
thereof broadened in several aspects. Moreover, recent developments in globalization have
brought about a new level of international interaction beyond the mere exchange of final
goods and services. First, innovations in communication and transportation technolo-
gies have massively facilitated to split up the value chain of production across different
countries. Second, economies that have customized their regulatory framework to ac-
commodate the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the adoption of innovative
production techniques from the world technology frontier have been able to boost their
total factor productivities (TFP). Third, trade, offshoring and the adoption of modern
production technologies have heavily increased welfare across economies, while in most
countries, wage differences between high- and low-skilled workers have substantially risen.
More generally, the steep increase in the volume of FDI and the trade in intermediate
inputs demanded new explanations of multinational firm activities and their impact on
domestic and global production structures.
Globalization in recent decades has mainly been a firm-level phenomenon. Foremost, the
intensified internationalization of firm activities led to the emergence of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) that conduct a variety of operations in a range of different countries.
Nevertheless, some firms across countries still produce and sell on a pure domestic scale.
Moreover, the analysis of how globalization effects even pure domestic firms’ technolo-
gies and reshapes production structures of MNEs requires a thorough understanding of
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firm-level choices in production. In essence, firms transform inputs into output by using
a specific production technology. When not being constrained by exogenous restrictions,
firms adopt optimally their production processes to output-specific factor requirements
and factor prices. Economic theory has to consider the endogenous choice of firm-level
technologies and production structures in the analysis of firm-level reactions to the inte-
gration of world economies.
This dissertation contributes to the economic analysis of the impact of globalization on
firm-level choices in the production process. For this purpose, a novel concept of en-
dogenous technology adoption is developed that provides new insights in the effects of
world-wide economic integration on domestic firms. Furthermore, a novel framework is
proposed that studies the optimal structure of value chains within and across countries .
Since empirical results of the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ production techniques and
productivity levels are mixed (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007), a
thorough theoretical analysis is required. A guideline for the latter consists in two obser-
vations. First, MNEs are substantively more productive than domestic firms (Greenaway
and Kneller, 2007). Second, the entry of foreign firms causes regularly an increase in a
country’s skill premium (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). The first chapter analyzes the
effects of increased factor market competition through the entry of MNEs on domestic
firms’ level of technology in production. For an analysis of the interaction of labor
markets and firm-level technology choices, Acemoglu et al. (2007)’s model of endogenous
technology choice is extended by the notion of technology being complementary to skills
(Goldin and Katz, 1998). However, the use of sophisticated production techniques is
restricted in many countries by barriers to technology adoption (Parente and Prescott,
1994, 2002). Moreover, also firms within a country differ largely in their productive use of
technologies (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999). The second chapter analyzes the impact
of lower barriers to technology adoption on firm-level differences in production techniques
via the labor market channel. In general, endogenous choices in production processes
encompass the optimal structure of intermediate production stages and, on a global scale,
the optimal structure of global value chains. In Costinot et al. (2011), a sequential global
production process emerges endogenously where less productive countries concentrate on
earlier intermediate production stages. However, modern production processes dispose of
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a variety of different structures which can be characterized by their sequential or parallel
nature. The third chapter proposes an endogenous firm-level choice of the structure of
production and analyzes the impact on global value chains.
The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the impact of foreign firm entry on the
endogenous technology choices of domestic firms. Empirical studies on the effects of
MNEs’ market entry on domestic firms’ technology and productivity levels provide mixed
results (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Greenaway and Kneller,
2007). The impact of FDI on a country’s skill premium is however clear-cut: Higher levels
of FDI increase the wage gap (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Since the use of technology
in production is skill-complementary (Goldin and Katz, 1998), a rise in the skill premium
implies higher technology adoption costs. This chapter provides an analysis of the impact
of MNEs’ market entry on the technology choices of domestic firms via the labor market
channel.
For this purpose, I develop a tractable model that extends Acemoglu et al. (2007)’s
approach of modeling a firm’s technology choice as the optimal degree of specialization in
production by two aspects. First, I introduce skill-complementarity of technology that in-
volves feedback effects of aggregated demands of high- and low-skilled labor on firm-level
technology choices. In particular, intermediate inputs in a firm’s production process are
produced within the firm and differ with respect to their high-skill intensity (Feenstra and
Hanson, 1997). In my model, an increase in the endogenous level of technology involves
to add intermediate inputs that are relatively more high-skill intensive than intermediates
required for less sophisticated production techniques. With symmetry among firms, a
higher level of technology in production thus rises aggregated relative skill demand and
implies a higher skill premium. Second, I introduce differences in the degree of gains from
technology in production across firms. In particular, MNEs use technology in production
more efficiently than domestic firms which results in a higher productivity of the former
(Doms and Jensen, 1998; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). Moreover, domestic and foreign
firms enter the economy endogenously where MNEs face higher market entry costs than
local firms (Aghion et al., 2009). Whether foreign as well as domestic firms enter the
economy depends in essence on the relation of MNEs’ advantage in the use of technology
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in production to domestic firms’ advantage in lower market entry costs. The main finding
of this chapter is that the entry of MNEs increases the competition for skilled workers,
rises the skill premium, and forces domestic firms to downgrade their levels of technology
in production.
The second chapter of my dissertation studies the impact of lower barriers to technology
adoption on endogenous technology choices of heterogeneous firms. Empirical studies
(Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Gancia et al., 2011) emphasize the importance of barriers to
technology adoption in explaining cross-country TFP differences. There exists a variety
of anecdotal evidence of firm-level restrictions on the adoption of sophisticated produc-
tion techniques (Parente and Prescott, 2002). Moreover, firms are heterogeneous with
respect to productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999) such that some firms’ optimal
production techniques are more sophisticated than others’. Technology is further skill-
complementary (Goldin and Katz, 1998) and the skill premium increases along with a
greater openness of the country (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) which typically involves
lower barriers to technology adoption. This chapter analyzes the impact of lower barriers
to technology adoption on differences in technology choices of heterogeneous firms with a
particular focus on the labor market.
For this purpose, I extend the concept of skill-complementary technology choices on the
firm-level, developed in the first chapter, by barriers that preclude the adoption of the
most sophisticated production techniques. Since firms differ in their use of technology
in production, barriers to technology adoption restrain in particular the most productive
firms from adopting their optimal level of technology in production. If barriers decrease,
more sophisticated production technologies become available which are primarily adopted
by the more productive firms that were constrained beforehand. Since technology is skill-
complementary, an upgrade in production techniques of some firms results in an increase
in aggregated relative skill demand which raises the skill premium. In this vein, a higher
wage gap increases technology adoption costs of less productive and by the barrier not
restricted firms and forces them to downgrade their production techniques. This chapter
shows that the endogenous technology gap between more and less productive firms
sharply increases when barriers to technology adoption are lowered. Nevertheless, in line
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with e.g. Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Gancia et al. (2011), smaller barriers increase
a country’s overall welfare.
The third chapter of my dissertation is joint work with Carsten Eckel. We develop an
elementary theory of endogenous production structures that provides novel insights in
firm-level production decisions and their impact on global value chains. Manufacturing
processes regularly consist of a large number of intermediate production stages which are
regularly segmented across firms in different countries (Hummels et al., 2001). In a recent
contribution, Costinot et al. (2011) analyze the endogenous specialization of countries in
different stages of a sequential global value chain. In particular, countries with a higher
probability of making mistakes specialize in earlier production stages while countries with
lower failure rates focus on later stages. In this respect, the probability of making mistakes
in production is a general measure of a country’s productivity. However, disparities in
value added at different intermediate stages imply that sequential production structures
are not necessarily optimal. This chapter analyzes endogenous production structures
within and across countries and focuses in particular on the impact of intermediates’
value added and country-specific probabilities of making mistakes.
For this purpose, we consider two intermediate production stages to produce a final good
where each intermediate step faces a country-specific probability of failure (Costinot et al.,
2011). Moreover, each intermediate production stage has a particular labor requirement
which represents its specific value added. At the beginning of each production process,
the first intermediate stage is carried out. Subsequent to completion, the intermediate is
either processed in a consecutive production stage, facing the country-specific probability
of failure. Or, it is combined with a second intermediate input that was completed in a
separate process subject to the country-specific failure rate. While we denote the former
process as sequential, the latter is labeled parallel. Both approaches yield the same final
good and require the same value added at the first and second intermediate production
stages. Moreover, in parallel production, the final product is assembled without any labor
costs, but subject to a particular probability of making mistakes. Whether a sequential
or parallel production structure is optimal depends on the trade-off between the value
added at loss within sequential structure’s second step versus the risk of losing both
5
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intermediates during assembly. Embedding firms’ choices into a closed economy shows
that countries with higher probabilities of making mistakes choose a parallel production
structure for lower value added at the first stage. In open economy, countries differ with
respect to their labor endowments and the probability of making mistakes, where the
latter reflects country-level differences in TFP. This chapter shows that Costinot et al.
(2011)’s sequential global value chain emerges if value added of the first intermediate
stage does not surpass a threshold. Countries with lower failure rates specialize in later
stages of the global production process which involves Ricardian comparative advantages
between economies. If first step’s value added is great compared to the failure rate,
welfare gains of Ricardian specialization are smaller than the potential loss at the second
stage. In this case, parallel production structures emerge and specialization of economies
on intermediate stages does not occur.
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own introduc-
tions and appendices such that they can be read independently.
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Chapter 1
Do Multinationals Constrain Local
Firms’ Technology Adoption?
1.1 Introduction
The effects of multinational firm entry on domestic firms and industries are at the heart of
a long-going debate about globalization and the liberalization of foreign direct investment
(FDI). Particularly in countries that are laggards in terms of production technologies
and productivity there exists a widespread desire to attract investments of multinational
enterprises (MNEs). Their entry is supposed to induce knowledge spillovers to domestic
firms as well as to foster competition on output and factor markets. However, the empirical
literature provides mixed effects of foreign firm entry on domestic firms’ technology and
productivity levels1. In contrast, there exists widespread agreement that FDI inflows
increase the demand of high-skilled labor and lead to a rise in the skill premium2. Since
FDI is primarily carried out by the most productive firms and MNEs are usually from
countries close to the world technology frontier, MNEs use more productive technologies
than domestic firms3. Moreover, the adoption of more sophisticated production techniques
1See e.g. Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004), Aghion et al. (2009), and, for literature
surveys, Sinani and Meyer (2004), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Crespo and Fontoura (2007).
2See e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and, for a literature survey, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
3See e.g. Doms and Jensen (1998), Dimelis and Louri (2002), Proença et al. (2002), Torlak (2004) for
MNEs’ productivity advantage over domestic firms, Castellani and Zanfei (2007), Helpman et al. (2004)
for evidence on firm-level productivity and FDI and, for a literature survey, Greenaway and Kneller
(2007).
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requires regularly a higher skill-level of the workforce4, such that the entry of MNEs
increases a country’s aggregated high-skilled labor demand and the skill premium. Even
though being rarely in the focus of policy makers, the impact of FDI on domestic labor
markets and the consequences for domestic firms’ production techniques clearly deserves
closer attention.
This study is to the best of my knowledge the first to analyze the impact of foreign firm
entry on the technology choices of domestic firms via the labor market channel. The
entry of MNEs increases competition for skilled workers, rises the skill premium, and
forces domestic firms to downgrade their levels of technology in production. With free
entry, multinationals’ advantage in technology relative to their disadvantage in market
entry costs determines if they enter the domestic market and whether domestic firms
are crowded out5. My theoretical study emphasizes the labor market effects of FDI on
domestic firms’ technology choices and analyzes the respective entry decisions of MNEs
and domestic firms, while abstracting from other impact channels.
For this purpose, I develop a tractable model of skill-complementary endogenous tech-
nology choice. Following Acemoglu et al. (2007), a firm chooses endogenously its level of
technology in production. The latter is modeled as the number of intermediate inputs
in production and augments output on the firm-level as in Felbermayr and Jung (2011).
While most studies that consider the degree of specialization in production assume sym-
metry among intermediates (Ethier, 1982; Benassy, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2007; Eckel,
2008), I introduce heterogeneity with respect to intermediates’ skill-intensity in produc-
tion as in Feenstra and Hanson (1997). Furthermore, the production process is vertically
integrated such that intermediate inputs and the final good are produced within the firm.
As a consequence, the adoption of more sophisticated production techniques requires the
production of intermediates that are relatively more skill intensive. This implies that
producing output with a more sophisticated technology comes at the cost of employing
relatively more of the more expensive factor, i.e. high-skilled labor. In this vein, a firm’s
production process directly links a firm’s endogenous technology choice to its relative de-
4See e.g. Goldin and Katz (1998), O’Mahony et al. (2008), Lewis (2011).
5See e.g. Aghion et al. (2009) for different market entry costs of foreign firms. See Kosová (2010) for
crowding out of domestic firms.
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mand of skilled workers. In general equilibrium, the production-inherent cost structure of
technology relates the endogenous technology level of firms to a country’s skill premium.
Firms differ in general with respect to their scope for technology in production. In partic-
ular, the capability of using sophisticated production techniques more efficiently implies
the choice of a higher level of technology in production and results in a higher produc-
tivity. Multinational firms, being based in countries closer to the technology frontier and
having a global expertise, are usually endowed with a technological advantage over do-
mestic firms. They choose more sophisticated production techniques and, complementary,
hire a more skilled labor force. Moreover, this model assumes that multinationals set up
a production unit in the host country, hire exclusively local workers, and sell the entire
output in the host country’s market. Whereas the latter assumption does not restrict
the scope of the model, the former implies that foreign firm entry increases aggregated
relative demand of high-skilled workers. However, as supplies of high- and low-skilled
labor are fixed within a country, labor market clearing implies an increase in the skill
premium. This directly raises technology adoption costs for all firms and forces domestic
firms to downgrade their level of technology in production.
While MNEs profit from a greater scope for technology in production, they face higher
market entry costs than domestic firms6. They regularly have to overcome greater bu-
reaucratic hurdles, invest more to gather information on market-specific knowledge, or
simply face institutional restrictions. In this vein, autarky mirrors a situation where the
fixed costs disadvantage of MNEs outweighs their technological advantage such that they
refrain from entering the domestic economy. In contrast, domestic firms may become
completely crowded out if their smaller market entry costs do not compensate for cop-
ing with a toughened factor market competition from technologically more sophisticated
multinationals. Given MNEs and domestic firms enter the market, their numbers depend
on the trade-off between gains from technology in production and relative market entry
costs. In this case, the autarkic relation of relative skill endowments to the wage gap
is replaced by a correspondence of relative productivities to relative market entry costs.
Hence, the extend of domestic firms’ technology downgrades is determined by the relation
6Note that I use the terms market entry costs and fixed costs interchangeably throughout this chapter
since there exists only one type of fixed costs for MNEs and domestic firms, respectively, which is paid
at market entry.
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of relative fixed costs to the difference in the scope for technology, since the latter drives
the gap between productivities.
There exists a rich empirical literature on the effects of MNEs’ market entry on domestic
firms’ technology and productivity levels. See e.g. Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Crespo
and Fontoura (2007) for extensive literature surveys. However, empirical studies provide
evidence on positive as well as on negative effects of foreign firm entry. For Venezuelan
data, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that an increase in FDI leads to a decline in
domestic firms’ productivities. Aghion et al. (2009) present empirical evidence from the
United Kingdom that emphasizes the existence of differential impacts of foreign firm entry
on domestic producers: Advanced domestic industries gain in productivity growth while
laggard industries face a decline. Haskel et al. (2007), also using data from the United
Kingdom, show a positive correlation between a domestic firms’s total factor productivity
and the share of foreign firms in that firm’s industry. Kosová (2010) presents evidence
from the Czech Republic that FDI results in a short-term crowding out of domestic firms
as well as in technology spillovers to domestic firms.
In this chapter, the exclusive purpose of FDI is to serve the local market. Using data from
Chinese firms, Li et al. (2001) show that there exist mainly negative spillovers to domestic
firms through increased competition if FDI aim at producing for the domestic market. In
a different approach, Javorcik (2004) finds evidence that the productivity of Lithuanian
firms is positively correlated with contacts of foreign affiliates to their local suppliers.
They find however no evidence that the presence of MNEs in the same industry or the
existence of multinational suppliers of intermediate inputs leads to knowledge-spillovers.
Moreover, the focus of this chapter is on the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ technol-
ogy and productivity levels via the labor market channel. There exist several empirical
studies that emphasize the increase in domestic high-skilled wages through the entry of
foreign firms. In a seminal contribution, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that a growth
in FDI flows towards Mexico raises the demand for high-skilled labor and increases its
relative wage. Lorentowicz et al. (2008) provide evidence from Poland that high-skilled
local workers gain from outsourcing towards their country. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)
present an extensive literature survey on how globalization effects wage inequalities and
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show that most studies agree on a positive correlation. Using a cross-country analysis of
more than 100 countries, Figini and Görg (2011) show that within developing countries
the wage inequality increases with the stock of FDI. Sinani and Meyer (2004) point to a
negative labor market effect of foreign firm entry on domestic firms. Their claim is that
MNEs may headhunt the best workers (in general the more skilled) of domestic producers
by offering higher wages than local firms.
This chapter of my dissertation relates to two different strands of the theoretical liter-
ature. First, this study contributes to a growing theoretical literature on the impact of
FDI on host country’s technology and productivity levels. For an analysis of the moti-
vation of multinational firms to conduct FDI and of FDI’s specific purposes, I refer to
the extensive literature on horizontal FDI that emerged in the sequel of Markusen (1984)
and is reviewed by Markusen and Maskus (2001). In general, theoretical studies on the
impact of MNEs’ entry on local economies can be distinguished by their focus on either
the country- or the firm-level consequences. A contribution to the former is Müller and
Schnitzer (2006)’s analysis of the incentives of a multinational firm and the host country
to engage in international joint ventures that may imply technology transfers. However,
my approach abstracts from knowledge-spillovers in order to focus on the impact on do-
mestic firms through the factor market channel7. An early contribution to the literature
on the effects of FDI on domestic firms is Rodríguez-Clare (1996)’s analysis. Spillovers
of foreign affiliates increase the productivity of domestic firms via an increased access to
specialized varieties of intermediate inputs while MNEs’ affiliates may replace domestic
firms. Kosová (2010) builds a model that separates the impacts of MNEs on domestic
firms into a negative crowding out and a positive technology-spillover effect. Aghion
et al. (2006) build a Schumpeterian style growth model that predicts an increased pro-
ductivity growth in advanced domestic industries and decreased productivity growth in
laggard industries if MNEs enter. However, their focus is on productivity growth and
firms compete for shares on output markets. While the last two studies take into account
productivity effects on the firm-level, they neglect in particular the endogenous choice
7See e.g. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) for a an analysis that considers technology spillovers in a firm’s
choices on FDI. There exists also an extensive macroeconomic literature on the virtues of FDI. See e.g.
McGrattan and Prescott (2009)’s growth model where a country’s productivity and welfare increase
through FDI.
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of production techniques and the impact of competition on factor markets. My model
contributes to this literature by analyzing the impact of MNEs’ entry on domestic firms’
technologies via the labor market channel. In particular, the market entry of MNEs in-
creases competition for high-skilled labor and rises the skill premium. Since technology is
skill-complementary, a higher wage gap induces domestic firms to downgrade their levels
of technology in production.
Second, the layout of my production function contributes to the literature on endoge-
nous technology adoption. The basic set-up of my model is closest to Acemoglu et al.
(2007)’s complete contract case. As in their paper, the level of technology in produc-
tion is endogenously chosen and depends on the degree of gains from specialization. My
model introduces complementarity of technology and high-skilled labor by assuming het-
erogeneity across intermediate inputs with respect to skill intensity. As a consequence, an
increase in the endogenous level of technology involves to add intermediate inputs that
are relatively more high-skill intensive than intermediates required for less sophisticated
production techniques. Moreover, my model introduces differences across firms in the de-
gree of gains from technology in production. In particular, MNEs gain more from the use
of technology in production than domestic firms, resulting in a productivity advantage of
the former.
In the following, firm-level production and profit maximization are introduced in Section
1.2. A firm’s optimal choices of the level of technology and the quantities of intermediates
in production as well as the corresponding demands of high- and low-skilled labor are
presented in Section 1.3. The previous outcomes are then embedded in an autarkic
economy in Section 1.4. The analysis of the impact of multinational firms’ entry on
domestic firms’ choices is provided in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 briefly concludes.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Firm-Level Production
Each firm i produces output Yi according to the generalized C.E.S. production function
Yi := Nκi+1i
(
1
Ni
∫ Ni
0
x
σ
1+σ
i,j dj
) 1+σ
σ
. (1.1)
A firm i chooses the level of technology in production, Ni8, as well as the input quantity
of each intermediate input, xi,j. In particular, there exists an infinite amount of different
intermediate inputs, j ∈ [0, µ] with µ  1, out of which a firm chooses optimally the
subset [0, Ni] where Ni ≤ µ9.
An important determinant of Ni is a firm’s scope for technology κi > 0, i.e. its technology
type, that captures the extent to which a firm’s production benefits from the level of tech-
nology. Whenever there is no loss of clarification, I will abstract from the firm index i to
save on notation. Similar to standard models with C.E.S. production, σ ∈ (0,∞) deter-
mines the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate inputs in production,
1 + σ > 1. The elasticity of output with respect to the endogenously chosen N depends
on the production function of intermediates. Evaluated at the optimum, the elasticity
becomes 1− κσ. I impose κσ < 1 to ensure a positive choice of N10.
A simple decomposition of (1.1) provides an intuition of how technology and interme-
diate inputs interact in the production process. Nκ represents the contribution of the
level of technology to the production of output where a higher κ increases the efficiency
8Ni is a measure of the number of different inputs used in production. In Acemoglu et al. (2007), it
accounts for the variety of intermediate suppliers and represents a measure of technology that augments
production. In Felbermayr and Jung (2011), higher input diversity implies a better fit of inputs in
production.
9Proposition 1.5 provides a condition for Ni ≤ µ. Note also that the assumption of an upper limit to
technology, 0 µ <∞, is necessary to ensure that Cobb-Douglas exponents in (1.2) are in [0, 1].
10According to Felbermayr and Jung (2011), standard CES functions as in Melitz (2003) and Krugman
(1980) implicitly assume κσ = 1 while Ardelean (2007) shows that 0 < κσ < 1. In my model, ∂Y∂N ((A1.4)
in Appendix 1.7.3) implies that the elasticity of Y with respect to N depends on the production function
of xi,j . Evaluated at the optimum, the elasticity equals 1− κσ. An increase in κ dampens the elasticity
at the profit maximizing level of technology. The restriction κσ < 1 ensures a positive elasticity of Y
with respect to N at the optimum. Thus, output reacts less to a change in the level of technology than
in Acemoglu et al. (2007)’s set-up as intermediates are produced heterogeneously. See Appendix 1.7.1 for
a brief review of Acemoglu et al. (2007)’s optimal technology choice and how it differs from mine.
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of technology in the production process. N accounts for the number of different inter-
mediates.
(
1
N
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
constitutes an average quantity of intermediate inputs that
are weighted by their degree of substitutability and results from netting the number and
technology components.
Each intermediate input j ∈ [0, N ] is produced according to a generalized Cobb-Douglas
function
xj(Lj, Hj) := zjL
1− j
µ
j H
j
µ
j (1.2)
where zj ≡
(
j
µ
)− j
µ (1− j
µ
)−(1−
j
µ
), Hj is the input quantity of high-skilled and Lj that of low-
skilled labor. Total employment in each firm is given by L ≡ ∫N0 Ljdj and H ≡ ∫N0 Hjdj.
Given (1.2), I derive in Appendix 1.7.2 minimum unit costs of producing one unit of j,
kj = wLw¯
j
µ , (1.3)
where w¯ ≡ wH
wL
is the wage gap between high- and low-skilled labor. The formulation
of the Cobb-Douglas production function in (1.2) is inspired by Antras (2005). The
modification zj corrects for the fact that standard Cobb-Douglas functions imply a change
in productivity as j varies even if both inputs were equally expensive11. I adopt (1.2) to
obviate these distortions in intermediate inputs’ productivities.
The production function of an intermediate (1.2) imposes also a plausible relation between
the productivity of skills and technology. In particular, Lj (Hj) is relatively less (more)
productive in producing intermediate j′ as it is in producing intermediate input j for
j′ > j12. As a consequence, a production process with a higher level of technology
requires the use of increasingly high-skill intensive intermediate inputs. Put differently,
the absolute technical rate of substitution |TRS(Hj, Lj)| = | dLjdHj | =
∂xj
∂Hj
/ ∂xj
∂Lj
is increasing
in j:
∂|TRS(Hj, Lj)|
∂j
=
∂
(
∂xj
∂Hj
/ ∂xj
∂Lj
)
∂j
= Lj
Hj
1
µ
(1− j
µ
)2
> 0.
11Productivity is measured by the inverse of minimum unit costs. In general equilibrium, high-
skilled wages are always greater than low-skilled wages since production-augmenting technology is skill-
complementary.
12Similar to Feenstra and Hanson (1997), intermediate inputs are arranged such that for higher j’s,
production is more high-skill intensive.
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1.2.2 The Firm’s Problem
Each firm maximizes its profit given wages (wH , wL) and market size (A),
Π
(
N, {Lj}N0 , {Hj}N0
)
= A1−βY β − C(Y ) = A1−βY (H,L)β −
∫ N
0
[wHHj + wLLj] dj,
where A1−βY β = pY is a firm’s revenue derived from household demand of each firm’s
final good in a standard monopolistic competition framework. Household demand is given
by (1.17) for domestic firms in autarky and by (1.24) for domestic firms and (1.25) for
multinationals in open economy. Note that I do not distinguish between multinational
and domestic firms in the firm-level analysis, except if explicitly stated. The measure
of market size, A, and wages are endogenously determined in general equilibrium and β
determines the elasticity of demand, 1/(1− β). C(Y ) are the production costs of Y that
consist exclusively of expenditures for high- and low-skilled labor.
Profit maximization requires the firm to choose the optimal quantities of Hj and Lj within
the production of each intermediate. This implies labor costs for each intermediate input
of wHHj + wLLj = kjxj. The specification of intermediate inputs’ production function
replaces general minimum unit costs kj by the specific unit costs wLw¯
j
µ (1.3) in a later
step. Applying the concept of minimum unit costs, the firm’s problem13 becomes
max
N,{xj}N0
Π
(
N, {xj}N0
)
= max
N,{xj}N0
{
A1−βY (N, {xj}N0 )β −
∫ N
0
kjxjdj
}
. (1.4)
1.3 Technology in Production
1.3.1 Optimal Technology Choice
General solution
Each firm maximizes its profit (1.4) given minimum unit costs and market size. I impose
(∂kj)/(∂j) > 0 for a finite choice of technology level N14. The first order maximization
13The constraint N ≤ µ is not considered at this stage, but it is shown in Proposition 1.5 that there
exist restrictions on parameters that ensure N ≤ µ.
14(∂kj)/(∂j) > 0 results from the production function of tasks.
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conditions determine simultaneously the optimal choice of technology 15 and the optimal
quantity of intermediate inputs:
N : κ =
(
N
∂K¯N
∂N
)
/K¯N︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡εK¯N
, (1.5)
xj ∀j ∈ [0, N ] : xj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N k
−1−σ
j . (1.6)
The derivation of first order conditions is delegated to Appendix 1.7.3. The elasticity εK¯N
captures the change in average unit costs K¯N when the level of technology increases. More
precisely, K¯N ≡
[
1
N
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj
]− 1
σ are the costs to produce the average intermediate input(
1
N
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
. Aggregation of the optimal xj given in (1.6) (see Appendix 1.7.3)
shows that NK¯N
(
1
N
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
= C(Y ), i.e. the number of different intermediates
times the average unit costs times the average quantity of intermediates equals total
production costs. In optimum, the level of technology in production (1.5) is given by
a trade-off between the degree of gains from technology (κ) and the elasticity of costs
implied by the level of technology N (εK¯N ). Assume e.g. that a firm is endowed with a
high technology type. As the latter implies that technology is very productive the firm
will choose a high level of N in production. This, in turn, increases the elasticity of
average unit costs (see Appendix 1.7.4) such that (1.5) holds.
Optimal choices of the level of technology in production and the quantities of intermediate
inputs results in the firm’s optimal output (see Appendix 1.7.3),
Y = β
1
1−βAN
κ
1−β K¯
− 11−β
N . (1.7)
It depends directly and indirectly (through K¯N) on the level of technology and, in com-
bination with household demand (Y = Ap
1
β−1 ), implies a firm’s price of the final good,
p = K¯N
Nκβ
. (1.8)
Note that the price is independent of output as neither N nor K¯N depend on output.
15Note that the implicit equation that determines N can be written as K¯N = kN (1− κσ)
1
σ .
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Furthermore, as in a standard monopolistic framework, the price is determined as marginal
costs over β. Total production costs, evaluated at the optimum, can be expressed in terms
of output as C(Y ) = Y K¯N
Nκ
= βpY .
Solution given Cobb-Douglas production of intermediate inputs
The production function of intermediates in (1.2) allows a more detailed understanding
of how gains from technology interact with the (in general equilibrium endogenous) wage
gap in affecting a firm’s choice of technology in production. For the following firm-level
analysis that uses Cobb-Douglas production of intermediates, I impose eκµ > w¯ > e
2κ
1−κσ 16
to ensure an endogenous choice of technology within (1, µ]. As e
2κ
1−κσ > eκβ, w¯ > e
2κ
1−κσ
implies also positive high- and low-skilled firm-level labor demands.
In particular, minimum unit costs to produce intermediate input j are kj = wLw¯
j
µ , allow-
ing to rewrite average unit costs into K¯N = wL
(
1
N
∫N
0 w¯
−σ j
µdj
)− 1
σ
= wL
(
w¯
−σNµ −1
N
µ
(−σ) ln w¯
)− 1
σ
.
Applying the latter in combination with minimum unit costs of the marginal intermedi-
ate, kN = wLw¯
N
µ , in (1.5), the optimal choice of N is obtained as an implicit function of
the wage gap17:
κ = 1
σ
−
N
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
N
µ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εK¯N
. (1.9)
The technology type as well as the elasticity of substitution between intermediates impact
the chosen level of technology. In contrast, the optimal N is independent of the size of the
market (A) and of the degree of “market competition” as measured by the elasticity of
substitution between different products (β). Furthermore, as technology is proportionally
chosen to the upper bound of the interval [0, µ], the following analysis does not contain
comparative static with respect to µ. Note that although technology is in essence a
function of the skill premium, w¯, I use for convenience N instead of N(w¯) throughout
this study.
An intuition for the optimal technology choice in (1.9) is given in Figure 1.1 by simulating
16Note that eκµ > w¯ can be easily ensured in general equilibrium since µ is chosen arbitrarily. Fur-
thermore, w¯ > e 2κ1−κσ holds in general equilibrium for defined technology choices, i.e. for N ∈ (1, µ]. See
Proposition 1.5 for autarky and Lemma 1.6 for open economy.
17(1.9) can be rewritten as w¯N
σ
µ − 1 = N
σ
µ ln w¯
1−κσ which reveals to be more convenient in calculations.
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the right hand side of (1.9). For this purpose, εK¯N is computed explicitly for an array of
technology levels where I consider two different skill premia, w¯I = 1.6 and w¯II = 1.9, and
a constant inter-intermediate input elasticity of σ = 118. The intersection of εK¯N (w¯) with
Figure 1.1: Optimal Technology Choice
( )1.0,* =κIIwN ( )2,0,* =κIIwN ( )2.0,* =κIwN
( )w
NK
ε
κ
( )IK wNε
( )IIK wNε
N
Optimal technology choices for two different skill premia. The graphs in red depict the κ’s while the
graphs in blue represent the εK¯N ’s.
a firm’s technology type, κ, marks a firm’s optimal technology choice, which is depicted in
Figure 1.1 as N∗(w¯, κ)19. In the following, I first establish the uniqueness of endogenous
level of technology in production and analyze in a second step optimal firm behavior.
Lemma 1.1 Assume N ≤ µ. Then, there exists a unique optimal level of technology.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. The assumption N ≤ µ holds under the condition
of Lemma 1.2 in the firm-level analysis and is extended to the general equilibrium in
Proposition 1.5. Given the type of technological gains in production (κ) and the elasticity
of substitution between intermediates (σ), the wage gap uniquely determines the level of
technology in production.
18All simulations within this dissertation are done with Wolfram Mathematica, Version 8.0.
19Note that Acemoglu et al. (2007) compute implicit values of κ = 0.135 and κ = 0.25 for the United
States.
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Lemma 1.2 The optimal level of technology in production, given w¯, can be approximated
from (1.9) by
N ≈ 2κµ(1− κσ) ln w¯ . (1.10)
Then, given that w¯ > e
2κ
1−κσ a firm chooses optimally N ∈ [0, µ]. Furthermore, the optimal
level of technology (N) is bigger than one which implies N ∈ (1, µ].
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. The approximated level of technology in production
exhibits qualitatively the properties of the exact, though implicitly given, solution in (1.9).
A skill premium above the threshold e
2κ
1−κσ makes technology adoption so costly that a
firm would never choose N > µ. The second property stems from the assumption eκµ > w¯
and ensures that firms with a higher technology type choose a higher level of technology
in production and are more productive. The following proposition states the two main
comparative statics results of the endogenous level of technology in production.
Proposition 1.1 A larger skill premium decreases the level of technology: dN
dw¯
= − N
w¯ ln w¯ <
0. Furthermore, a higher technology type (κ) increases the level of technology: dN
dκ
=
N
(1−κσ)(Nµ ln w¯−κ)
> 0.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. Relative costs of higher-j to lower-j intermediate
inputs have a crucial impact on a firm’s choice of the level of technology: An increase
in the latter requires to add more skill intensive intermediates which becomes profitable
when the skill premium decreases. In contrast, the elasticity of average unit costs, εK¯N ,
increases in the wage gap (see Appendix 1.7.4) such that very skill intensive intermediates
have to be dropped when the skill premium increases. Retrenching the most skill inten-
sive intermediates however dampens automatically the technology level. From a technical
point of view, the choice of N has to be lowered to bring εK¯N (see Appendix 1.7.4) back to
the equilibrium level in (1.9). This is illustrated in Figure 1.1 where the elasticity of aver-
age unit cost intersects κ at a lower optimal technology level when w¯I rises to w¯II which
implies that the optimal choice becomes N∗
(
wII , κ = 0.2
)
instead of N∗
(
wI , κ = 0.2
)
.
In my model, endogenous technology choice allows firms to react more decisively to a
wage gap increase than without the capability of a technology downgrade. In the case of
an exogenously given level of technology in production, merely the relative employment
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of xj′ to xj,
xj′
xj
= w¯(j−j′)
1+σ
µ where j′ > j, can be optimally adjusted. In the proof of
Proposition 1.1, it is shown that xj′
xj
decreases in the wage gap. A rise in the skill premium
would involve a mere shift in the quantities of intermediate inputs from more to less high-
skilled intensive ones, but would not decrease the number of intermediates (i.e. the level
of technology).
An important factor of the optimal technology choice is the scope for technology in pro-
duction, κ. Higher κ’s imply larger gains from technology such that firms producing with
a higher κ choose greater levels of technology in production. Furthermore, the elasticity of
average unit costs with respect to N is independent of κ. Assume a firm is endowed with
κ = 0.2 instead of κ = 0.1. In Figure 1.1, the (unaltered) graph of εK¯N would intersect
κ = 0.2 at N∗
(
wII , κ = 0.2
)
instead of N∗
(
wII , κ = 0.1
)
(see Figure 1.1), implying a
greater optimal technology level. The firm would add more skill intensive intermediate
inputs as the greater scope for technology compensates for the costs incurred by more
sophisticated technologies.
1.3.2 Optimal High- to Low-skilled Production Labor Demand
Essentially, the production process is based on the employment of high- and low-skilled
labor. The adoption of higher levels of technology in production requires the use of
relatively more high-skilled labor. In particular, production labor demands20 for each
intermediate input, production labor demands in each firm as well as relative high- to
low-skilled production labor demands are derived in Appendix 1.7.5. Production labor
demands for each intermediate input j are
Hj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L w¯
− j
µ
σ−1 j
µ
,
Lj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L w¯
− j
µ
σ
(
1− j
µ
)
.
20Production labor demand is the labor used in the production of the final good, after having incurred
labor costs of market entry.
20
Do Multinationals Constrain Local Firms’ Technology Adoption?
Aggregation over production labor demands of all intermediates within the firm results in
H = βAp
−β
1−βw−1H
κ
ln w¯ , (1.11)
L = βAp−
β
1−βw−1L
ln w¯ − κ
ln w¯ . (1.12)
Aggregated relative production labor demands21 within the firm read as
H
L
= 1
w¯
κ
ln w¯ − κ (1.13)
and depend on the wage gap (w¯) and the type of technology (κ). While the endogenous
level of technology has no direct effect on relative production labor demands, w¯ and κ
jointly determine technology and relative factor demands. Consequently, the complemen-
tary nature of technology and skills has to be understood as a positive correlation through
common determinants.
Proposition 1.2 Relative production labor demands (H
L
) are higher for firms with a
greater scope for technology in production. Furthermore, an increase in the skill premium
lowers relative production labor demands.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. A higher technology type implies a more efficient use
of technology in production. Naturally, a firm that is endowed with a higher κ chooses a
higher level of technology. The adoption of more sophisticated production techniques re-
quires to add more high-skill intensive intermediate inputs. As a consequence, aggregated
relative production demand of high-skilled labor is higher for firms of higher technology
types.
An increase in the skill premium raises the implied labor cost of the marginal intermediates
above their implied productivity gains in technology terms. They are dropped and, as
a consequence, the technology level and relative skill demands decrease. Simultaneously,
high-skilled labor is substituted for low-skilled labor in the production of each intermediate
input, decreasing in addition the aggregated relative skill demand. Furthermore, the
21Total relative labor demands within the firm are HL =
1
w¯
κ
ln w¯
β −κ
. The assumption w¯ > eκβ ensures
that the latter relation is positive and implies in addition a positive relation in (1.13).
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relative employment of intermediates changes in favor of less high-skilled intensive inputs
as xj′
xj
= w¯(j−j′)
1+σ
µ (j < j′) decreases in w¯. All three effects decrease aggregated relative
production demands of a firm as a reaction to a rise in the skill premium.
1.3.3 Firm-Level Productivities
Productivity is the most important efficiency measure of producing output from inputs.
Here, the use of two inputs, L and H, necessitates the consideration of relative prices.
More precisely, productivity is defined as real output over real costs,
φ ≡ Y
C(Y ) =
Nκ
K¯N
= Nκk−1N (1− κσ)−
1
σ , (1.14)
where the second equation results from using the optimal technology choice (1.5). Remark
that C(Y ) also represents real production costs, as C(Y )/PI = C(Y ) where PI is set to
unity in general equilibrium. Given the Cobb-Douglas production of intermediate inputs,
productivity becomes
φ = N
κ
wLw¯
N
µ
(1− κσ)− 1σ (1.15)
and incorporates, different to the optimal level of technology in production, level effects.
In particular, it decreases in the low-skilled wage. Since the optimal choice of technology
depends on the skill premium and firm characteristics, changes in the latter also affect
productivity.
Proposition 1.3 Productivity (φ) is higher for firms with a higher technology type: ∂φ
∂κ
=
ln (N)φ > 0. An increase in the skill premium decreases productivity: ∂φ
∂w¯
= − κφ
w¯ ln w¯ < 0.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. As firms with a higher technology type use a
higher level of technology in the production process, they profit more from the technology
component in production (Nκ). This increases overall production and results in a higher
productivity. Larger wage gaps increase technology adoption costs and lead to lower
choices of technology. As a consequence, the technology component in production shrinks
and productivity decreases. Since a firm’s use of technology increases in its scope for
technology in production, the downgrade of production techniques is stronger for greater
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levels of κ.
Assume there are two types of firms that differ with respect to the scope for technology
in production. Consider in particular multinational and domestic firms which anticipates
the analysis of the open economy. There, multinational firms are endowed with κm, while
domestic firms have a scope for technology of κd, where I impose κm > κd. Furthermore,
variables of multinationals are denoted by m and those of domestic firms by d. Then, the
relative difference in their productivities is calculated as
φ∆ ≡ φm
φd
= N
κm
m
Nκdd
w¯−
Nm−Nd
µ
( 1− κdσ
1− κmσ
) 1
σ
. (1.16)
Note that φ∆ does not depend on wage levels, but on the skill premium, the technology
types, and the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs.
Lemma 1.3 The productivity difference between multinational and domestic firms de-
creases in the skill premium: ∂φ∆
∂w¯
= −φ∆ κm−κdw¯ ln w¯ < 0.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.6. Since κm > κd, multinational firms employ relatively
more high-skilled labor to implement higher technology levels. As a consequence, they
downgrade technology stronger following a wage gap increase, which implies that they lose
some of their advantage in technology and productivity. Moreover, the extend to which
the productivity gap decreases is proportional to the difference in the respective scopes
for technology in production. The latter determine in fact the difference in production
techniques where relative downgrades of multinational to domestic firms are the greater
the more skill-intensive the production process of multinationals is. In other words, a
higher technological advantage involves a production structure of multinationals that relies
relatively more on the more expensive factor, i.e. high-skilled labor. As a consequence, the
rise in the relative renumeration of skilled workers has more severe effects on multinational
than on domestic firms.
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1.4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
Firms’ choices of the level of technology in production and the related quantities of in-
termediate inputs are embedded in an autarkic Dixit-Stiglitz economy. A representative
household has a taste for variety implied by the utility function
uc =
(∫ Mc,d
0
Y βc,d,idi
) 1
β
, 0 < β < 1,
and supplies low- and high-skilled labor (Ls, Hs) inelastically. c denotes variables in
closed economy. There exists a continuum of final goods Yc,d,i, with i ∈ [0,Mc,d], that are
supplied by a (symmetric) mass Mc,d of domestic firms of technology type κd. 11−β > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between final goods. The above preferences imply the
demand function
Yc,d,i =
(
pc,d,i
PI
)− 11−β Ac
Pc,I
(1.17)
where pc,d,i is the price of good i, Ac is the aggregate spending level, and Pc,I ≡(∫Mc,d
0 p
− β1−β
c,d,i di
)− 1−β
β
is the price index of final goods. Defining Pc,I as the numeraire
(Pc,I ≡ 1), the implied demand function for each firm, Acp−
1
1−β
c,d,i , in Section 1.2.2 becomes
identical to (1.17). Whenever there is no loss of clarification I abstract from the firm
index i. With optimal firm choices in Section 1.3.1 and market clearing, equilibrium is
defined as:
Definition 1.1 Equilibrium in a closed economy with symmetric firms is given by a set
of prices {pc,d, wc,H , wc,L}, quantities {Yc,d, Hc,d, Lc,d}, and a level of technology Nc,d such
that with free entry of firms consumers choose consumption of each final good optimally,
firms choose output, level of technology and labor inputs optimally, and labor and product
markets clear.
Note that intermediate inputs do not show up directly. They are produced within each
firm with high- and low-skilled labor and are aggregated to firm-specific high- and low-
skilled labor production demands.
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1.4.1 Wages in Closed Economy
There is free entry, but firms have to incur fd units of low-skilled labor to set up pro-
duction. Adding this to the production low-skilled labor demand results in a firm’s total
low-skilled labor demand (Lc,d + fd). The following free entry condition
pc,dYc,d − C(Yc,d)− wc,Lfd = 0 ⇐⇒ (1− β)pc,dYc,d = wc,Lfd (1.18)
fixes the wage level given a firm’s revenue. The latter is derived by multiplying the optimal
price (1.8) by the optimal output (1.7). Using subsequently the optimal technology choice
(1.9) as well as minimal unit costs, kj = wLw¯
j
µ , results in the following revenue function
pc,dYc,d = β
β
1−βAcN
κdβ
1−β
c,d w
β
β−1
c,L w¯
Nc,dβ
µ(β−1)
c (1− κdσ)
β
σ(β−1) . (1.19)
Plugging this expression into the free entry condition (1.18) and using total labor income
(wc,LLs + wc,HHs = Ac) shows that the low-skilled wage
wc,L = βNκdc,dw¯
−Nc,d
µ
c (1− κdσ)− 1σ
(
(1− β)(Ls + w¯cHs)
fd
) 1−β
β
(1.20)
is a function of labor endowments, parameters, and the skill premium. The wage gap is
computed from setting relative labor supply equal to total relative labor demand, Hs
Ls
=
Mc,dHc,d
Mc,d(Lc,d+fd) . Using (1.11) and (1.12), this implies
w¯c
Hs
Ls
= κdln w¯c
β
− κd
. (1.21)
The above equation implicitly and uniquely determines the skill premium. It depends on
the relative scarcity of high-skilled labor
(
Hs
Ls
)
, the elasticity between final goods (β), and
the firms’ scope for technology in production (κd).
Lemma 1.4 There exists a unique skill premium. Furthermore, w¯c > eκdβ.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.7. The proof builds on the properties of the left and
right hand side of (1.21). The existence of an unique skill premium implies that there
25
Do Multinationals Constrain Local Firms’ Technology Adoption?
exists an unique choice of the level of technology in equilibrium, since the wage gap is the
only endogenous variable in the equation of the optimal technology choice (1.9).
Proposition 1.4 The wage gap is lower for higher relative skill endowments (HS
LS
), larger
for higher technology types (κd), and increases in the elasticity of market demand (β).
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.7. A country’s high- and low-skill labor endowments
are supplied to firms that use technology-complementary production processes. The skill
premium represents a measure of the relative scarcity of skills. Holding κ and β constant,
the wage gap increases when the relative supply of high- to low-skilled labor decreases.
This is illustrated in Figure 1.2 where the left and right hand side of (1.21) are simulated
Figure 1.2: Skill Premia in Closed Economy
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Skill premia in closed economy for different skill endowments and technology types. The graphs in red
depict the left hand side of (1.21) while the graphs in blue depict the right hand side of (1.21).
for an array of skill premia. In particular, a fall in the share of skilled workers from 25%
to 15%, i.e. a relative skill supply decrease from
(
Hs
Ls
)I
to
(
Hs
Ls
)II
, implies a rise in the
skill premium from w¯c
(
κm,
(
Hs
Ls
)I)
to w¯c
(
κm,
(
Hs
Ls
)II)22. Firms with a technologically
22Note that this section analyzes autarky. κm and κd are used to depict a closed economy with a high
and low technology type, respectively. In open economy analysis, I refer to these cases.
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more efficient production function (i.e. a higher κ) choose a higher level of technology
and employ more skill intensive intermediate inputs. This is best illustrated by comparing
two economies with equal skill endowments, but with firms of different technology types.
One is populated by domestic firms such that all firms are endowed with κd = 0.16 while
the other consists of multinationals with κm = 0.24. As a consequence, the skill premium
in an economy populated exclusively by domestic firms, w¯c
(
κd,
(
Hs
Ls
)I)
, is well below the
wage gap of an economy populated exclusively by multinational firms, w¯c
(
κm,
(
Hs
Ls
)I)
(see Figure 1.2). As technology is skill-complementary, multinationals demand relatively
more high-skilled labor what is settled in equilibrium by a higher wage gap.
Furthermore, higher technology types imply a greater productivity, changing the free
entry condition (1.18). For a detailed analysis of how parameters effect free entry in
general and equilibrium firm numbers in particular, (1.18) is plugged into the equality of
household income and total expenditures (wc,LLs + wc,HHs = Mc,dpc,dYc,d). This results
in the number of firms
Mc,d =
1− β
fd
(Ls + w¯cHs), (1.22)
which clearly increases in the skill premium. Since a larger technology type rises the
wage gap, a greater scope for technology in production leads to an increase in the number
of firms. Intuitively, an increase in the efficiency of technology in production implies
higher expected profits. More firms enter the market while simultaneously the relative
renumeration of high-skilled workers increases.
Whereas a greater market elasticity has no effect on relative production labor demands,
it increases total relative labor demands and, consequently, the skill premium. The latter,
indirect effect, rises the number of firms while the direct effect of β in (1.22) decreases
the equilibrium number of firms. However, the total impact on the number of firms
is negative23 as a higher market elasticity increases competition among firms, reduces
mark-ups and decrease firms’ profits.
23∂Mc,d/∂β = 1/fd[−Ls − w¯cHs(1− β(1− β) ln w¯cw¯c−κdβ+1 )] < 0 as β(1− β) ln w¯c + κdβ < w¯c + 1.
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1.4.2 Technology Levels in Closed Economy
The relative endowment of high-skilled labor determines (given κd, β) the skill premium
that, in turn, is crucial for the decision on the optimal technology level. Very low skill
premia that arise from an abundant supply of high-skilled labor may induce firms to choose
levels of technology that are not defined (i.e. Nc,d > µ). The explicit approximation of
the implicitly given level of technology (1.10) leads to the determination of a threshold
level of relative skill supply which ensures optimal technology choices within Nc,d ∈ (1, µ].
Proposition 1.5 There exists an approximated threshold
Hs
Ls
≤ exp
( −2κd
1− κdσ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
1− κdσ
2
β
− 1 + κdσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
. (1.23)
such that firms optimally choose Nc,d ∈ [0, µ]. Furthermore, Nc,d > 1 and Nc,d ∈ (1, µ].
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.7. The optimal level of technology in production,
given the skill premium, can be approximated from (1.9) by (1.10). Then, given the wage
gap from equation (1.21), an approximated threshold to the relative supply of skills is
derived that restrains firms’ choices to the admitted interval. As a consequence, a relative
skill endowment smaller than or equal to the threshold ensures an optimal choice of Nc,d
within [0, µ]. Clearly, the scarcer high-skilled labor is the larger may be the right hand
side of (1.23) such that the resulting skill premium still delivers a well defined level of
technology.
1.5 Open Economy Equilibrium
Closed economies mirror a very rare case among world’s economies. Most countries are, to
different extends, open to the entry of multinational firms. Drawing on their international
expertise, their use of technology in production is more efficient than that of domestic
firms, i.e. κm > κd24. However, MNEs are less familiar with local conditions and may
24Since firm-level productivity increases in κ, this assumption implies the empirical observation that
MNEs are more productive than domestic firms. See e.g. Doms and Jensen (1998), Dimelis and Louri
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have to overcome more bureaucratic and other hurdles to get production units installed
and running. This is summarized in higher market entry costs of MNEs25, fm > fd, which
have to be payed in units of low-skilled labor.
Consider a closed economy that decides to open its market to FDI of multinational firms.
A MNE will enter the economy when expected returns from the foreign investment,
pic,m(w¯c) = pc,m(w¯c)Yc,m(w¯c) − wc,Lfm ≥ 0, are positive. Note that wages in the decision
problem are autarkic wages since at this stage no MNE has entered yet. In addition, the
market entry decision of domestic firms is considered by relating their free entry condition
(1.18) to pic,m(w¯c) ≥ 0. This implies that φ
β
1−β
∆ (w¯c) ≥ fmfd : Market entry of multinationals
becomes profitable when the (β weighted) productivity advantage of multinational firms
at least equals their fixed costs disadvantage. As a consequence, lowering the relative
fixed costs of foreign investments may involve, in my model, the transition from autarky
to open economy.
Note that pre-optimization production capabilities of multinational and domestic firms
differ only with respect to the technology type. Their optimal choices imply that multina-
tionals produce with a higher level of technology than domestic firms and employ relatively
more high-skilled labor in production. The consequence of labor demand differences is
that the entry of MNEs will increase the skill premium and will lower in this way the
productivity advantage (see Lemma 1.3) up to the point where the (β weighted) produc-
tivity head start equals relative fixed costs, φ
β
1−β
∆ (w¯o) = fmfd . Here, the wage gap in open
economy replaces the autarkic skill premium, where o denotes open economy variables26.
Multinational and domestic firms’ choices of the level of technology and the related quan-
tities of intermediate inputs are embedded in a Dixit-Stiglitz economy. A representative
household has a taste for variety implied by the utility function
uo =
(∫ Mo,d
0
Y βo,d,idi+
∫ Mo,m
0
Y βo,m,hdh
) 1
β
,
(2002), Proença et al. (2002), Torlak (2004).
25See e.g. Aghion et al. (2009) for the impact of different levels of foreign firms’ entry costs.
26Note further that while the functional form of Nk,d (k ∈ {c, o}) in (1.9) does not change from autarky
to open economy, the implicit wage gaps (w¯c from (1.21) and w¯o from (1.29)) that determine technology
choices given parameters differ substantially.
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and supplies low- and high-skilled labor (Ls, Hs) inelastically. Note that uo implies that
the household does not discriminate between final goods produced by MNEs or domestic
firms27. Final goods Yo,d,i with i ∈ [0,Mo,d] are supplied by a mass Mo,d of domestic firms
while a mass Mo,m of MNEs supplies final goods Yo,m,h, with h ∈ [0,Mo,m]. The above
preferences imply the demand functions of the household,
Yo,d,i =
(
po,d,i
PI
)− 11−β Ao
Po,I
, (1.24)
Yo,m,h =
(
po,m,h
PI
)− 11−β Ao
Po,I
, (1.25)
where po,d,i (po,m,h) is the price of good i (h), Ao is the aggregate spending level in open
economy, and Po,I ≡
(∫Mo,d
0 p
− β1−β
o,d,i di+
∫Mo,m
0 p
− β1−β
o,m,h dh
)− 1−β
β
is the price index of final
goods. Defining Po,I as the numeraire (Po,I ≡ 1), the implied demand function for each
i (h) firm, Aop
− 11−β
o,d,i
(
Aop
− 11−β
o,m,h
)
, in Section 1.2.2 becomes identical to (1.24)
(
(1.25)
)
.
Whenever there is no loss of clarification I will abstract from firm indices i and h in the
following . With optimal firm choices in Section 1.3.1 and market clearing, equilibrium is
defined as:
Definition 1.2 Equilibrium in an open economy with symmetry among domestic and
symmetry among multinational firms is given by a set of prices {po,d, po,m, wo,H , wo,L},
quantities {Yo,d, Yo,m, Ho,d, Ho,m, Lo,d, Lo,m}, and levels of technology {No,d, No,m} such that
with free entry of domestic and multinational firms consumers choose consumption of each
final good optimally, firms choose outputs, levels of technology, and labor inputs optimally,
while labor and product markets clear.
1.5.1 Wages and Technologies with a Fixed Number of MNEs
First, I assume that a fixed number of multinational firms (Mo,m) enters the economy while
domestic firms’ entry is endogenous. This assumption will be relaxed subsequently by
endogenizing the entry of MNEs. Nevertheless, the main result of this analysis (stated in
27This is implied by the CES. However, Yo,d,i will be smaller than Yo,m,h since MNEs have higher
productivities, involving lower prices. In particular, abstracting from indices, p = 1βφ from (1.8.) and
(1.14)
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Proposition 1.6) holds irrespective of exogenous or endogenous entry as long as parameters
and endowments imply the endogenous entry of both type of firms.
Since the number of multinational firms is fixed, the skill premium is computed analog to
the closed economy case by equating relative labor supply with relative labor demand,
Hs
Ls
= Mo,dHo,d +Mo,mHo,m
Mo,d(Lo,d + fd) +Mo,m(Lo,m + fm)
. (1.26)
Domestic firms may freely enter. However, in the case of an enormous technology
advantage of multinationals or a great given number of MNEs in the economy, they
may also decide to stay out of the market. Using firm-level revenues (1.19), φ∆,
and total labor renumeration (Ao = wo,LLs + wo,HHs) in product market clearing
(Ao = Mo,dpo,dYo,d +Mo,mpo,mYo,m) results in the number of domestic firms,
Mo,d =
(1− β)
fd
(Ls + w¯oHs)−Mo,mφ
β
1−β
∆ . (1.27)
This calls in mind the number of domestic firms in closed economy (1.22), reduced by
the given number of MNEs. Moreover, the latter is weighted by multinational firms’
productivity advantage which is, in turn, weighted by the market elasticity (β). Applying
firm-level high- and low-skilled labor demands ((1.11), (1.12)), together with the number
of domestic firms (1.27), to the relation of labor supply and demand (1.26) results in
w¯o
Hs
Ls
=
(Ls + w¯oHs)κd 1−βfd + (κm − κd)φ
β
1−β
∆ Mo,m(
ln (w¯o)
β
− κd
)
(Ls + w¯oHs) 1−βfd −
(
(κm − κd)φ
β
1−β
∆ +
(
φ
β
1−β
∆ − fmfd
)
1−β
β
ln (w¯o)
)
Mo,m
.
(1.28)
The closed economy skill premium (1.21) can be easily obtained by setting Mo,m = 0.
When domestic firms are crowded out completely by multinationals, i.e. if (1.27) implies
Mo,d = 0, a skill premium equation similar to the autarkic case emerges. However,
the symmetric technology type will be κm instead of κd. When multinationals have
completely replaced domestic firms the skill premium is higher than in autarky, since
Proposition 1.4 implies a higher wage gap for greater scopes for technology in production.
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Proposition 1.6 Assume an open economy populated by positive numbers of multina-
tional and domestic firms such that both types of firms have an incentive to enter. Then,
the wage gap in open economy is higher than in closed economy. Moreover, domestic firms’
levels of technology in production and their productivities are lower than in autarky.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.8. The intuition is straightforward. Multinational
and domestic firms expect positive returns from market entry. However, the entry of
MNEs is sufficient for an increase in the wage gap. In particular, multinationals demand
relatively more high-skilled labor than domestic firms which implies a rise in aggregated
relative skilled labor demand. As a consequence, the skill premium increases in equilibrium
since high- and low-skilled labor markets have to be cleared simultaneously. The impact
on domestic firms works via the labor market channel: The rise in the skill premium
decreases the technology choice of domestic firms since the employment of technology-
complementary high-skilled labor becomes relatively more expensive.
1.5.2 Wages and Technologies with Free Entry
The restrictive assumption of a fixed number of MNEs is relaxed in the following. In
particular, zero profit conditions of multinational and domestic firms endogenize firm
numbers. Moreover, my focus is on the comparison of different equilibria while I abstract
from transitional dynamics. Remark that free entry does not change the main result of
my paper given in Proposition 1.6, as the latter is derived from equation (1.28) which still
holds for endogenous firm numbers, Mo,m and Mo,d.
However, in contrast to the equilibrium with a given number of MNEs (or to the closed
economy equilibrium with free entry), the skill premium is not determined by relative
total labor demands and supply. Rather, it is derived from free entry conditions of
multinational (po,mYo,m = wo,Lfm1−β ) and domestic firms (po,dYo,d =
wo,Lfd
1−β ) in combination
with respective revenues of firms (apply (1.19) to m- and d-firms):
φ
β
1−β
∆ (w¯o) =
fm
fd
. (1.29)
As described in the beginning of Section 1.5, the entry of multinationals drives up the skill
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premium and, consequently, decreases the productivity advantage up to the point where
foreign firms are indifferent with respect to entry. In equilibrium, the wage gap becomes
a function of technology types (κm, κd), market elasticity (β), inter-input elasticity (σ),
and relative fixed cost
(
fm
fd
)
since φ∆ ≡ φmφd =
Nκmm
N
κd
d
w¯−
Nm−Nd
µ
(
1−κdσ
1−κmσ
) 1
σ . Moreover, these
parameters also determine whether both types of firms enter the market which is analyzed
in Section 1.5.3.
Note that an equilibrium in open economy where both types of firms coexist involves that
relative skill supplies have no implications for the skill premium. Rather, foreign and
domestic firms differ in their output reactions towards an increase in skill supply. More
precisely, firms’ output elasticities are28
∂Yo,m
∂Hs
Hs
Yo,m
= ∂Yo,d
∂Hs
Hs
Yo,d
. (1.30)
An increase in the high-skill endowment (Hs) raises firm-level outputs such that the
elasticities of output with respect to Hs equalize. However, multinationals produce more
than domestic firms, i.e. (Yo,m > Yo,d) as they are more productive (φ∆ > 1). A direct
implication is that they profit relatively more from an increase in Hs than domestic firms(
∂Yo,m
∂Hs
>
∂Yo,d
∂Hs
)
since their higher degree of gains from technology in production involves
that they use Hs more efficiently29.
Proposition 1.7 There exists a unique skill premium if φ∆(χ)
β
1−β ≥ fm
fd
. The skill pre-
mium increases in the technology type of multinationals (κm) and decreases in the tech-
nology type of domestic firms (κd) as well as in relative fixed costs (fmfd ).
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.8 30. The open economy skill premium, provided the
coexistence of MNEs and domestic firms, is larger than the autarkic wage gap but smaller
28Since in an open economy with MNEs and domestic firms dw¯/dHs = 0, it holds, using (1.7), that
∂Yo,i/∂H
s = (Yo,i/A)(∂A/∂Hs) for i ∈ {m, d}.
29This calls in mind the well known Rybczynski Theorem: Relative factor prices (here w¯) are stable but
firms that use the factor that increases more intensively (multinationals) produce proportionally more,
while the others (domestic firms) produce proportionally less. Furthermore, Mo,d (see (1.32)) increases
in Ls and decreases in Hs while for Mo,m (see (1.31)) the opposite holds. Intuitively, firms that use a
factor more intensively increase in numbers if the respective endowment grows and decrease in numbers
if it shrinks.
30Note that χ ≡ exp
[
β
2
((
1
β − κd
)2
+ 4κdβ
(
1 + LsHs
)) 12 − 12 + κdβ2
]
.
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than the skill premium implied by the exclusive entry of MNEs. An approximation of
the skill premium in closed economy provides thus a lower bound to all skill premia
(χ) which is given by β, κd, Hs, and Ls. Since φ∆(w¯)
β
1−β is strictly decreasing in w¯,
a sufficient condition that φ∆(w¯)
β
1−β intersects fm
fd
exactly once is that φ∆(χ)
β
1−β ≥ fm
fd
holds. Moreover, the existence of an unique skill premium makes sure that the technology
choices of firms exist and are unique.
Figure 1.3: Skill Premia in Open Economy
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Skill premia in open economy for different degrees of gains from technology in production of MNEs.
The black line depicts relative market entry costs and the green graphs denote (weighted) productivity
gaps for different κm’s.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the existence of a unique skill premium which is located at the in-
tersection of the adjusted productivity gap
(
φ∆(w¯)
β
1−β
)
and relative fixed costs
(
fm
fd
)
31.
Whereas the graph of the former is convex and downward sloping, the graph of the latter
is a parallel to the abscissa. Differences in the technology type of multinationals trans-
late into different adjusted productivity gaps which intersect relative fixed costs at the
31If not otherwise stated simulations in open economy are carried out with κm = 0.24, κd = 0.16,
σ = 1, µ = 100, Hs = 15, Ls = 85, fd = 1, fm = 2.5, and β = 0.75. Note that the value of β is within
the standard range of estimates, as e.g. in Broda et al. (2006). Shares of high- and low-skilled labor
endowments of 15%, respectively 85% apply to a range of countries.
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equilibrium value of the skill premium. A higher κm widens the spread in chosen tech-
nology levels between MNEs and domestic firms such that the graph of φ
β
1−β
∆ is shifted
upwards. Given a constant fm
fd
, the equilibrium level of the wage gap is shifted to the
right. Intuitively, a higher technology type of multinationals involves a greater advantage
in technology and productivity of MNEs. Their shares in the production of output and the
demand of labor increase, driving up the aggregated relative demand of high-skilled labor
and, consequently, the skill premium. In Figure 1.3, this is illustrated by the upward shift
of the (weighted) productivity gap which results in an increase of the equilibrium wage
gap from e.g. w¯o(κm = 0.23) to w¯o(κm = 0.24). While aggregated relative skill demands
have no direct impact on the wage gap, κm and κd jointly determine aggregated relative
skill demands and the wage gap. Consequently, the complementary nature of aggregated
relative demands of high-skilled labor and the skill premium has to be understood as
a positive correlation through common determinants. A similar reasoning applies to an
increase in κd’s which narrows the spread of technology types. Domestic firms increase
their shares in the demand of labor and the production of output which diminises ag-
gregated relative skill demand, and drives down the wage gap. Moreover, higher relative
fixed costs (i.e. an upward shift of fm
fd
in Figure 1.3) make market entry less attractive
for multinationals. As a consequence, the share of domestic firms in the market increases.
Since the latter demand relatively less high-skilled labor, the skill premium decreases.
1.5.3 Endogenous Numbers of MNEs and Domestic Firms
Up to this point, I implicitly assume that there exist parameters such that either multina-
tional and domestic firms enter simultaneously or that multinationals, respectively domes-
tic firms, enter exclusively. For a more thorough analysis of firm entry decisions, numbers
of multinational and domestic firms are computed. Moreover, conditions for coexistence
or exclusive entry are derived.
Solving the skill premium equation given the number of MNEs (1.28) for Mo,m and plug-
ging the result in the respective number of domestic firms (1.27) (while using also the
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equation of the equilibrium wage gap (1.29)) provides the number of multinational firms,
Mo,m =
(1− β)(w¯oHs( ln (w¯o)β − κd)− κdLs)
fm(κm − κd) . (1.31)
Moreover, the above expression is applied to the number of domestic firms given MNEs
(1.27) and φ
β
1−β
∆ is substituted by fmfd (1.29), which results in the equilibrium number of
domestic firms
Mo,d =
(1− β)(κmLs − w¯oHs( ln (w¯o)β − κm))
fd(κm − κd) . (1.32)
Lemma 1.5 Assume that multinational and domestic firms enter the market. Then, the
number of domestic firms increases in κd and fmfd ; It decreases in κm and the skill premium.
The number of multinational firms increases in κm and the skill premium; It decreases in
κd and fmfd .
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.8. A domestic firm gains from a higher technology type
in terms of technology and productivity, inducing more domestic firms to enter. Larger
relative fixed costs imply higher market entry costs for multinationals relative to domestic
firms. Less multinationals enter the economy, implying a decrease in the skill premium.
This induces domestic firms to choose higher levels of technology in production, increasing
their productivity. As a consequence, expected profits from market entry rise and more
domestic firms enter the economy. Inversely, a higher κm increases the technology choice
and, thus, the productivity advantage of multinationals. The wage gap is driven up and
less domestic firms enter the market. The direct effect of the wage gap on domestic
firm numbers is also negative, but its interpretation has to be more cautious due to its
endogenous nature. Most changes in parameters effect firm numbers directly and, in
addition, indirectly via an impact on the skill premium.
Similarly, the number of MNEs increases when they are endowed with a higher κm, imply-
ing a greater technological and productivity advantage. Their number however decreases
if their advantage shrinks, e.g. if κd rises. Moreover, higher relative market entry costs
make FDI in the domestic market less attractive for multinational firms. The follow-
ing proposition determines conditions under which multinationals and/or domestic firms
enter the market.
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Proposition 1.8 Holding all other parameters constant, ∀fm
fd
∈
((
fm
fd
)∗
,
(
fm
fd
)∗∗)
where(
fm
fd
)∗
<
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
, domestic firms as well as MNEs enter the market. ∀fm
fd
≤
(
fm
fd
)∗
,
exclusively multinationals and ∀fm
fd
≥
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
, exclusively domestic firms enter. Moreover,(
fm
fd
)∗
is increasing in κm and
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
is decreasing in κd.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.8. The proposition describes the different ranges of
fixed costs that imply either the exclusive entry of multinational or domestic firms or
the simultaneous market entry of both. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4 where three dif-
ferent types of economies are distinguished where the relation of parameters determines
the observed type. Note that since there exists a unique skill premium in each type of
economy, Mo,d, Mo,m, No,d, and No,m are characterized uniquely within each economy.
First, consider the case of fm
fd
≤
(
fm
fd
)∗
. Here, exclusively multinational firms enter since
Figure 1.4: Numbers of Multinational and Domestic Firms
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(
fm
fd
)∗
(0.24) and
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(0.24) are the thresholds between different types of economies for
κm = 0.24 and
(
fm
fd
)∗
(0.235) and
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(0.235) are the thresholds between different types of
economies for κm = 0.235.
their technological advantage far outweighs their disadvantage in relative market entry
costs. Second, if fm
fd
∈
((
fm
fd
)∗
,
(
fm
fd
)∗∗)
, MNEs and domestic firms enter since the ad-
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vantage in technology of the former is, to some extend, balanced by their higher relative
fixed costs. However, the greater the disadvantage in relative market entry costs the less
MNEs and the more domestic firms enter. Of course, numbers of domestic firms decline
as soon as multinationals gain some market share. This can be seen in Figure 1.4 where
Mo,d(κm = 0.24) clearly decreases if, starting from
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(0.24), relative market entry
costs are lowered. Third, ∀fm
fd
≥
(
fm
fd
)∗
MNEs’ fixed cost disadvantage outweighs their
technological advantage and the economy is, as in autarky, exclusively populated by do-
mestic firms. Remark that the number of multinational firms in the first case is lower
than that of domestic firms in the third since κm’s positive impact on the skill premium
is less strong on the number of MNEs than their burden of higher market entry costs (see
firm numbers in an economy populated by one type of firms (1.22)).
The second property of Proposition 1.8 states that if κm, increases market entry becomes
profitable for multinationals for higher values of relative fixed costs. Or, if κd rises,
the autarkic situation prevails for lower relative market entry costs since the technology
disadvantage of domestic firms shrinks. The former case is illustrated in Figure 1.4 where
two different scopes for technology in production of MNEs are considered. The range
of relative market entry costs that implies coexistence of MNEs and domestic firms in
the market,
((
fm
fd
)∗
(0.24),
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(0.24)
)
, shifts to
((
fm
fd
)∗
(0.235),
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(0.235)
)
if the
technology type of multinational firms is decreased from κm = 0.24 to κm = 0.235. Note
that the latter small decrease has a huge impact in this model since even small changes
in the difference of the firms’ scopes for technology in production, κm − κd, involve large
changes in relative productivities and, thus, the skill premium 32. A smaller κm implies a
smaller technology advantage of domestic firms such that domestic firms enter for lower
values of relative fixed costs, i.e.
(
fm
fd
)∗
(0.24) is shifted to
(
fm
fd
)∗
(0.235). Moreover,(
fm
fd
)∗∗
also decreases since lower κm involve that market entry is less profitable for MNEs
for higher relative fixed costs.
32See Figure 1.3 for the impact of different κm’s on the skill premium.
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1.5.4 Skill Premia and Domestic Firms’ Technology Choices in
Closed Versus Open Economy
In Proposition 1.6, it is shown that the entry of MNEs decreases the endogenous tech-
nology level of domestic firms. Moreover, I provide conditions for market entry of multi-
nationals in the above section. Since domestic firms downgrade their technologies as a
reaction to the skill premium increase induced by the entry of multinationals, the spe-
cific determination of skill premia in autarky and open economy deserves more attention.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the determination of the skill premium in three distinct cases: au-
Figure 1.5: Skill Premium in Closed Versus Open Economy
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right hand side, with κd in the case of domestic firms and κm in the case of multinationals.
tarky, open economy with coexistence of MNEs and domestic firms, and open economy
without domestic firms33. In each case, the equilibrium value of the wage gap is given by
33Note that for reasons of presentation, φ
β
1−β
∆ ,
(
fm
fd
)∗
, and
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
are divided by four. Note further
that there exists no continuity of the implicit function of the skill premium when the economy passes
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the intersection of the left and right hand side of the respective implicit wage gap equa-
tion34. Which economy emerges depends in particular on the difference in multinational
and domestic firms’ scope for technology in production and relative market entry costs.
Relative fixed cost above
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
preclude the entry of multinationals and imply the wage
gap w¯o
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
that equals the closed economy skill premium which is determined by the
intersection of w¯Hs
Ls
and κdln w¯
β
−κd (see (1.21)). In this case, domestic firms choose autarkic
technology levels. However, relative fixed costs below
(
fm
fd
)∗
involve that multinationals’
technological advantage outweighs their fixed costs disadvantage such that domestic firms
are completely crowded out. In this case, w¯o
(
fm
fd
)∗
represents the skill premium of an
economy populated exclusively by multinationals which is given by the intersection of
w¯H
s
Ls
and κmln w¯
β
−κm (see (1.21) with κm instead of κd). Here, domestic firms are forced to
downgrade technology to an extend where market entry is no longer profitable. Within
the range of coexistence,
((
fm
fd
)∗
,
(
fm
fd
)∗∗)
, both types of firms enter and an intermediate
wage gap w¯o emerges where w¯o
((
fm
fd
)∗∗)
< w¯o < w¯o
((
fm
fd
)∗)
. This implies that domestic
firms lower their level of technology in production compared to the level in autarky. How-
ever, the skill premium increase is affected by the number of multinationals that enter
the economy since a downward-sloping (β-weighted) relative productivity curve, φ
β
1−β
∆ (w¯),
intersects higher relative market entry costs at lower wag gaps. Moreover, higher relative
fixed costs imply a lower number of MNEs in the market (see Figure 1.5) while a greater
scope for technology in production of MNEs increases their number. As a consequence,
the extent to which domestic firms’ optimal technology choices decrease in open economy
depends crucially on the relation of multinationals’ technological advantage to their fixed
costs disadvantage. This implies, e.g., that within the range of coexistence, lower rela-
tive market entry costs lead to higher skill premia and, consequently, less sophisticated
production techniques of domestic firms.
Furthermore, Figure 1.5 illustrates how a sufficient condition for defined technology
choices (i.e. No,d, No,m ≤ µ) can be derived from extending the condition in autarky
that assures Nc,d ≤ µ (Proposition 1.5) to the open economy equilibrium.
from closed (1.21) to open economy (1.29). In particular, the wage gap equations do not converge for
Mo,d → 0 or Mo,m → 0. Rather, three cases have to be distinguished and need to be taken into account
in the analysis.
34For autarky (1.21), for coexistence in open economy (1.29), and for an open economy without
domestic firms (1.21) where κd is replaced by κm.
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Lemma 1.6 No,d ≤ µ and No,m ≤ µ hold if
Hs
Ls
≤ exp
( −2κm
1− κmσ
) 1− κmσ
2
β
κm
κd
− 1 + κmσ . (1.33)
The proof is given in Appendix 1.7.8. From the firm-level analysis of technology choices,
two dependencies are known. First, the level of technology increases in the scope for
technology in production, κ. Since κm > κd, it is sufficient to show that No,m ≤ µ.
Second, the optimal technology choice decreases in the skill premium. Consequently,
No,m attains its highest level in an economy that implies the lowest w¯. As the wage gap
decreases in κ, this represents an economy populated by domestic firms with a single
(marginal) multinational. Combining the respective wage gap equation with a restriction
to the approximated technology choice of the multinational firm delivers the threshold
given by (1.33). Remark that the latter is smaller than the threshold in autarky, (1.23),
as high-skilled labor has to be more scarce to oppose the multinational’s higher scope
for technology in production. Moreover, the skill premium in the coexistence equilibrium
does not depend on labor endowments. However, as illustrated in Figure 1.5, it is limited
from above by the wage gap of an economy populated exclusively by multinationals and
from below by the skill premium in autarky. Hence, although relative skill endowments
have no direct impact on the wage gap in the coexistence equilibrium, they are included
in the general condition of defined technology choices in open economy.
1.6 Conclusion
The emergence of technology leading firms that produce and sell on a global scale and
the associated increase in FDI flows have far-reaching consequences for host countries’
production processes. Moreover, empirical studies provide mixed results on the impact
of FDI on domestic firms’ choices of production techniques whereas the theoretical liter-
ature focuses in particular on knowledge spillovers. In contrast, little research has been
conducted to unveil the effects of increased factor market competition on domestic firms’
production technologies.
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In this chapter, I overcome this shortfall by explicitly focusing on the impact of a tough-
ened factor market competition, provoked by the entry of multinational firms, on the
endogenous technology choices of domestic firms. For this purpose, I provide a new firm-
level production function that links the endogenous technology decision to the demands
of high- and low-skilled labor. Moreover, MNEs are more productive than domestic firms
since they have an advantage in the use of technology in production. As technology is
skill-complementarity, the entry of multinational firms via FDI increases the demand of
skilled labor which induces an increase in the skill premium. In particular, a higher wage
gap rises the technology adoption costs of all firms, forcing domestic firms to downgrade
their chosen level of technology production. Moreover, the extend to which domestic
firms have to downgrade their production techniques depends on the relation of MNEs’
advantage in the use of technology to their higher costs of market entry.
This study isolates the labor market channel of the effects of FDI on the choice of produc-
tion techniques of domestic firms. Nevertheless, competition on output markets, learning,
or knowledge spillovers might interact with high- and low-skilled labor demands. In partic-
ular, learning or knowledge spillovers could increase domestic firms’ scope for technology
in production, eventually converging to multinational’s scope. Or, MNEs could start
learning from domestic firms in terms of market entry costs. Furthermore, regulation of
FDI inflows could be altered such that a change in market entry costs for foreign firms
induces more or less multinational firms to enter. As a consequence, depending on the
precise nature of interactions, the impact on domestic firms’ technology choices could be
mitigated or enforced which provides a fruitful field of future research.
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1.7 Appendix A1
1.7.1 Homogeneous Versus Heterogeneous Intermediate Inputs
Acemoglu et al. (2007) present the production function (1.1) with homogeneous interme-
diate inputs j and symmetric minimal unit costs (kj = k ∀j). In this case, concavity
implies symmetry: x (j) = x (j′) for all j, j′ ∈ [0, N ]. Hence, Y = Nκ+1x and profits are
given by
Π (N,x) = A1−βY β −Nkx− C (N) .
Here, C(N) is the cost of employing technology N . If all intermediates are equally ex-
pensive, C(N) is necessary to obtain a finite choice of N . In my model, C = 0 as the
cost of technology adoption are fully integrated in the production function of interme-
diates. Comparing the two models’ resulting elasticities of output with respect to N is
only feasible if I consider post-maximization elasticity within my model. My model’s
elasticity is smaller than Acemoglu et al. (2007)’s (κ + 1) as mine incorporates condi-
tions for a finite choice of N (1− σκ > 0). Furthermore, with heterogeneous production
of intermediate inputs, gains from technology and the elasticity of substitution between
different intermediates cannot be separated additively (as it is feasible in the case with
homogeneous intermediates) and are intertwined. However, they are still governed by two
distinct parameters, κ and σ, where the elasticity between intermediates is driven only
by σ.
The first-order maximization conditions with respect to N and x in Acemoglu et al. (2007)
imply
β
1
1−βAN
β[κ+1]−1
1−β κ = k
β
1−βC ′ (N) and x = C
′ (N)
κk
such that the optimal technology choice as well as its uniqueness depends crucially on
the functional form of C(N). In contrast, my model allows for an endogenous level of
technology without any additional cost function since I introduce skill-complementarity
of technology. The latter implies that cost of technology adoption increase in the level of
technology.
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1.7.2 Minimal Unit Costs in the Adjusted Cobb-Douglas Case
Consider the production function of intermediate inputs (1.2) and abstract from indices.
Minimize
wLL+ wHH s.t. zL1−ζHζ = x¯, ζ ∈ (0, 1)
where z = ζ−ζ(1 − ζ)−(1−ζ) and x¯ is a given intermediate output. The Langrangian
L = wLL+ wHH − λ
(
zL1−ζHζ − x¯
)
leads to the following first order conditions
wL = λ(1− ζ)z
(
H
L
)ζ
, wH = λζz
(
H
L
)ζ−1
.
Combining the first order conditions leads to the relative factor demand, H = L wL
wH
ζ
1−ζ ,
and the factor demands of H and L that depend on output and relative wages,
H(x¯, wL, wH) = x¯ζ
(
wL
wH
)1−ζ
, L(x¯, wL, wH) = x¯(1− ζ)
(
wH
wL
)ζ
.
Define k as the minimum unit cost to produce x¯, total costs of producing x¯ can be written
as kx¯ = wLL + wHH. Plugging in H(x¯, wL, wH) and L(x¯, wL, wH), and rearranging
provides the formulation of minimum unit costs, k = wL
(
wH
wL
)ζ
.
1.7.3 Derivation of Firm’s Optimality Conditions
The first order maximization conditions derived from (1.4) are:
∂Π
∂N
= 0 ⇐⇒ βA1−βY β−1 ∂Y
∂N
= kNxN , (A1.1)
∂Π
∂xj
= 0 ∀j ∈ [0, N ] ⇐⇒ βA1−βY β−1 ∂Y
∂xj
= kj ∀j ∈ [0, N ] . (A1.2)
Combining (A1.1) and (A1.2) for some j results in
∂Y
∂N
∂Y
∂xj
= kNxN
kj
∀ j ∈ [0, N ] . (A1.3)
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From the definition of Y I calculate
∂Y
∂N
= Y
N
κ+ 1− 1 + σ
σ
+ Nx
σ
1+σ
N
σ
1+σ
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
 , (A1.4)
∂Y
∂xj
=
x
−1
1+σ
j Y∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
. (A1.5)
Using (A1.5) in (A1.2), I obtain, for each pair (j, j′),
xj
xj′
=
[
k′j
kj
]1+σ
. (A1.6)
Plugging (A1.6) back in (A1.5) results in ∂Y
∂xj
= x
−1
j Y
kσj
∫ N
0 k
−σ
j dj
. Similarly, combining (A1.6)
and (A1.4) results in
∂Y
∂N
= Y
N
κ+ 1− 1 + σ
σ
+ Nx
σ
1+σ
N
σ
1+σx
σ
1+σ
j k
σ
j
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj
 . (A1.7)
Plugging the last two expressions in (A1.3), I obtain a non-linear expression for xj:
xj
(
κ− 1
σ
)
kσj
1
N
∫ N
0
k−σj dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡K¯−σN
+x
1
1+σ
j x
σ
1+σ
N
1 + σ
σ
= xNkN
kj
. (A1.8)
(A1.8) again holds for all j ∈ [0, N ]. For j = N an implicit expression for the optimal
choice of N is obtained: (
κ− 1
σ
)
kσNK¯
−σ
N = −σ (A1.9)
Simple manipulations lead to
κ = 1
σ
− 1
σ
k−σN
1
N
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
(
N
∂K¯N
∂N
)
/K¯N
, (A1.10)
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what is equation (1.5) in the main text. Consider next the optimal choice of xj. Dividing
(A1.8) by xN and using (A1.6) enables me to rewrite xj as
xj = k−1−σj kNxNK¯σN
1
1− κσ . (A1.11)
Using this expression in the production function results in Y = Nκ+1kNxNK¯−1N 11−κσ .
In order to use this result in the FOCs, I rewrite ∂Y
∂xj
in (A1.5) using (A1.11), ∂Y
∂xj
=
Y N−1kjk−1N x
−1
N (1− κσ). Combining this expression with (A1.2) leads to the optimal de-
mand for xN , xN = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β k−1N K¯
− β(1−β)
N (1−κσ). Substituting with this expression
in (A1.11), I obtain the optimal demand for each j, xj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N k
−1−σ
j .
This is (1.6) in the main text. Taking to the power of σ1+σ , integrating from 0 to N ,
dividing through N and taking to the power of 1+σ
σ
results in
(
1
N
∫ N
0
x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
= A
(
βNβ(κ+1)
NK¯N
) 1
1−β
. (A1.12)
Multiplying (A1.12) by N and K¯N results in NK¯N
(
1
N
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
= Aβ
1
1−βN
βκ
1−β K¯
−β
1−β
N
where the RHS equals the RHS in C(Y ) =
∫N
0 kjxjdj = Aβ
1
1−βN
βκ
1−β K¯
−β
1−β
N and, thus,
NK¯N
(
1
N
∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
) 1+σ
σ
= C(Y ). The demand for the last, or marginal, intermediate
input j = N can be simplified by rewriting kN in terms of KN (using (1.5) and j = N in
(1.6)):
xN = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
− 11−β
N (1− κσ)
1+σ
σ . (A1.13)
Multiplying (A1.12) by Nκ+1− 1+σσ results in the output of a firm: Y = β
1
1−βAN
κ
1−β K¯
− 11−β
N .
This is (1.7) in the main text.
1.7.4 Properties of the Elasticity of Average Unit Costs
General minimum unit costs
The first derivative of average unit costs, K¯N ≡
[
1
N
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj
]− 1
σ , reads as ∂K¯N
∂N
=
K¯N
σ
(
1
N
− k−σN∫ N
0 k
−σ
j dj
)
and, consequently, the elasticity of average unit costs is εK¯N =
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∂K¯N
∂N
N
K¯N
= 1
σ
− N
σ
k−σN∫ N
0 k
−σ
j dj
. Its first derivative with respect to N is
∂εK¯N
∂N
= k
−σ
N
NσK¯−2σN
[
k−σN + K¯−σN
(
N
kN
∂kN
∂N︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡εkN
σ − 1
)]
which is strictly positive if and only if kN (1− εkNσ)
1
σ > K¯N ⇐⇒ εkN > εK¯N . The
respective elasticities are defined as the change in percentage of kN (K¯N) in reaction to a
one percent change in N . Since K¯N constitutes an average, it contains all minimum unit
costs. Adding kN+ (with N+ = N + δ, δ > 0) increases K¯N less in terms of percentage
than this increases kN (to kN+) in percents. Consequently, εkN > εK¯N and
∂εK¯N
∂N
> 0.
Cobb-Douglas specific minimum unit costs
Given Cobb-Douglas production of intermediates, minimum unit costs are provided by
(1.3) and the elasticity of average minimum unit costs with respect to N becomes εK¯N =
1
σ
−
N
µ
ln w¯
w¯
σNµ −1
. Taking the first derivative with respect to N results in
∂εK¯N
∂N
= ln w¯
µ
(
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
)2
(
σ
N
µ
ln w¯w¯σ
N
µ − w¯σNµ + 1
)
which is positive if and only if eν > 1 + ν, ν ≡ −σN
µ
ln w¯. Similarly, the first derivative
with respect to w¯ (keeping N constant) results in
∂εK¯N
∂w¯
= N
µw¯
(
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
)2
(
σ
N
µ
ln w¯w¯σ
N
µ − w¯σNµ + 1
)
which is equally positive if and only if eν > 1 + ν. First, eν = 1 + ν for ν = 0. Second,
∀ν < 0, ∂eν
∂ν
< (1+ν)
∂ν
. It follows that, as eν and 1 + ν are strictly monotonously increasing
functions, eν > 1 + ν ∀ν < 0. Consequently, ∂εK¯N
∂N
> 0 and ∂εK¯N
∂w¯
> 0 (keeping N
constant in the latter).
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1.7.5 Derivation of Production Factor Demands
Demand of high-skilled labor to produce intermediate input j, Hj, is given through cost
minimization (see Appendix 1.7.2),
Hj = xj
j
µ
w¯
j
µ
−1 = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
j
µ
w¯−σ
j
µ
−1.
Taking the integral
∫N
0 dj and using kj = wLw¯
j
µ leads to
H =
∫ N
0
Hjdj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
1
µw¯
∫ N
0
jw¯−σ
j
µdj
where integration by parts results in
H = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
1−w¯−
N
µ σ
ln w¯ σ
µ
−Nw¯−Nµ σ
σw¯ ln w¯ . (A1.14)
Substituting for w¯
N
µ
σ − 1 using (1.9) simplifies the above equality further to
H = β
1
1−βAN
βκ
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L w¯
−N
µ
σ−1 (ln w¯)−1 κ1− κσ . (A1.15)
Similarly, Lj is given by
Lj = xj(1− j
µ
)w¯
j
µ = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
(
1− j
µ
)
w¯−
j
µ
σ
and L =
∫ N
0
Ljdj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
∫ N
0
w¯−
j
µ
σdj − w¯H,
where integrating and using the expression in (A1.14) for H results in
L = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
µ
(
1− w¯−Nµ σ
) (
1− 1
σ ln w¯
)
+Nw¯−
N
µ
σ
σ ln w¯ .
Again, substituting for w¯
N
µ
σ − 1 and using (1.9) results in
L = β
1
1−βAN
βκ
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L w¯
−N
µ
σ ln w¯ − κ
ln w¯(1− κσ) . (A1.16)
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Relative production labor demands:
Dividing (A1.15) by (A1.16) involves directly H
L
= 1
w¯
κ
ln w¯−κ .
1.7.6 Proofs for Firm Decisions Given Wages and Market Size
Proof of Lemma 1.1
A firm’s optimal choice of the level of technology in production, N∗, given w¯ is a solution
to (1.9):
w¯σ
N
µ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(N,w¯)
=
σN
µ
ln w¯
1− κσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(N,w¯)
.
I start proofing the existence of a unique equilibrium N∗(w¯) given w¯ by showing that
there exist optimal technology levels ∀w¯ ∈ (1,∞) and subsequently establish uniqueness.
Applying L’Hôpital’s Rule, the following holds ∀w¯ ∈ (1,∞):
lim
N→0
f(N, w¯)
g(N, w¯) = limN→0
∂f(N,w¯)
∂N
∂g(N,w¯)
∂N
= 0 < 1
lim
N→+∞
f(N, w¯)
g(N, w¯) = limN→+∞
∂f(N,w¯)
∂N
∂g(N,w¯)
∂N
= +∞ > 1.
Since f(N) and g(N) are continuous, ∀w¯ ∈ (1,∞) ∃N∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that f(N∗, w¯) =
g(N∗, w¯). Moreover, it is immediate that f(N) is a strictly convex and g(N) is a linear
function. Consequently, the fact that f(N) and g(N) intersect implies that they intersect
twice for a given w¯, as I abstract from a tangent solution. First, they intersect at N∗ = 0
∀w¯ ∈ (1,∞). Second, since I impose N∗ > 0, N∗ ∈ (0,∞) is a unique choice of the level
of technology in production ∀w¯ ∈ (1,∞).
Furthermore, ∀N ≥ N∗ it holds that f(N) ≥ g(N) and ∂f(N,w¯)
∂N
> ∂g(N,w¯)
∂N
.
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Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof of N ≤ µ:
The level of technology, N , is given implicitly. A second order Taylor approximation35
results in N ≈ 2κµ(1−κσ) ln w¯ where N exhibits qualitatively all comparative statics’ properties.
From the above approximation, N ≤ µ if and only if 2κ(1−κσ) ln w¯ ≤ 1 which implies w¯ ≥
e
2κ
(1−κσ) .
Proof of N > 1:
The assumption eκµ > w¯ can be rewritten as κµln w¯ > 1. Taking derivatives of f and g with
respect to N leads to
∂f
∂N
= σ
µ
w¯σ
N
µ ln w¯, ∂g
∂N
=
σ
µ
ln w¯
1− κσ .
As ∂f
∂N
> 0 and ∂2f
∂N2 > 0, f is strictly convex in N . As
∂g
∂N
> 0 and ∂2g
∂N2 = 0, g is linear
in N with a positive slope. For N = 0, f and g would be zero. For N+ → 0, ∂f
∂N
< ∂g
∂N
.
Consequently, a necessary condition for an equilibrium value of N (N∗) is that partial
derivatives evaluated at N∗ satisfy: ∂f
∂N
(N∗) > ∂g
∂N
(N∗). In the following, it is shown that
∂f
∂N
(N = κµln w¯ ) <
∂g
∂N
(N = κµln w¯ ) and consequently N
∗ > κµln w¯ . Evaluating first derivatives at
N = κµln w¯ results in
∂f
∂N
= σ
µ
ln w¯eκσ, ∂g
∂N
= σ
µ
ln w¯(1− κσ)−1
which implies that ∂f
∂N
< ∂g
∂N
⇐⇒ κσ < − ln (1− κσ). As −1 < κσ < 0, a Taylor
expansion can be applied to − ln (1− κσ) which transforms κσ < − ln (1− κσ) into
κσ < κσ + 12 (κσ)
2 + 13 (κσ)
3 + ◦
(1
3 (κσ)
3
)
.
Consequently, ∂f(N = κµln w¯ )/∂N < ∂g(N =
κµ
ln w¯ )/∂N for all admissible parameter values.
35Consequently, the presented restriction is an approximation.
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Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof of dN/dw¯:
(1.9) determines implicitly a firm’s choice of technology in production. Assume that N is
a solution to (1.9). The reaction of N with respect to changes in the wage gap is computed
by implicit differentiation: dN
dw¯
= −∂F
∂w¯
/ ∂F
∂N
. From (1.9), define
F =
σN
µ
ln w¯
1− κσ − w¯
σN
µ + 1 = 0
and calculate partial derivatives:
∂F
∂w¯
= N
µ
σ
w¯
[ 1
1− κσ − w¯
σN
µ
]
,
∂F
∂N
= σ
µ
ln w¯
[ 1
1− κσ − w¯
σN
µ
]
.
Combining and rearranging leads to dN
dw¯
= − Nln w¯ w¯ < 0.
Proof of dN/dκ:
How the choice of technology in production reacts to a change in κ can again be determined
by the implicit differentiation approach where ∂F
∂κ
= N
µ
ln w¯ (σ)
2
(1−κσ)2 . As a consequence,
dN
dκ
= −
∂F
∂κ
∂F
∂N
= − Nσ
(1− κσ)2
(
1
1−κσ − w¯σ
N
µ
) .
Replacing w¯σNT from equation (1.9) leads to dN
dκ
= N(1−κσ)(Nµ ln w¯−κ)
> 0 as Lemma 1.2
implies that N
µ
ln w¯ > κ.
Proof of dN/dµ:
The first derivative of F with respect to µ reads as ∂F
∂µ
= − N
µ2σ ln w¯
[
1
1−κσ − w¯σ
N
µ
]
. Thus,
dN
dµ
= −
∂F
∂µ
∂F
∂N
= N
µ
> 0.
Proof of
(
∂ xj+1
xj
)
/ (∂w¯):
The first derivative of relative intermediate inputs employment, xj+1
xj
= w¯−
1+σ
µ , with re-
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spect to w¯ is
∂
(
xj+1
xj
)
∂w¯
= −1+σ
µw¯
xj+1
xj
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Taking the first derivatives of (1.13) with respect to w¯ and κ results in:
∂
(
H
L
)
∂w¯
= −H
L
1
w¯
ln w¯ − κ+ 1
ln w¯ − κ < 0,
∂
(
H
L
)
∂κ
= 1
w¯
ln w¯
(ln w¯ − κ)2 > 0.
Taking the derivative of ∂(
H
L )
∂κ
with respect to w¯ gives ∂
2(HL )
∂κ∂w¯
= − 1
w¯2
ln w¯(ln w¯−κ)+κ
(ln w¯−κ)2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Taking the first derivative of (1.14) with respect to w¯ holding wL constant and subsequent
manipulating leads to ∂φ
∂w¯
= − κφ
w¯ ln w¯ . Taking the first derivative of (1.14) with respect to
κ holding wL and w¯ constant and subsequent manipulating leads to ∂φ∂κ = ln (N)φ > 0
which holds as ln (N) > 1 is implied by Lemma 1.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.3
The derivative of productivity differences (1.16) with respect to the skill premium and
subsequent manipulating reads as ∂φ∆
∂w¯
= −φ∆ κm−κdw¯ ln w¯ < 0.
1.7.7 Proofs for Closed Economy
Note that within this section, I abstract from the index c that denotes closed economy
variables for reasons of readability.
Proof of Lemma 1.4
Define
Hs
Ls
w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡u(w¯)
= κln w¯
β
− κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡v(w¯)
.
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First, w¯ > 0 as wH and wL are strictly positive. Moreover, ∀ w¯ such that 0 < w¯ <
eκdβ, u(w¯) > v(w¯). Consequently, if there exists any solution to (1.21), w¯∗, w¯∗ > eκdβ.
∀w¯ > eκdβ, u(w¯) is strictly monotonously increasing in w¯ and v(w¯) is strictly monotonously
decreasing in w¯. Furthermore, ∀w¯ > eκdβ it holds that
lim
w¯→eκdβ
u(w¯) < lim
w¯→eκdβ
v(w¯), lim
w¯→∞u(w¯) > limw¯→∞ v(w¯).
Consequently, ∀w¯ > 0 ∃! w¯∗. It holds that w¯∗ > eκdβ.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Define Gc = H
s
Ls
w¯ − κdln w¯
β
−κd = 0. First derivatives are
∂Gc
∂w¯
= H
s
Ls
+ 1
w¯
κd
β
( ln w¯
β
− κd)2
,
∂Gc
∂κd
= −
ln w¯
β
( ln w¯
β
− κd)2
,
∂Gc
∂β
= − κd ln w¯
( ln w¯
β
− κd)2
.
As a consequence,
dw¯
d
(
Hs
Ls
) = −
∂Gc
∂(HsLs )
∂Gc
∂w¯
= − w¯
Hs
Ls
+ 1
w¯
κd
β
( ln w¯
β
−κd)2
< 0,
dw¯
dκd
= −
∂Gc
∂κ
∂Gc
∂w¯
= w¯ ln w¯
κd(ln w¯ − κdβ + 1) > 0,
dw¯
dβ
= −
∂Gc
∂β
∂Gc
∂w¯
= βw¯ ln w¯ln w¯ − κdβ + 1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof that dN/dµ:
From Proposition 1.2, N ≈ 2κdµ(1−κdσ) ln w¯ . The restriction N/µ ≤ 1 does not bind if and only
if w¯ ≥ exp
(
2κd
1−κdσ
)
. Define a threshold skill premium: w¯◦ = exp
(
2κd
1−κdσ
)
. Let’s further
define the functions
Hs
Ls
w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡x(w¯)
= κdln w¯
β
− κd︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y(w¯)
(A1.17)
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where x(w¯) is a linear and strictly monotone increasing and y(w¯) is a strictly decreasing
function for w¯ > eκdβ. The equilibrium value of w¯ is defined as w¯∗ what implies x(w¯∗) =
y(w¯∗). Furthermore, limw¯→eκdβ x(w¯) < limw¯→eκdβ y(w¯). Therefore, ∀eκdβ < w¯ ≤ w¯∗ it
holds that x(w¯) ≤ y(w¯) while ∀w¯ ≥ w¯∗ it is true that x(w¯) ≥ y(w¯). Plugging the threshold
value w¯◦ into equation (A1.17) under the assumption that x(w¯◦) ≤ y(w¯◦) results, as
a consequence, in a parameter combination that ensures w¯∗ ≥ w¯◦. Consequently, the
restriction N/µ ≤ 1 does not bind if and only if
Hs
Ls
≤ exp
( −2κd
1− κdσ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
1− κdσ
2
β
− 1 + κdσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
.
Proof that eκdµ > w¯:
Given w¯, Lemma 1.2 states that if eκdµ > w¯ than N > 1. ∀w¯ > w¯∗, where w¯∗ is the
equilibrium skill premium from (1.21), it holds that w¯Hs
Ls
(LHS of (1.21)) is greater than
κd
ln w¯/β−κd (RHS of (1.21)). Plugging e
κµ into (1.21) results in eκdµHs
Ls
> κdκdµ
β
−κd ⇐⇒ κ >
ln ( βµ−β L
s
Hs )
µ
which always holds if µ is chosen high enough.
1.7.8 Proofs for Open Economy
Note that within this section I will abstract from the index o that denotes open economy
variables for reasons of readability.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
The left hand side of the skill premium equations (1.21) and (1.28) are identical in their
functional forms and strictly monotonously increasing in w¯. It is evident that the right
hand side of (1.21) is strictly decreasing in w¯. In the following, I show that the right hand
side of (1.28) is also strictly decreasing in w¯:
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∂RHS of (1.28)
∂w¯
< 0 ⇐⇒(
denominator of RHS of (1.28)
)(
κd
(1− β)
fd
w¯Hs − (κm − κd)2 Mmln (w¯)
β
1− βφ
β
1−β
∆
)
−(
nominator of RHS of (1.28)
)(
(1− β)
fdβ
(Ls + w¯Hs) +
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
(1− β)
fd
w¯Hs
+(κm − κd)2 β1− βφ
β
1−β
∆
Mm
ln (w¯) + φ
β
1−β
∆ (κm − κd)Mm − φ
β
1−β
∆
1− β
β
Mm +
fm
fd
1− β
β
Mm
)
< 0
⇐⇒ −κdMm ln (w¯)w¯H
s(1− β)2
fdβ
(
φ
β
1−β
∆ −
fm
fd
)
−(κm − κd)(1− β)φ
β
1−β
∆ M
2
m
β
(
Ls + w¯Hs
fdMm
− φ
β
1−β
∆
)
−κd(1− β)
2Mm
fdβ
(Ls + w¯Hs)
(
Ls + w¯Hs
fdMm
− φ
β
1−β
∆
)
− Σ < 0,
where Σ = (κm− κd)φ
β
1−β
∆
Mm
fd
(
(κm− κd) (Ls + w¯Hs + fmMm) + κd(1− β) (Ls + 2w¯Hs) +(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
(1−β)w¯Hs+ 1−β
β
fmMm
)
+ κd(Ls+w¯Hs)(1−β)2fmMm
f2
d
β
> 0. Production is profitable
for a multinational firm if and only if pmYm ≥ wLfm. Free entry for domestic firms
implies that pdYd = wLfd. Dividing the former inequality by the latter equality leads
to φ
β
1−β
∆ ≥ fmfd . A positive number of domestic firms being in the market implies that
(1−β)(Ls+w¯Hs)
Mmfd
> φ
β
1−β
∆ (see (1.27)). As a consequence,
∂RHS of (1.28)
∂w¯
< 0. Furthermore, the
RHS of (1.28) is above the RHS of (1.21) if and only if:
κd
(1−β)
fd
(
LS + w¯oHS
)
+ (κm − κd)φ
β
1−β
∆ Mm(
ln (w¯o)
β
− κd
)
(1−β)
fd
(LS + w¯oHS)− (κm − κd)φ
β
1−β
∆ Mm −
(
φ
β
1−β
∆ − fmfd
)
1−β
β
ln (w¯o)Mm
>
κd
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
⇐⇒ (κm − κd)φ
β
1−β
∆ > κd(1− β)
(
fm
fd
− φ
β
1−β
∆
)
.
This is true for all parameter combinations. The skill premium in closed and open economy
is uniquely given by the intersection of the LHS (strictly increasing and of range [0,∞))
and RHS (strictly decreasing and of range (∞, c), 0 < c < ∞) of (1.21) and (1.28),
respectively. As the RHS of (1.28) is for all parameter combinations strictly above the RHS
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of (1.21), the skill premium in open economy is for all feasible parameter combinations
greater than in closed economy. All parameter combinations that imply zero profits for
domestic firms and zero or positive profits for foreign firms are feasible.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
Existence proof:
According to Lemma 1.3, the LHS of (1.29) decreases strictly monotonously in w¯; as the
RHS is unaffected by w¯, there exists at most one equilibrium value of w¯. Furthermore,
from Proposition 1.6 it is known that w¯c constitutes a lower bound to w¯o where w¯o
is the skill premium in open and w¯c that in closed economy. Rewriting (1.21) leads
to eln (w¯c)
(
ln (w¯c)
β
− κd
)
= κd L
s
Hs
where a first order Taylor approximation of eln (w¯) and
manipulating results in ln (w¯)
2
β
+
(
1
β
− κd
)
ln (w¯) − κd
(
1 + Ls
Hs
)
≈ 0. As one of the two
solutions to the above quadratic equation implies a ln (w¯) < 0, the only admissible one is
w¯ = exp
β2
( 1
β
− κd
)2
+ 4
β
κd
(
1 + L
s
Hs
) 12 − 12 + κdβ2
 ≡ χ.
Consequently, as long as φ∆(χ)
β
1−β ≥ fm
fd
(
φ∆(w¯c)
β
1−β ≥ fm
fd
)
there exists a w¯o > w¯c such
that φ∆(w¯o)
β
1−β = fm
fd
.
Proof of skill premium comparative statics:
Define G = φ
β
1−β
∆ − fmfd . First derivatives with respect to w¯ and κm are
∂G
∂w¯
= − β1− βφ
β
1−β
∆
κm − κd
w¯ ln w¯ < 0,
∂G
∂κm
= β1− βφ
β
1−β
∆ ln (Nm) > 0.
This implies
dw¯
dκm
= −
∂G
∂κm
∂G
∂w¯
= ln (Nm)w¯ ln (w¯)
κm − κd > 0.
The first derivative with respect to κd is ∂G∂κd = −
β
1−βφ
β
1−β
∆ ln (Nd) < 0 which implies
dw¯
dκd
= −
∂G
∂κd
∂G
∂w¯
= − ln (Nd)w¯ ln (w¯)
κm − κd < 0.
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As ∂G
∂
(
fm
fd
) = −1 < 0,
dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
) = −
∂G
∂
(
fm
fd
)
∂G
∂w¯
= −1− β
β
φ
β
β−1
∆
w¯ ln (w¯)
κm − κd < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.5
Proof of the number of domestic firms:
The partial derivative of Md with respect to κd reads as
∂Md
∂κd
= 1− β
fd(κm − κd)2
[
ln (Nd)w¯ ln w¯
(
Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)
+ H
s
β
)
+
(
κmL
S − w¯HS
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
))]
> 0
since κmLS − w¯HS
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)
> 0 if Md > 0. The partial derivative of Md with respect
to fm
fd
given fd is
∂Md
∂
(
fm
fd
) = − 1− β
fd(κm − κd)
dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
) [(Hs ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)
+ H
s
β
]
> 0,
as dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
) < 0 from Proposition 1.7. Finally, the partial derivative of Md with respect to
κm is
∂Md
∂κm
= 1− β
fd(κm − κd)2
[
(κm − κd)
(
Ls − dw¯
dκm
Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)
− H
s
β
dw¯
dκm
+ w¯Hs
)
−κmLS + w¯HS
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)]
< 0
⇐⇒ H
s
Ls
<
βκd
(
1 + w¯Hs
Ls
)
ln (w¯)w¯ + ln (Nm)
(
ln (w¯) + 1− βκm
)
.
From (1.10), Nm ≈ 2κm1−κmσ µln w¯i . The highest wage level imposes the most negative effect
on the choice of Nm, thus I impose w¯i = w¯o. However, since in this case w¯i is independent
of µ, µ can be chosen arbitrarily high, such that in particular ln (Nm) > 1. A similar
reasoning can be applied to ln (Nd) > 1. Moreover, ln (w¯) > κm. As a consequence,
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∂Md
∂κm
< 0.
Proof of the number of multinational firms:
The first partial derivative of Mm with respect to κm reads as
∂Mm
∂κm
= 1− β
fm(κm − κd)2
[
(κm − κd)
(
dw¯
dκm
Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κm
)
+ H
s
β
dw¯
dκm
)
−
(
w¯Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
− κdLs
)]
> 0
⇐⇒ ln (Nm)w¯ ln (w¯)Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd + 1
β
)
+ κdLs > Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
which holds since ln (Nm) > 1 and ln (w¯)
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
+ ln (w¯)
β
> ln (w¯)
β
−κd. The first partial
derivative of Mm with respect to fmfd given fd is
∂Mm
∂
(
fm
fd
) = 1− β
f 2m(κm − κd)
[
fm
 dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
)Hs ( ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
+ H
s
β
dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
)

−
(
w¯HS
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
− κdLS
)]
< 0
since dw¯
d
(
fm
fd
) < 0 from Proposition 1.7 and w¯HS ( ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
− κdLS > 0 if Mm > 0.
Finally, the partial derivative of Mm with respect to κd is
∂Mm
∂κd
= 1− β
fm(κm − κd)2
[
(κm − κd)
(
dw¯
dκd
Hs
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
+ H
s
β
dw¯
dκd
− w¯Hs − Ls
)
+w¯HS
(
ln (w¯)
β
− κd
)
− κdLS
]
< 0
⇐⇒ H
s
Ls
<
βκm
(
1 + w¯Hs
Ls
)
ln (w¯)w¯ + ln (Nd)
Hs
Ls
(
ln (w¯) + 1− βκd
)
.
Since ln (Nd) > 1 and ln (w¯) > κd, it holds that ∂Mm∂κd < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.8
Proof of ∀fm
fd
≤
(
fm
fd
)∗
, Mm > 0, Md = 0:
Let me denote the largest fm
fd
that ensures Mm > 0, Md = 0 by
(
fm
fd
)∗
. For any
(
fm
fd
)∗
+ δ,
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(δ > 0) domestic firms enter and Mm > 0, Md > 0. Thus ∀fmfd ≤
(
fm
fd
)∗
,
Md =
(1− β)(κmLS − w¯HS( ln (w¯)β − κm))
fd(κm − κd) = 0 ⇐⇒ w¯H
s = κmL
s
ln w¯
β
− κm
,
where the last equation determines the skill premium in an economy exclusively populated
by κm-firms.
Proof of ∀fm
fd
≥
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
, Mm = 0, Md > 0:
Let me denote the smallest fm
fd
that ensures Mm = 0, Md > 0 by
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
. For any(
fm
fd
)∗∗ − ε, (ε > 0) MNEs enter and Mm > 0, Md > 0. Thus ∀fmfd ≥ (fmfd )∗∗,
Mm =
(1− β)(w¯HS( ln (w¯)
β
− κd)− κdLS)
fm(κm − κd) = 0, ⇐⇒ w¯H
s = κdL
s
ln w¯
β
− κd
,
where the last equation determines the skill premium in an economy exclusively populated
by κd-firms.
Proof of
(
fm
fd
)∗
<
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
:
From Lemma 1.3, ∂φ∆/∂w¯ < 0. Consequently, the right hand side of (1.29), fmfd , can only
be decreased if and only if the skill premium is increased. Thus,
(
fm
fd
)∗
<
(
fm
fd
)∗∗ ⇐⇒
w¯∗ > w¯∗∗. Mm = 0 implies a closed economy populated by κd-firms and Md = 0 one
by κm-firms. As Proposition 1.4 states that dw¯/dκ > 0, w¯∗ > w¯∗∗ and consequently(
fm
fd
)∗
<
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
. This implies the existence of the interval
((
fm
fd
)∗
,
(
fm
fd
)∗∗)
.
Proof of
(
fm
fd
)∗
is increasing in κm:
According to Lemma 1.5, Md decreases in κm. Holding all other parameters constant,
increasing κm from κ0m to κ1m implies that ∃fmfd >
(
fm
fd
)∗
(κ0m) that ensure Md = 0. The
largest of those fm
fd
’s is
(
fm
fd
)∗
(κ1m) >
(
fm
fd
)∗
(κ0m).
Proof of
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
is decreasing in κd:
According to Lemma 1.5, Mm decreases in κd. Holding all other parameters constant,
increasing κd from κ0d to κ1d implies that ∃fmfd <
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(κ0d) that ensure Mm = 0. The
smallest of those fm
fd
’s is
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(κ1d) <
(
fm
fd
)∗∗
(κ0d).
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Proof of Proposition 1.6
Since κm > κd and dN/dκ > 0, it always holds that No,m > No,d and, thus, No,m ≤ µ ⇒
No,d ≤ µ. No,m ≤ µ is left to proof. Furthermore, dN/dw¯ < 0 and, consequently, No,m is
greatest in an economy with the lowest w¯ which is an economy populated exclusively by
domestic firms. Similar to the proof of Nc,d ≤ µ in Appendix 1.7.7, the optimal technology
choice of MNEs is approximated by a Taylor expansion where I set No,m ≤ µ. This is
plugged into the skill premium equation of an autarkic economy, (1.21), which results in
the threshold that ensures No,m ≤ µ:
Hs
Ls
≤ exp
( −2κm
1− κmσ
) 1− κmσ
2
β
κm
κd
− 1 + κmσ .
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Chapter 2
Do All Firms Profit from Lower
Barriers to Technology Adoption?
2.1 Introduction
The majority of the economic literature agrees that roughly 50 % of differences in output
per worker across countries can be accounted for disparities in total factor productivity
(TFP)1. Moreover, being a general mapping from aggregate factors to aggregate output,
TFP represents in essence a country’s production technique (Gancia et al., 2011). The
observation that countries differ largely in their use of technology in the production process
is usually attributed to two major sources. First, the appropriate technology literature2
emphasizes the importance of differences in country-level skill endowments. Second, an
amplitude of differing barriers to technology adoption prevent the implementation of the
most efficient production techniques3. The study of Caselli and Coleman (2006) unites
the two strands of the literature and shows that half of cross-country disparities in income
stem from restrictions on the use of appropriate technologies. Like other studies, they
concentrate on the barrier’s impact on the country-level although, from a disaggregated
perspective, a country’s firms have to cope with restrictions on technology choices (Parente
1E.g. Hall and Jones (1999) claim a greater impact of TFP whereas Caselli and Coleman (2006)
report a share of 40%.
2Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) claim that techniques developped in skill-rich countries cannot be
adopted efficiently in skill-scarce countries.
3See Section 2.2 for a literature review on barriers to technology adoption.
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and Prescott, 2002). While various studies show that the heterogeneity of firms4 has far-
reaching economic implications, the impact of barriers on firms’ technology choices may
well be of an asymmetric nature. In other words, firms from low-productivity industries
anticipate their technological disadvantage vis-à-vis more productive firms and lobby for
the maintenance and/or erection of barriers to protect their vested interests. However,
there exists to the best of my knowledge no study that analyzes the impact of lower barriers
to technology adoption on the difference in endogenous technology choices between more
and less productive firms.
My model is the first to formalize the intuition that lower barriers to technology adoption
increase the technology gap between high- and low-productivity firms. Moreover, I show
that while the gap in technology choices widens, a country’s overall level of welfare in-
creases where the latter effect constitutes a well-known fact (Caselli and Coleman, 2006;
Gancia et al., 2011).
In my theoretical analysis, more and less productive firms choose endogenously their pro-
duction techniques. They differ with respect to the scope for technology in production, i.e.
high-productivity firms (h-firms) are endowed with an inherent advantage such that their
use of technology in the production process is more efficient than that of low-productivity
firms (l-firms). However, the former have to incur higher market entry costs since a higher
level of efficiency usually involves greater investments in research and development. More-
over, l-firms reduce their technological disadvantage and protect their vested interests by
urging policy makers to impose barriers to technology adoption. In this way, h-firms are
precluded from the use of their optimal technology level (Parente and Prescott, 2002).
Although studying the underlying causes of barriers may be of interest in itself, it is be-
hind the scope of this study and constitutes no prerequisite for my analysis of differential
impacts of lower barriers on heterogeneous firms. Similar to my approach in the first
chapter of this dissertation, the adoption of more sophisticated technologies requires a
more skilled workforce, i.e. technology is complementary to high-skilled labor (Goldin
and Katz, 1998). However, the implied increase in skill-intensity raises a firm’s labor
4See e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) and Bernard et al. (2007) for heterogeneity with respect
to productivity. Furthermore, Bustos (2011) models and estimates heterogeneous levels of technology in
production.
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costs since more qualified workers earn a skill premium over less skilled.
When e.g. vested interest groups lose political influence and barriers to technology adop-
tion are decreased, high-productivity firms will adopt more sophisticated production tech-
niques. Along with the involved rise in productivity, h-firms increase their relative demand
of high-skilled workers which, in turn, leads to a rise in the wage gap. The pre-reform
technology level of low-productivity firms becomes more expensive, causing them to down-
grade their production techniques. As a consequence, the technology gap of h- to l-firms
increases, highlighting the motivation of low-productivity firms to lobby against lower
barriers in the first place. Although a decrease in barriers to technology adoption has op-
posing impacts on h- and l-firms, it unambiguously increases a country’s overall welfare
which is in line with the literature (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Gancia et al., 2011).
In this study, barriers to technology adoption are exogenous and of a rather abstract na-
ture in order to accommodate a variety of different causes. Nevertheless, there exists an
extensive literature on the origins of barriers to technology adoption and their effects on a
country’s output per worker, skill premium, technologies, and welfare which is discussed
in more detail in Section 2.2. Parente and Prescott (2002), Caselli and Coleman (2006),
Gancia et al. (2011), and others5 show that removing barriers to technology adoption
would lead to a massive increase in per capita income of developing countries. While
having a different focus my model replicates this ‘stylized fact’. Similar to a recent study
by Gancia et al. (2011), I show that lower barriers imply an increase in the skill pre-
mium which in my model widens the technology gap between h- and l-firms. Since lower
barriers usually involve a greater openness, this relates to the literature on the effects of
globalization on the wage gap in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
Empirical evidence on the impact of lower barriers to technology adoption on the tech-
nology gap between different types of firms is relatively scarce. In a recent study, Bustos
(2011) analyzes the impact of reducing Brazilian tariffs against Argentinian firms on the
endogenous technology choices of firms in Argentina. She shows that most productive
firms within an Argentinian industry increase their level of technology the most. Ozler
and Yilmaz (2009) analyze productivity improvements caused by declining protection
5E.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005), Harding and Rattso (2005).
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rates in trade policy and conclude that larger firms (which are usually more productive)
benefit more. Nakamura and Ohashi (2008)’s study of the Japanese steel industry in
the 1950’s and 60’s shows that more productive firms were more inclined to adopt newly
available technologies.
This chapter of my dissertation contributes to an emerging theoretical literature. In Par-
ente and Prescott (1994, 2002), barriers to technology adoption are explicitly modeled as
an increase in investment costs that incur to improve a plant’s quality or to enhance a
firm’s physical capital. In a second step, they aggregate firm-level decisions such that bar-
riers to plant-level efficiency can be related to cross-country TFP differences. However,
their assumption of homogeneous firms abstracts from any differential impact of lower
barriers on technology levels of firms. Moreover, the assumption of homogeneous labor
supply ignores the impact of lower barriers on the skill premium. In contrast, Caselli and
Coleman (2006) build a model with an aggregated production function and heterogeneous
labor where lower barriers to technology adoption increase the skill premium and, simul-
taneously, output per worker6. Their analysis links the literature on barriers to technology
adoption to studies on country-appropriate technologies7. In a recent contribution, Gan-
cia et al. (2011) incorporate Caselli and Coleman (2006)’s approach into a North-South
model that endogenizes barriers to technology adoption. In the empirical part of their
study, a reduction in barriers implies a rise both in the skill premium and in the adoption
of skill-biased technologies. However, in both studies output is produced according to a
country-level production function that neglects firm-level decisions as well as differences
in technology choices across firms.
I am the first to analyze the impact of lower barriers to technology adoption on firm-level
differences in optimal production techniques. My model shows that while the technology
gap between more and less productive firms rises, a country’s skill premium increases and
its overall welfare-level improves.
This chapter of my dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly presents
6Growth of per capita income constitutes the focus of endogenous growth models. E.g., Barro and
Sala-i Martin (1997) incorporate explicit costs of technology adoption and Howitt (2000) accounts for the
impact of regulatory policies on the extend of technology transfers in explaining cross-country differences
in productivities.
7See e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) where the better a technology fits a country’s skill endowment
the more efficient it is.
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evidence on barriers to technology adoption. Section 2.3 analyzes firm-level decisions on
the level of technology in production and studies the impact of lower barriers to technology
adoption given wages. In Section 2.4, homogeneous firms’ behavior is embedded in a
general equilibrium framework and the impact of lower barriers on the skill premium and
aggregated welfare is analyzed. Section 2.5 introduces the heterogeneous firms equilibrium
and studies the consequences of lower barriers to technology adoption with a focus on the
technology gap between more and less productive firms, the skill premium, and overall
welfare. Section 2.6 briefly concludes.
2.2 Sources and Consequences of Barriers to Tech-
nology Adoption
Throughout this chapter, barriers to technology adoption are summarized into an abstract
and simple measure that is exogenously given. Nevertheless, there exists a vast array of
empirical and anecdotal evidence on the political, institutional, and historical causes and
forms of barriers to technology adoption. In a seminal work, Parente and Prescott (2002)
motivate a model of micro-founded barriers by providing an extensive literature overview
of different institutional causes and forms. First, their approach of modeling barriers
as restrictions to plant-level investments is influenced by de Soto (1989)’s cross-country
comparisons of regulatory constraints to set up new firms. In particular, the latter pro-
cess can take more than 250 working days and demands bribery in Peru while in New
York City, it requires only 2 hours and no briberies to be made8. Second, Parente and
Prescott (2002) provide historical evidence, e.g. Wolcott (1994)’s study on the productiv-
ity growth of Japanese and Indian textile industries from 1920 to 1938. Whereas Indian
textile workers received extensive governmental support to prevent the introduction of
labor-saving machinery, their Japanese counterpart did not, leading to a much higher
productivity growth in Japan (120%) than in India (40%). Parente and Prescott (2002)
present another historical example where governmental non-acting eroded barriers to tech-
8In Parente and Prescott (2005), they bolster the hypothesis of widespread political constraints
that restrict firms’ decisions on technology and productivity by Djankov et al. (2002)’s cross-country
comparisons of legal requirements to set up a new firm.
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nology adoption: upheavals in the English woolen industry at the end of the eighteenth
and beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Randall (1991), fierce resistance
of shearers against the introduction of gig mills, which resulted in hugh labor-savings in
the examination and repair of finished cloth, failed as its use was not forbidden by the
government. Nevertheless, the shearers managed to resist the application of gig mills in
some regions for nearly 25 years and had to capitulate in particular due to increasing
competition from regions where gig mills were already prevalent. Third, Baily (1993)
and Baily and Gersbach (1995) present cross-country comparisons of technology use in
service and manufacturing industries. Plants of multinational corporations located in
different countries have usually access to the same base of knowledge, but use in fact
different amounts of knowledge and apply different work practices. For instance, Ford
U.S.A. has adopted Japanese just-in-time production while Ford Europe failed to do so.
Another example is the beer industry, where much of the high technology machinery used
in Japanese and U.S. plants is manufactured in Germany. However, German breweries
fail to use these more productive technologies as explicit rules and regulations govern
German beer production. Furthermore, a smaller productivity of the European vis-à-vis
the American airline sector is the result of overstaffing which cannot be reduced because
of union rules and political opposition. Parente and Prescott (2002)’s conclusion from
Baily (1993) and Baily and Gersbach (1995) is that cross-country differences in produc-
tion technologies can be explained by explicit constraints that prevent changes in work
practices and the use of better technologies.
In a similar vein, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) focus on the nature of political in-
stitutions to analyze technological backwardness across countries. They motivate their
model on political losers that erect barriers to technology advances to protect their po-
litical power by a variety of historical evidence. In particular, Mokyr (1990) contrasts
the Luddites, skilled weavers that faced unemployment from technological progress, and
the land-owning elites in the 19th century. Whereas the former attempted but ultimately
failed to halt advances in mechanization, the latter did not stop the evolution since their
continued political power was secure. This was different in Russia where the elites op-
posed economic advances, fearing social and political change, and admitted it only after
having been defeated heavily in the Crimean War (Mosse, 1992).
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In a different approach, Comin et al. (2008) show that there exist large cross-country time
lags in the use of technologies which account for substantive TFP differences. Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2011) demonstrate that the implied cross-country differences in technology
adoption stem from massive barriers to technology adoption. The latter are caused by the
degree of long-term historical relatedness between human populations since societies that
share more cultural and other traits are more likely to adopt technologies from each other.
In particular, the relative frontier distance, defined by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2011) as
the relatedness of a country’s population to that of the U.S., explains large differences in
the adoption of technologies.
Although the above empirical study focuses on rigid barriers to technology adoption, most
other economists agree on the fact that barriers are mainly shaped by modifiable regula-
tions and institutions. Ngai (2004) shows that changes in institutions which imply changes
in barriers to technology adoption have far reaching economic consequences. In her article
on long-term economic growth, higher barriers not only lower the level of income along
a balanced growth path, but also delay an economy’s turning point from extensive, i.e.
traditional, to modern economic growth. The latter happened in Argentina where changes
in institutions implied a rise in barriers to technology adoption. In contrast, institutions
in Japan improved such that barriers decreased, involving a higher income level along its
balanced growth path and an earlier start of modern economic growth. Moreover, Hall
and Jones (1999) explain cross-country differences in output per worker by differences in
institutions and government policies. Those favorable to high levels of output per worker
provide an environment that supports among others technology transfers, i.e. low barriers
to technology adoption. Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) show that modest barriers
to international knowledge spillovers could hinder international technology diffusion and
account for great differences in TFP. Harding and Rattso (2005) establish a long run
relationship between South African productivity and the world technology frontier where
changes in the barrier to technology adoption affect transitional growth.
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2.3 Firm-Level Analysis
Since more and less productive firms differ exclusively with respect to their scope of
technology in production, their production possibilities and respective optimal choices
given market size (A) and wages (wH , wL) do not require a distinct analysis. Market size
and wages will be endogenously determined in general equilibrium analysis.
2.3.1 Production
Each firm i produces output Yi according to the production function
Yi := Nκi+1i
(
1
Ni
∫ Ni
0
x
σ
1+σ
i,j dj
) 1+σ
σ
(2.1)
where Ni denotes the level of technology in production and xi,j the respective input
quantity of each intermediate input. In particular, a firm chooses a subset [0, Ni] out of
the available set of intermediate inputs [0, T ] ⊆ [0, µ] with 1  T ≤ µ9. T is an inverse
measure of barriers to technology adoption that summarizes the constraints a firm faces
in its decision on the optimal level of technology in production. The smaller T , the less
sophisticated are the production techniques a firm may adopt. The barrier to technology
adoption binds and the firm is technologically constrained if N∗i > T where N∗i represents
the optimal choice of technology in the absence of barriers. In the following, Ni denotes a
firm’s level of technology which will be replaced by N∗i or, respectively, by T if clarification
is required.
A firm’s technology type κi > 0 captures the extent to which a firm benefits from tech-
nology, i.e. by how much technology augments a firm’s output. Whenever there is no loss
of clarification, I will abstract from the firm index i to save on notation. Furthermore,
σ ∈ (0,∞) determines the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate inputs
in production, 1 + σ > 1. Also, I impose κσ < 110.
9Note that the assumption of an overall upper limit to technology, 0 µ <∞, constitutes a modeling
necessity to ensure that Cobb-Douglas exponents in the production function of intermediate inputs (1.2)
are in [0, 1].
10This implies a defined choice of N . See the first chapter for further details.
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Each intermediate input j ∈ [0, N ] is produced according to
xj(Lj, Hj) := zjL
1− j
µ
j H
j
µ
j (2.2)
where zj =
(
j
µ
)− j
µ (1− j
µ
)−(1−
j
µ
), Hj is the input quantity of high- and Lj that of low-skilled
labor. Total employment of each skill category within a firm is given by L ≡ ∫N0 Ljdj and
H ≡ ∫N0 Hjdj. In essence, (2.2) constitutes a smooth way of modeling technology-skill
complementarity. See the first chapter for more details. Minimum unit costs of producing
one unit of j are
kj = wLw¯
j
µ (2.3)
where w¯ ≡ wH
wL
is defined as the wage gap between high- and low-skilled labor.
2.3.2 Profit Maximization
A firm’s profit reads as
Π
(
N, {Lj}N0 , {Hj}N0
)
= A1−βY β − C(Y ) = A1−βY (H,L)β −
∫ N
0
[wHHj + wLLj] dj,
where A1−βY β = pY is a firm’s revenue (derived from household’s demand (1.17)), β
determines the elasticity of demand 1/(1−β), and C(Y ) are the (labor) costs of producing
Y . Profit maximization implies to choose the optimal quantities of Hj and Lj ∀j ∈ [0, N ],
weigh them with respective wages, and aggregate to obtain a firm’s cost.
A different approach consists in using the minimum unit cost function kj. Then, the firm’s
problem becomes
max
N,{xj}N0
Π
(
N, {xj}N0
)
= max
N,{xj}N0
{
A1−βY (N, {xj}N0 )β −
∫ N
0
kjxjdj
}
(2.4)
and the number of endogenous variables is reduced from 2N + 1 to N + 1. I further
impose that N > 0 to ensure a positive demand of high-skilled labor (see (2.2)). In
general equilibrium, wages adjust such that N = 0 would never constitute an optimal
choice. Moreover, each firm is constrained to choose a level of technology in production
that does not exceed the barrier to technology adoption. As a consequence, each firm has
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to maximize its profit for N ∈ (0, T ].
2.3.3 Optimal Firm Behavior
A firm’s optimal production structure given wages and market size depends on the profit-
maximizing level of technology as well as on the optimal quantities of intermediates in
production. The latter relate through the production function of intermediates to the
corresponding optimal demands of high- and low-skilled labor. For this and the following
section, I impose eκµ > w¯ > e
2κ
1−κσ to ensure an optimal choice of technology within (1, µ].
As e
2κ
1−κσ > eκβ, w¯ > e
2κ
1−κσ also ensures positive high- and low-skilled labor demands.
The first order maximization conditions derived from (2.4) determine the optimal quantity
of intermediate input j ∈ [0, N ] for any level of technology N ∈ (0, T ],
xj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N k
−1−σ
j , (2.5)
where K¯N ≡
[
1
N
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj
]− 1
σ are average minimal unit costs. A derivation of first order
conditions is given in Appendix 2.7.1 which also shows that the exclusive impact of barriers
to technology adoption on the optimal quantity of xj given in (2.5) consists in the level
of technology in production. Whenever the latter is chosen optimally, the respective level
of technology is determined by the first order condition ∂Π
∂N
= 0. However, as long as
∂Π
∂N
= Π
N
κ− (N ∂K¯N
∂N
)
/K¯N︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡εK¯N
 > 0,
barriers to technology adoption (T ) restrict a firms choice and N∗ > T . εK¯N is defined as
the elasticity of K¯N with respect to N where ∂εK¯N/∂N > 0 (see Appendix 2.7.2). As a
consequence, whenever a firm’s endogenous technology choice is constrained by the barrier,
it is optimal to adopt the most sophisticated production technique that is available: T .
In contrast, if ∂Π
∂N
= 0 which implies κ = εK¯N∗ given intermediates’ production function
(2.2), a firm is able to implement its optimal technology level, N∗ ≤ T .
Using minimal unit costs (2.3) derived from the adjusted Cobb-Douglas production
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function for intermediate inputs, the index of average unit costs can be rewritten as
K¯N = wL
(
1
N
∫N
0 w¯
−σ j
µdj
)− 1
σ
= wL
(
w¯
−σNµ −1
N
µ
(−σ) ln w¯
)− 1
σ
. This implies the following elasticity of
average unit costs11 with respect to the level of technology N :
εK¯N =
1
σ
−
N
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
. (2.6)
If barriers to technology adoption do not restrict a firm’s technology choice, (2.6) equals
a firm’s scope for technology in production, κ, and determines in this way the optimal
technology level N∗. For the unrestricted case, the proof of uniqueness of a firm’s endoge-
nous level of technology is given in the first chapter. Moreover, if the barrier constrains
the technology adoption decision, a firm will always choose the highest attainable level
since ∂Π
∂N
> 0 for N∗ > T . As a consequence, a firm’s choice of the level of technology in
production is unique in either case, i.e. regardless whether N∗ R T .
Optimal output of the firm depends directly and indirectly on the level of technology in
production,
Y = β
1
1−βAN
κ
1−β K¯
− 11−β
N , (2.7)
since the technology-skill complementarity implies that K¯N increases in N , i.e. εK¯N > 0.
Prices are derived from firm-level output (2.7) and the representative household’s demand,
Y = Ap
1
β−1 . As in a standard Dixit-Stiglitz economy, they are set as a mark-up over
marginal costs:
p = K¯N
Nκβ
. (2.8)
Total production costs are given by C(Y ) = wHH + wLL and become, evaluated at the
optimum, Y K¯N
Nκ
. Note that C(Y ) are nominal and real costs as real wages are given by wH
PI
and wL
PI
, respectively, where PI represents the price index which is normalized to one in
general equilibrium12. Hence, productivity is defined as real output over real production
costs:
φ ≡ Y
C(Y ) =
Nκ
K¯N
= N
κ
wLw¯
N
µ
(
1− σεK¯N
) 1
σ
. (2.9)
11Remark that K¯N = wLw¯
N
µ
(
σ
N
µ ln w¯
w¯
σN
µ −1
) 1
σ
= wLw¯
N
µ
(
1− σεK¯N
) 1
σ .
12PI could be included as a constant in the function of productivity but this would not alter any result.
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Therefore, firm-level productivity depends on the skill premium and the level of technology
but, beyond that, also on the wage level (i.e. it takes into account the level of production
costs). Furthermore, a final good’s price relates proportionally to productivity, p = 1
φβ
,
whereby both represent equivalent measures of efficiency.
Foreshadowing the heterogeneous firms equilibrium, I assume in the following two different
types of firms where the high-productivity firm (h-firm) has a greater scope for technology
in production, κh, than the low-productivity firm (l-firm), κl, i.e. κh > κl. While their
technology gap is defined as Nh
Nl
, their difference in productivities is given by
φ∆ ≡ φh
φl
= N
κh
h
Nκll
w¯−
Nh−Nl
µ
 1− σεK¯Nl
1− σεK¯Nh
 1σ (2.10)
which immediately follows from (2.9). Note that in contrast to productivity levels the
productivity gap φ∆ is independent of wage levels but depends on the respective technol-
ogy levels of more and less productive firms as well as on the the skill premium. Since
I will impose in the heterogeneous firms case that h-firms are constrained while l-firms
are not, high-productivity firms’ technology choice will be restricted to T whereas Nl will
be chosen endogenously by l-firms through the first order condition κl = εK¯Nl . In this
case, productivity differences will become φ∆ = T
κh
N
κl
l
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1−σκl
1−σεK¯T
) 1
σ
and will depend
directly and indirectly (through εK¯T ) on barriers to technology adoption.
Labor is the only factor in the production of intermediate inputs. In particular, labor
resources devoted to intermediates’ production are labeled production labor to distinguish
them from resources required for market entry. Respective production labor demands for
each intermediate input as well as aggregated demands on the firm-level are derived in
Appendix 2.7.3. A firm’s factor demands of high- and low-skilled labor can be summarized
as
H = βpY
εK¯N
wH ln w¯
, (2.11)
L = βpY
ln w¯ − εK¯N
wL ln w¯
. (2.12)
Note that if a firm is constrained by the barrier to technology adoption, εK¯N = εK¯T ,
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and, in the case of an endogenous choice of the optimal level of technology in production,
εK¯N = κ. This implies that relative high- to low-skilled production labor demands
H
L
= 1
w¯
εK¯N
ln w¯ − εK¯N
. (2.13)
depend on the level of technology in the case of high-productivity firms since Nh =
T . In contrast, low-productivity firms’ relative high- to low-skilled production labor
demands are independent of their level of technology Nl. However, low-productivity
firms’ production techniques and relative high- to low-skilled production labor demands
are given by their common determinants κl and the skill premium.
2.3.4 Firm-Level Impacts of Changes in Skill Premia and Bar-
riers to Technology Adoption
From a firm’s perspective, the skill premium is exogenous akin to the barrier to technology
adoption. Moreover, a respective increase or decrease has an impact on the firm’s tech-
nology choice and the resulting productivity level whenever the wage gap or the barrier
constitutes a determining factor in the decision process. This implies that a lower skill
premium affects the optimal technology choice if and only if the barrier does not bind.
Vice versa, a lower barrier has an impact on the adoption of production techniques if and
only if the endogenous choice of the level of technology is constrained by the barrier.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that firms’ choices of the level of technology in production are
not restricted by the barrier. Then, the technology level decreases in the skill premium,
dN∗
dw¯
= − N∗
w¯ ln w¯ < 0, and increases in a firm’s technology type,
dN∗
dκ
= N∗(1−κσ)(N∗µ ln w¯−κ)
> 0.
Furthermore, productivity increases in the technology type, ∂φ
∂κ
= ln (N∗)φ > 0, decreases
in the wage gap, ∂φ
∂w¯
= − κφ
w¯ ln w¯ < 0, and the productivity gap shrinks in the skill premium,
∂φ∆
∂w¯
= −φ∆ κh−κdw¯ ln w¯ < 0.
The case where the barrier to technology adoption has no impact on the production
process applies in particular to low-productivity firms when wages are exogenous. Their
level of skill-complementary technology in production is downgraded if its implicit price,
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the skill premium, increases. As a result, l-firms’ productivity is dampened. Since a
greater scope for technology in production implies a more productive use of technology,
an increase in κ leads to a choice of more sophisticated production techniques and a
higher productivity. Consequently, a graduate increase in barriers to technology adoption
will restrict higher κ (high-productivity) firms first. Moreover, given that neither type
is constrained, h-firms have to downgrade their production techniques by more than l-
firms when the skill premium increases since the latter has a stronger impact on more
technology intensive production processes13.
In contrast to the above analysis, assume that a high-productivity firm’s choice is re-
stricted by the barrier. Then, the adoption of higher technology levels when the wage
gap shrinks is not feasible. Remark that I abstract in the following from very sharp skill
premium increases which may induce high-productivity firms to choose optimal technol-
ogy levels below the barrier, i.e. N∗ < T . Whether N∗ > T decreases to N∗∗ R T , where
N∗ > N∗∗, is in fact determined by firm-level parameters κ and σ in combination with
the extend of the skill premium rise and the level of the barrier. For example, if high-
productivity firms are endowed with a relatively small scope for technology in production,
their choice of technology would be more prone to a decrease as a result of a sharp rise in
the wage gap. However, considering cases where N∗ > T is dampened to N∗∗ < T would
not add insights to the present analysis.
Proposition 2.2 Given wages, a firm’s choice of technology is constrained if and only if
T < 2κµln (w¯)(1−κσ) . Moreover, high-productivity firms are constrained while low-productivity
firms are not if and only if κl < 12µ
ln (w¯)T +σ
< κh.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.4. Lower skill premia involve lower adoption costs
and increase a firm’s optimal technology level which is then obviously more likely to be
constrained. Furthermore, firms that are endowed with a greater κ usually choose higher
levels of technology in production, and are consequently more prone to become constrained
by the barrier. The more restrictive the latter is (i.e., the smaller T ) the more likely it
constrains firms’ production techniques. Since the skill premium represents the implicit
costs of technology in production, a lower wage gap decreases technology adoption costs
13See the first chapter for proofs as well as an detailed discussion of the unconstrained cases.
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and makes firms more prone to become technologically constrained. To sum up, a relative
restrictive barrier constrains a firm’s choice if it has a great scope for technology and faces
a rather low skill premium.
In essence, the difference in their respective scopes for technology in production implies
whether high-productivity firms are restricted in their endogenous choice of technology
while low-productivity firms are not. Remark that κh > κl is not sufficient but that h-
firms’ technology type has to be greater than a threshold while l-firms’ scope for technology
has to be smaller. Moreover, this requires rather medium levels of the skill premium and
the barrier to technology adoption. Note that in comparison to the case where both are
unrestricted the technology gap is smaller if barriers constrain high-productivity but not
low-productivity firms’ choices.
Proposition 2.3 If a firm’s choice of technology in production is constrained by the bar-
rier, productivity increases when the barrier is lowered (i.e. T increases), ∂φ
∂T
= φκ−εK¯T
T
>
0, and decreases when the skill premium rises, ∂φ
∂w¯
= − εK¯T φ
w¯ ln w¯ < 0. Furthermore, relative
production labor demands increase if the barrier is reduced.
Assume that high-productivity firms’ technology choices are restricted while low-
productivity firms’ are not. Then, φ∆ increases when the barrier is lowered,
∂φ∆
∂T
= φ∆
κh−εK¯T
T
> 0, and decreases for higher skill premia, ∂φ∆
∂w¯
= −φ∆ εK¯T−κlw¯ ln w¯ < 0.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.4. Given that barriers to technology adoption indeed
restrict a firm’s choice the latter is confined to produce with less sophisticated technologies.
Since higher levels of technology augment production a firm’s productivity is necessarily
dampened. A reform in policies and institutions that involves lower barriers implies
the adoption of more productive technologies. Note that the increase in productivity is
proportional to the difference κ− εK¯T . The closer T is to N∗ the smaller is the marginal
gain from a rise in T since the cost elasticity of technology adoption (εK¯N ) increases in
the level of technology and dampens the positive effect of technology on productivity. If
κ = εK¯T barriers do not impede an optimal choice of technology and the marginal gain of
lower barriers vanishes.
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Similar to the case of unrestricted choices a higher wag gap rises the cost of technology and
implies lower levels of technology in production and, consequently, a lower productivity.
However, the downgrade is somewhat dampened by the factor εK¯T < κ as the lower
technology level in the constrained case requires relatively less high-skilled labor. In a
similar vein, lower barriers imply more sophisticated production techniques that require
relatively more high-skilled workers.
In the case of heterogeneous firms, high-productivity firms’ use of technology in production
is more efficient than low-productivity firms’ whereas the former’s optimal technology
choice is constrained in contrast to the latter’s. In particular, this case emerges when low-
productivity firms manage to influence politics to protect their vested interests. Resulting
e.g. from a reform in regulations, lower barriers to technology adoption enable h-firms to
use more sophisticated production techniques and increase their productivity while having
no impact on l-firms when wages are exogenous. As an immediate result, the productivity
gap rises proportionally to κh − εK¯T . That is, akin to ∂φ∂T , increases in the productivity
gap abate if T approaches high-productivity firms’ optimal technology level.
On the other hand, h-firms have to employ relatively more high-skilled labor due to the
complementarity of technology and skills. They will suffer more in terms of productivity
from a skill premium increase. The relative loss is again proportional to εK¯T − κl and,
thus, smaller than in the unconstrained case as restricted h-firms employ relatively less
high-skilled labor than they would in optimum.
2.4 Homogeneous Firms Equilibrium
A firm’s level of technology in production and the related demands of high- and low-skilled
labor are embedded in a Dixit-Stiglitz economy. In this section, I will abstract from any
differences across firms and will focus on the equilibrium impact of barriers to technology
adoption on firm-level and aggregated variables. In a first step, firms are assumed to
be constrained in their technology choice by the barrier to technology adoption. The
resulting wage levels and the skill premium are determined. In a second step, I analyze
under which conditions firms’ technology levels are restricted by the barrier. Lowering
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the latter has various implications for wages and welfare which are explored subsequently
in detail.
The representative household has a CES-utility function
u =
(∫ M
0
Y βi di
) 1
β
, 0 < β < 1,
and supplies low- and high-skilled labor (Ls, Hs) inelastically. There exists a continuum
of final goods Yi, with i ∈ [0,M ], that are produced by a homogeneous mass M of firms
that are all of technology type κ. The elasticity of substitution between final goods is
1
1−β > 1. The above taste for variety preferences imply the demand function
Yi =
(
pi
PI
)− 11−β A
PI
(2.14)
where pi is the price of final good i, A are aggregate expenditures, and PI ≡(∫M
0 p
− β1−β
i di
)− 1−β
β
is the price index of final goods. Since PI is defined as the numeraire
(PI ≡ 1) the implied demand function for each firm, Ap−
1
1−β
i , in Section 2.3.2 becomes
identical to (2.14). In combination with optimal firm choices in Section 2.3.3 and market
clearing, equilibrium is defined as:
Definition 2.1 Equilibrium in an economy with homogeneous firms is given by a set of
prices {p, wH , wL}, quantities {Y,H, L}, and level of technology N such that with free
entry of firms consumers choose consumption of each final good optimally, firms choose
output, level of technology and labor inputs optimally, and labor and product markets clear.
Note that intermediate inputs do not show up in the definition of equilibrium. However,
they are produced within each firm with high- and low-skilled labor that are aggregated
on the firm-level to firm-specific high- and low-skilled labor demands. Furthermore, when
technology choices are constrained and thus given by the barrier, the set of equations
defining the equilibrium is reduced by the optimal firm decision on technology.
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2.4.1 Wages Levels, Skill Premium, and Firm numbers
There is free entry of firms and each firm has to incur f units of low-skilled labor to set
up production. Adding these market entry cost to production low-skilled labor demand
results in a firm’s total low-skilled labor demand: L+ f . The free entry condition,
pY − C(Y )− wLf = 0 ⇐⇒ (1− β)pY = wLf, (2.15)
fixes the wage level given a firm’s revenue. The latter is derived by multiplying the optimal
price (2.8) by the optimal output (2.7) and using the expression of average unit costs K¯N :
pY = β
β
1−βAN
κβ
1−βw
β
β−1
L w¯
Nβ
µ(β−1) (1− εK¯Nσ)
β
σ(β−1) . (2.16)
Plugging this expression into the free entry condition (2.15) and considering total labor
income (wLLs + wHHs = A) results in the wage level
wL = βNκw¯−
T
µ (1− εK¯Nσ)−
1
σ
(
(1− β)(Ls + w¯Hs)
f
) 1−β
β
(2.17)
which is a function of labor endowments, parameters, the barrier to technology adoption,
and the skill premium.
The wage gap and, implicitly, the high-skilled wage are derived from setting relative labor
supply equal to relative labor demand, using production labor demands ((2.11) and (2.12))
and the zero profit condition (2.15) in a firm’s revenue where pY = Ap
β
β−1 :
HS
LS
= MH
M(L+ f) =
1
w¯
εK¯N
ln w¯
β
− εK¯N
. (2.18)
If the barrier does not constrain the technology choice, the above skill premium equa-
tion collapses to HS
LS
= 1
w¯
κ
ln w¯
β
−κ exhibiting the properties presented in the first chapter.
However, whenever firms’ optimal technology choice is restricted by the barrier, the im-
plied wage gap in (2.18) depends on the barrier which has important repercussions in the
following.
Plugging the free entry condition (2.15) into the equality of household income and total
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expenditures (wLLs + wHHs = MpY ) results in the number of firms
M = 1− β
f
(Ls + w¯Hs).
Clearly, firm numbers rise in the absolute supply of labor and decrease in fixed costs.
They depend on the barrier to technology adoption when the latter determines the skill
premium, i.e. when firms are restricted in their technology choice. Note further that a
higherM increases variety and, as a consequence, welfare of the representative household.
2.4.2 Determinants of Technology Restriction
The relative endowment of high-skilled labor and the scope for technology in production
determine the skill premium and, simultaneously, a firm’s technology level. Whether the
latter is chosen optimally or restricted by the barrier to technology adoption is analyzed
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 If and only if it holds that
HS
LS
> exp
( −2κ µ
T
1− κσ
)
1− κσ
2
β
µ
T
− 1 + κσ (2.19)
firms’ technology choices are constrained by the barrier to technology adoption. In partic-
ular, the latter precludes the use of better technologies if it is rather restrictive, high-skilled
labor is relatively abundant, firms are endowed with a rather great scope for technology in
production, or the elasticity of substitution between final goods is relatively small.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.5. A more restrictive barrier to technology adoption
is, ceteris paribus, more likely to constrain a firm’s technology choice14. A smaller range
of feasible production techniques decreases firms’ chances to adopt the most efficient
technologies. On the other hand, a country’s labor endowments have an indirect impact
on the fact whether the barrier is binding or not. A greater relative endowment of high-
skilled labor implies ceteris paribus a lower skill premium which, in turn, decreases costs
14As T ≤ µ, a firm cannot choose a ‘not defined’ technology level of N > µ. See the first chapter for
an analysis of N ≤ µ in the unconstrained case.
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of technology adoption. Firms would choose a higher optimal level of technology in
production and would be more prone to become restricted by the barrier. In the same line,
a higher scope for technology in production increases the benefits of more sophisticated
production techniques. The optimally chosen technology level rises and, consequently,
being restricted in their technology choice becomes more likely for firms. A different
mechanism applies to the elasticity of substitution between final products. A less elastic
demand (i.e. a smaller β) implies greater operating profits what induces more firms to
enter the market. As fixed costs are paid in units of low-skilled labor, relative skill demand
decreases and the skill premium shrinks. This reduces the cost of technology adoption
as in the case of a greater relative skill endowment and raises the level of the optimally
chosen technology.
2.4.3 Impact of Lower Barriers to Technology Adoption on
Firms and Welfare
Beside vested interests of groups, inefficient institutions and bureaucratic regulations are
often the underlying causes of barriers to technology adoption (Parente and Prescott,
2002). Their removal requires dedicated policy reforms which are usually tackled step-
by-step. My model follows this process by analyzing the marginal impact of a reduction
in barriers on a country’s economic variables.
Proposition 2.5 The skill premium, a firm’s productivity, the number of firms, total
labor income, and a country’s welfare increase when the barrier is lowered (i.e. if T
increases).
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.5. If firms are not restricted in their choice of tech-
nology, the barrier has no impact on any firm decision or aggregated variable. However,
if the barrier constrains effectively firms’ decisions, it has severe consequences. Instead of
choosing their optimal level of technology in production, N∗, firms’ production techniques
are restricted to T < N∗. When the barrier is lowered, i.e. through a policy change, firms
adopt higher and more efficient levels of technology that boost their productivities. How-
ever, the implementation of more sophisticated production techniques is relatively more
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high-skilled labor intensive. As a result, relative high-skill demand increases and, as labor
supply is fixed, necessarily the skill premium. Nevertheless, the total impact on firm-level
productivity is positive since gains from more advanced technologies outweigh the labor
costs increase that results from a combination of higher skill intensity and a widening wage
gap. Furthermore, the rise in productivity increases firms’ revenues and makes market
entry more profitable. As a consequence, more firms enter the market and set up produc-
tion. However, perfect competition on labor markets imply that higher productivities are
passed on to workers via higher wages resulting in greater total labor income. An inherent
property of models having a representative consumer with CES utility is that total labor
income directly translates into the representative household’s utility or, in other words,
into welfare. As a result, a gradual improve in a country’s regulatory framework that
implies lower barriers to technology adoption increases overall welfare.
2.5 Heterogeneous Firms Equilibrium
The above analysis focuses on the equilibrium impact of lower barriers to technology
adoption on skill premia, technology levels, and productivity. However, the assumption of
homogeneous firms excludes any difference in firm-level reactions although the disparities
may be huge. The majority of the economic literature agrees on substantial heterogeneity
in productivity across firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999), which is introduced in the
present model through differences in firms’ scopes for technology in production. A direct
implication is that firms are heterogeneous with respect to the chosen level of technology,
production, productivity, and relative skilled labor demand.
In the following, I analyze the impact of a lower barrier to technology adoption on an
economy populated by firms of technology type κh (high-productivity firms) and, respec-
tively, type κl (low-productivity firms), where κh > κl. Prior to market entry, a firm may
choose its type. Benefits in terms of production are higher in the case of a greater scope
for technology. However, this requires regularly a higher investment in research and devel-
opment. As a consequence, firms of the technology type κh incur higher fixed costs than
firms of technology type κl, implying fh > fl. fhfl is defined as relative fixed costs and
Nh
Nl
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represents the technology gap of more to less productive firms. In particular, enormous
relative fixed costs may prevent any firm to choose the high type. If the difference in
the scope for technology in production is very large, the low type is never chosen. In the
following, I will first assume that parameters are such that both types coexist and in a
second step, I will analyze the conditions of coexistence in more detail.
2.5.1 Impact of Lower Barriers to Technology Adoption on the
Skill Premium and Technologies
Given that more and less productive firms enter the market and produce, the expected
return of each investment strategy is zero and firms are consequently indifferent which
strategy to choose.
Definition 2.2 Equilibrium with heterogeneous firms is given by a set of prices
{ph, pl, wH , wL}, quantities {Yh, Yl, Hh, Hl, Lh, Ll}, and levels of technology {Nh, Nl} such
that with free entry of firms consumers choose consumption of each final good optimally,
firms choose output, level of technology and labor inputs optimally, while labor and product
markets clear.
While the above equilibrium definition is of a more general nature, I will restrict my
analysis to the case where the technology choice of h-firms is constrained by the barrier T .
In the spirit of Parente and Prescott (2002), barriers to technology adoption are imposed
by institutions such that technology choices of high-productivity firms are restricted. In
this way, less productive firms avoid an increased competition15 and protect their vested
interests. As a consequence, h-firms’ first order condition of the optimal technology choice
drops from the set of equilibrium equations and Nh is set to T .
Different to the homogeneous firms economy with free entry, the skill premium is not
determined by relative total labor demands and supply. Rather, it is derived from the
15Note that in this class of CES-utility models competition occurs exclusively on labor markets, i.e.
higher wages imply an increased competition.
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relation of free entry conditions phYh = wLfh1−β and plYl =
wLfl
1−β
16:
φ
β
1−β
∆ =
fh
fl
. (2.20)
While the above implicit skill premium equation holds irrespective whether the technology
barrier binds or not, its explicit functional form differs.
Proposition 2.6 Assume that high-productivity firms are restricted in their technology
choice and that the technology barrier is lowered, i.e. T increases. Then, the skill premium
rises, dw¯
dT
= w¯ ln w¯
T
κh−εK¯T
εK¯T
−κl > 0, and the technology gap,
∂
(
T
Nl
)
∂T
= κh−κl
Nl(εK¯T−κl)
> 0, widens.
However, relative productivities remain constant.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.6. Lower barriers to technology adoption enable high-
productivity firms to approach or even attain their optimal levels of technology in produc-
tion while having no direct effect on l-firms’ choices. However, higher technology levels of
h-firms imply a greater relative demand of high-skilled labor and drive up the skill pre-
mium. As a consequence, l-firms face higher labor costs for maintaining their technology
level and are finally forced to downgrade their production techniques.
This is illustrated by a simulation in Figure 2.117. N∗l depicts the optimal technology
choice of an l-firm for any wage gap while N∗∗l constitutes its optimal choice given a con-
stant skill premium w¯(T = 70). The increase in the technology gap Nh
N∗
l
is considerably
sharper than that of Nh
N∗∗
l
since the latter does not include downgrades caused by widening
wage gaps. The difference in the two technology gaps increases for lower barriers and
becomes agnostic to further reductions once high-productivity firms have reached their
optimal level of technology. Although lower barriers to technology adoption lead to an
increase in the technology gap, its positive impact on the productivity difference is exactly
canceled by the simultaneous skill premium rise18. A higher level of technology in produc-
tion leads to a rise in high-productivity firms’ relative skill demand. This, in combination
16See the first chapter for an analysis of how that relates to the Rybczynski Theorem and how the
technology choices of different firms are related through factor markets.
17Parameters are κh = 0.24, κl = 0.16, σ = 1/3, β = 0.75, fh/fl = 2.75, Hs = 15, Ls = 85, and
µ = 100. Remark that Acemoglu et al. (2007) compute implicit values of κ = 0.135 and κ = 0.25 for the
U.S..
18Further details are given at the end of the proof of Pproposition 2.6.
83
Do all firms profit from lower barriers to technology adoption?
Figure 2.1: Technology Gap and Skill Premia
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The impact of lower barriers to technology adoption on the technology gap and the skill premium. To
the left of N∗h , h-firms are constrained by the barrier T while to the right, they are not. The blue graph
depicts the wage gap, the red NhN∗
l
, and the green NhN∗∗
l
.
with the skill premium increase, has a strong dampening effect on their productivity. On
the other hand, low-productivity firms downgrade their level of technology and, conse-
quently, their relative skill demand as a reaction to the widening wage gap. In this way,
they alleviate the negative impact of the wage cost increase on their level of productivity.
Note that the above result of a constant productivity gap differs from the firm-level equi-
librium where firms consider wages as given and lower barriers imply growing differences
in productivities. In essence, the existence of an equilibrium with positive numbers of
both types of firms requires that the productivity gap is unaffected by altering the bar-
rier. Otherwise, comparative static exercises for firm differences cannot be carried out as
an increase in the barrier would imply an economy without low-productivity firms.
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2.5.2 Endogenous Numbers of Firms
Whether homogeneous or heterogeneous firms populate the economy depends in fact on
the set of a country’s parameters and endowments (κh, κl, β, σ, Hs, Ls, T ). They deter-
mine simultaneously whether both types of firms enter or whether one type is precluded
from entering profitably the economy. For a more detailed analysis of firm entry deci-
sions, numbers of more and less productive firms are computed explicitly. Furthermore,
conditions for simultaneous or exclusive entry are derived.
In a first step, the number of h-firms is fixed. Using the free entry condition of l-firms,
(1 − β)plYl = wLfl, the skill premium equation (2.20), and labor renumeration (A =
wLL
S +wHHS) in product market clearing (A = MlplYl +MhphYh) results in the number
of l-firms
Ml =
(1− β)(LS + w¯HS)
fl
−Mhφ
β
1−β
∆ . (2.21)
Relating high- and low-skilled labor market clearing implies
Hs
Ls
= MlHl +MhHh
Ml(Ll + fl) +Mh(Lh + fh)
.
Next, using the demands of low- (2.12) and high-skilled labor (2.11) within each firm,
while considering in addition free entry of l-firms and the number of l-firms (2.21), results
with the skill premium equation (2.20) in the number of high-productivity firms
Mh =
(1− β)(w¯HS( ln (w¯)
β
− κl)− κlLS)
fh(εK¯T − κl)
. (2.22)
Finally, plugging the above expression into (2.21) results in the number of low-productivity
firms:
Ml =
(1− β)(εK¯TLS − w¯HS( ln (w¯)β − εK¯T ))
fl(εK¯T − κl)
. (2.23)
The following proposition determines conditions under which more and/or less productive
firms enter the market.
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Proposition 2.7 Holding all other parameters constant, ∀fh
fl
∈
((
fh
fl
)∗
,
(
fh
fl
)∗∗)
, where(
fh
fl
)∗
<
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
, low-productivity as well as high-productivity firms enter the market. Fur-
thermore, ∀fh
fl
≤
(
fh
fl
)∗
, exclusively high-productivity firms and ∀fh
fl
≥
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
, exclusively
low-productivity firms enter.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.6. Essentially, the above proposition describes the
ranges of fixed costs that imply either the exclusive entry of high-productivity or low-
productivity firms or the simultaneous market entry of both. Relative fixed costs above(
fh
fl
)∗∗
preclude the entry of h-firms and imply an economy populated by l-firms. How-
ever, relative fixed costs below
(
fh
fl
)∗
involves that high-productivity firms’ technological
advantage outweighs their fixed costs disadvantage such that no firm chooses to become a
low-productivity firm. Given the scopes for technology in production and other parame-
ters, there exists a range of ‘coexistence’,
((
fh
fl
)∗
,
(
fh
fl
)∗∗)
, where both types of firms enter
the economy.
2.5.3 Impact of Lower Barriers to Technology Adoption on
Wages and Welfare
Although the skill premium rises it remains unclear whether low-skilled workers only lose
in relative terms or whether lowering barriers to technology adoption leaves them worse
off. Plugging firm-level labor demands ((2.11), (2.12)) and firm numbers ((2.22), (2.23))
into high-skilled labor market clearing (MlHl + MhHh = Hs) and using firms’ revenue
functions ((2.16) for h- and l-firms, respectively) results in the low-skilled wage level
wL = βT κhw¯−
T
µ (1− εK¯Tσ)−
1
σ
(
(1− β)(Ls + w¯Hs)
fh
) 1−β
β
. (2.24)
wL differs from the case of homogeneous firms (2.17) with respect to the implicit function
that determines the skill premium and with respect to fixed entry costs.
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Proposition 2.8 A country’s welfare increases if barriers to technology adoption are
lowered. The low-skilled wage decreases in lower barriers if the scope for technology in
production of low-productivity firms is relatively big, and low-skilled labor is relatively
abundant: ∂wL
∂T
= wL
T
κh−εK¯T
εK¯T
−κl
(
1−β
β
w¯Hs
Ls+w¯Hs ln w¯ − κl
)
. The high-skilled wage increases in
lower barriers to technology adoption.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.7.6. Lower barriers to technology adoption enable high-
productivity firms to improve on their level of technology in production. Since high-skilled
labor is complementary to more sophisticated production techniques, its demand and,
consequently, its wage level increases. On the other hand, the increase in the skill premium
downgrades the technology choice of low-productivity firms, implying a dampening effect
on the high-skilled wage. Nevertheless, a decrease in barriers increases overall welfare of a
country since more productive firms are able to use a production technique that is closer
to their optimal choice, Nh. Moreover, since more productive high-skilled workers are
shifted towards the more productive firms, country-level efficiency increases and, hence,
aggregated output.
The impact of lower barriers to technology adoption on the low-skilled wage is less clear-
cut. Since high-productivity firms implement a higher level of technology the high-skill
complementarity implies that demand of low-skilled labor decreases. Given that low-
skilled are relatively abundant, a decrease in the wage level equilibrates the low-skilled
labor market. A great scope for technology in production of low-productivity firms implies
that they operate with a high level of technology in production. In case of a downgrade
of production techniques, l-firms will still produce with sophisticated technologies, thus
increasing the low-skilled labor demand only by little which does not compensate for the
lowered demand of h-firms.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter of my dissertation, I analyze the impact of reducing barriers to tech-
nology adoption on the endogenous technology choices of heterogeneous firms, the skill
premium, and a country’s welfare. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their scope for
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skill-complementary technology in production. High-productivity firms have an inherent
advantage in the use of technology in production and choose in optimum more sophis-
ticated production techniques than low-productivity firms. However, bad institutions or
regulatory policies that protect the vested interests of the latter impose a barrier that
constrains high-productivity firms to use technologies in production well inferior to their
optimal choice. Whenever a policy reform loosens the restrictions, high-productivity
firms face lower barriers and adopt more sophisticated techniques. In contrast, there
exists no direct impact on low-productivity firms. However, since technology is skill-
complementary the relative skill demand of high-productivity firms rises and the skill
premium increases. Consequently, low-productivity firms with already low levels of tech-
nology have to downgrade production techniques since the costs of technology adoption
increase. As a consequence, the technology gap between more and less productive firms
widens.
Although some firms are induced to produce with less productive technologies a country’s
overall welfare increases. Hence, this study, in line with most of the literature, emphasizes
the importance of lowering barriers to technology adoption to improve output per capita
in emerging and developing countries. However, the detrimental effects on out-of-date
industries and their employees have to be taken into account. The welfare gains in my
analysis crucially depend on increased labor market competition that reallocates in partic-
ular high-skilled workers to more productive industries. In the presence of labor market
frictions, welfare losses would occur from a hindered reallocation which would lead to
transitional unemployment. Although gains from lower barriers should still prevail, fur-
ther research is needed to clarify the impact of lower barriers to technology adoption on
the welfare level of workers.
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2.7 Appendix A2
2.7.1 Derivation of Optimal Quantities of Intermediate Inputs
This section contains a derivation of the optimal xj for any N ∈ (0, T ]. The first order
maximization conditions ∀j ∈ [0, N ] derived from (2.4) are:
βA1−βY β−1
∂Y
∂xj
= kj ∀j ∈ [0, N ] . (A2.1)
From the definition of Y I calculate
∂Y
∂xj
=
x
−1
1+σ
j Y∫N
0 x
σ
1+σ
j dj
. (A2.2)
Using (A2.2) in (A2.1), I obtain, for each pair (j, j′),
xj
xj′
=
[
k′j
kj
]1+σ
. (A2.3)
Plugging (A2.3) back in (A2.2) results in ∂Y
∂xj
= x
−1
j Y
kσj
∫ N
0 k
−σ
j dj
. Using this in (A2.1) implies
βA1−βY β
x−1j
kσj NK¯
−σ
N
= kj as
∫N
0 k
−σ
j dj = NK¯−σN . Simple rearranging shows that
xj = βA1−βY βN−1K¯σNk−σ−1j . (A2.4)
Plugging (A2.4) in the production function (2.1) and solving for Y leads to Y =
β
1
1−βAN
κ
1−β K¯
− 11−β
N which is (2.7) in the main text. Using this result in (A2.4) and rear-
ranging implies xj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N k
−1−σ
j which is (2.5) in the main text. Using
optimal firm output (2.7) as well as optimal intermediates inputs (2.5) and the defini-
tion of productivity (2.9) involves a new form of the firm’s profit function for any given
N ∈ (0, µ]: ΠN = β
β
1−βAφ
β
1−β (1 − β). Note that a firm’s profit is not yet maximized
with respect to the level of technology. The first derivative with respect to N implies
∂ΠN
∂N
= ΠN
N
(κ− εK¯N ) where I use the fact that ∂φ∂N = φ
(
κ
N
−
∂K¯N
∂N
K¯N
)
= φ
N
(κ− εK¯N ).
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2.7.2 Properties of the Elasticity of Average Unit Costs
The elasticity of average unit costs reads as
εK¯N =
1
σ
−
N
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
. (A2.5)
Note that if the firm is technology constrained, N = T . Furthermore, within this section
I assume that w¯ is constant.
Derivative with respect to N :
Taking the derivative with respect to N leads to
∂εK¯N
∂N
= ln w¯
µ
w¯σ
N
µ ln (w¯)σN
µ
− (w¯σNµ − 1)
(w¯σ
N
µ − 1)2
= 1
N
( 1
σ
− εK¯N
) (
w¯σ
N
µ (1− εK¯Nσ)− 1
)
(A2.6)
and, consequently, since 1
σ
> εK¯N due to
1
σ
> κ > εK¯N :
∂εK¯N
∂N
> 0 ⇐⇒ w¯σNµ (1 −
εK¯Nσ) − 1 > 0 ⇐⇒ w¯σ
N
µ σN
µ
ln (w¯) > w¯σ
N
µ − 1. Note that w¯σNµ = eln (w¯)σNµ and ex
for x ∈ R is defined as the power series ex ≡ ∑∞n=0 xnn! . Therefore, I can rewrite w¯σNµ as(
1 + ln (w¯)σN
µ
+ 12
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)2
+ . . .
)
and the above inequality reads as
1 + ln (w¯)σN
µ
+ 12
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)2
+ . . .
 ln (w¯)σN
µ
> 1 + ln (w¯)σN
µ
+ 12
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)2
+ · · · − 1
⇐⇒ 12
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)2
+ 12
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)3
+ 16
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)4
+ . . .
>
1
6
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)3
+ 124
(
ln (w¯)σN
µ
)4
+ . . .
which holds and implies ∂εK¯N
∂N
> 0.
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Derivative with respect to w¯:
Taking the derivative with respect to w¯ leads to
∂εK¯N
∂w¯
= 1
w¯
ln (w¯)σ
(
N
µ
)2
w¯σ
N
µ − N
µ
(
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
)
(w¯σ
N
µ − 1)2
= 1
w¯ ln (w¯)
( 1
σ
− εK¯N
) (
w¯σ
N
µ (1− εK¯Nσ)− 1
)
> 0 (A2.7)
as
(
w¯σ
N
µ (1− εK¯Nσ)− 1
)
> 0 from ∂εK¯N
∂N
> 0.
2.7.3 Derivation of Production Factor Demands
Rewriting εK¯N for any N ∈ (0, µ) implies
εK¯N =
1
σ
−
N
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
N
µ − 1
⇐⇒ 1− w¯
−σN
µ
N
µ
ln (w¯)
= 1
w¯σ
N
µ
(
1
σ
− εK¯N
) . (A2.8)
Similarly, average unit costs can be written as
K¯N = wLw¯
N
µ
(
1− εK¯Nσ
) 1
σ . (A2.9)
Demand of high-skilled labor to produce intermediate input j, Hj, with the production
function (2.2) is given through cost minimization (see the first chapter) and reads as
Hj = xj
j
µ
w¯
j
µ
−1 = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
j
µ
w¯−σ
j
µ
−1 (A2.10)
Taking the integral
∫N
0 dj and using kj = wLw¯
j
µ leads to
H =
∫ N
0
Hjdj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
1
µw¯
∫ N
0
jw¯−σ
j
µdj
where integration by parts results in
H = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
1−w¯−
N
µ σ
ln w¯ σ
µ
−Nw¯−Nµ σ
σw¯ ln w¯ . (A2.11)
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Using (A2.8) implies H = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
N
σw¯ ln w¯ w¯
−σ T
µ
1
σ
−( 1σ−εK¯T )
1
σ
−εK¯T
while us-
ing the optimal price p = K¯T
Nκβ
of (2.8) and simplifying results in
H = βAp
β
β−1 K¯σN
w−σL
wH ln w¯
w¯−σ
T
µ
εK¯T
1− εK¯Tσ
.
(A2.9) allows to substitute for K¯N and simplifying results in H = βAp
β
β−1
εK¯N
wH ln w¯ . This is
(2.11) in the main text. Similarly, Lj is given by
Lj = xj(1− j
µ
)w¯
j
µ = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
(
1− j
µ
)
w¯−
j
µ
σ
and L =
∫ N
0
Ljdj = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
∫ N
0
w¯−
j
µ
σdj − w¯H
where integrating and using the expression in (A2.11) for H results in
L = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
µ
(
1− w¯−Nµ σ
) (
1− 1
σ ln w¯
)
+Nw¯−
N
µ
σ
σ ln w¯
= β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
N
σ ln w¯
1− w¯−Nµ σ
N
µ
σ ln w¯
(σ ln w¯ − 1) + w¯−Nµ σ
 .
Using (A2.8) implies that
L = β
1
1−βAN
β(κ+1)−1
1−β K¯
σ− β1−β
N w
−1−σ
L
N
σ ln w¯ w¯
−σ T
µ
1
σ
(σ ln w¯ − 1) +
(
1
σ
− εK¯T
)
1
σ
− εK¯T
while employing the optimal price p = K¯T
Nκβ
(2.8) and simplifying results in L =
βAp
β
β−1 K¯σN
w−1−σL
ln w¯ w¯
−σ T
µ
ln w¯−εK¯N
1−εK¯T σ
. Then, the use of (A2.9) allows to substitute for K¯N and
further manipulations lead to L = βAp
β
β−1
ln w¯−εK¯N
wL ln w¯ . This is (1.12) in the main text.
2.7.4 Proofs for Firm-Level Choices Given Wages
Proof of Proposition 2.2
A second order Taylor approximation of κ = 1
σ
−
N∗
µ
ln w¯
w¯
σN
∗
µ −1
is computed: N∗ ≈ 2κµln (w¯)(1−κσ) .
This implies that the choice of technology is restricted if and only if T < 2κµln (w¯)(1−κσ) .
92
Do all firms profit from lower barriers to technology adoption?
In particular, it must hold that 2κlµln (w¯)(1−κlσ) = N
∗
l < Nh = T < 2κhµln (w¯)(1−κhσ) for the h-
firm being constrained while the l-firm is not. Simple manipulations show that if κl <
1
2µ
ln (w¯)T +σ
< κh, the h-firm is constrained while the l-firm is not. Clearly, the condition
κh < 1/σ still holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Assume that the firm is constrained in its technology choice by the barrier.
Proof of an increase in productivity due to an increase in T :
The derivative of firm productivity (2.9) with respect to the technology barrier in case
of a binding barrier reads as: ∂φ
∂T
= φ
(
κ
T
− ln w¯
µ
+ (1− σεK¯T )−1
∂εK¯T
∂T
)
. Plugging in ∂εK¯T
∂T
given wages and εK¯T from Appendix 2.7.2 results in
∂φ
∂T
= φ
T
(κ− εK¯T ).
Proof of a decrease in productivity (2.9) due to an increase in w¯:
The derivative of firm productivity (2.9) with respect to the skill premium in case of a
binding barrier reads as ∂φ
∂w¯
= φ
(
− T
µw¯
+ (1− σεK¯T )−1
∂εK¯T
∂w¯
)
. Plugging in ∂εK¯T
∂w¯
and εK¯T
from Appendix 2.7.2 implies that ∂φ
∂w¯
= − εK¯T φ
w¯ ln w¯ < 0.
Proof of an increase in relative production labor demands due to an increase in T :
The derivative of relative production labor demands (2.13) with respect to the technology
barrier in case of a binding barrier reads as
∂
(
H
L
)
∂T
=
∂εK¯T
∂T
w¯
ln w¯
(ln w¯ − εK¯T )2
> 0,
since ∂εK¯T
∂T
> 0 from Appendix 2.7.2.
Proof of the impact of a higher T on productivity differences:
When the h-firm is technology restricted while the l-firm is not, φ∆ becomes
φ∆ =
T κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− κlσ
1− εK¯Tσ
) 1
σ
(A2.12)
and, consequently, the derivative with respect to T holding w¯ constant and using ∂εK¯T
∂T
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given wages and εK¯T from Appendix 2.7.2 results in
∂φ∆
∂T
= φ∆
κh
T
− ln w¯
µ
+
∂εK¯T
∂T
1− εK¯Tσ

= φ∆
σT
(
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
) (−(1− κhσ) (w¯σ Tµ − 1)+ σT
µ
ln w¯
)
= φ∆
T
[
κh − εK¯T
]
> 0.
Proof of the impacts of a higher w¯ on productivity differences:
The derivative of (A2.12) with respect to w¯ using ∂εK¯T
∂w¯
given wages and εK¯T from Appendix
2.7.2 results in
∂φ∆
∂w¯
= φ∆
 κl
w¯ ln w¯ −
T
w¯µ
+
∂εK¯T
∂w¯
1− εK¯Tσ

= φ∆
σw¯ ln w¯
(
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
) (−(1− κlσ) (w¯σ Tµ − 1)+ σT
µ
ln w¯
)
= − φ∆
w¯ ln w¯
[
εK¯T − κl
]
< 0.
2.7.5 Proofs for Homogeneous Firms
Proof of Proposition 2.4
From Proposition 2.2 N∗ ≈ 2κµ(1−κσ) ln w¯ . Then, the barrier does not constrain the technology
choice if and only if
N∗ ≤ T ⇐⇒ T ≥ 2κµ(1− κσ) ln w¯ ⇐⇒ w¯ ≥ exp
(
2κ µ
T
1− κσ
)
.
Define a threshold skill premium: w¯◦ = exp
(
2κ µ
T
1−κσ
)
. Let’s further define the functions
HS
LS
w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡x(w¯)
= κln w¯
β
− κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y(w¯)
(A2.13)
where x(w¯) is a linear and strictly monotone increasing and y(w¯) is a strictly decreasing
function for w¯ > eκβ. The equilibrium value of w¯ is defined as w¯∗ what implies x(w¯∗) =
y(w¯∗). Furthermore, limw¯→eκβ x(w¯) < limw¯→eκβ y(w¯).
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Therefore, ∀eκβ < w¯ ≤ w¯∗ it holds that x(w¯) ≤ y(w¯) while ∀w¯ ≥ w¯∗ it is true that
x(w¯) ≥ y(w¯). Plugging the threshold value w¯◦ into equation (A2.13) under the assumption
that x(w¯◦) ≤ y(w¯◦) results, as a consequence, in a parameter combination that ensures
w¯∗ ≥ w¯◦. Consequently, a firm’s technology choice is not constrained by the frontier if
and only if
HS
LS
≤ exp
( −2κ µ
T
1− κσ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
1− κσ
2
β
µ
T
− 1 + κσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
.
The above right hand side increases in T , decreases in κ, and increases in β. The inequality
thus does not hold for ‘too small’ T ’s, for ‘too big’ HS
LS
, for ‘too big’ κ’s, or for ‘too small’
β’s.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof of an increase in the wage gap:
From (2.18) define G = HS
LS
w¯ ln w¯
β
− εK¯T
(
1 + HS
LS
w¯
)
, involving
∂G
∂w¯
= H
S
LS
ln w¯
β
+ H
S
LS
1
β
− ∂εK¯T
∂w¯
(
1 + H
S
LS
w¯
)
− εK¯T
HS
LS
,
∂G
∂T
= −∂εK¯T
∂T
(
1 + H
S
LS
w¯
)
.
As dw¯
dT
= −(∂G
∂T
)/(∂G
∂w¯
) and ∂εK¯T
∂T
> 0, it suffices to show that ∂G
∂w¯
> 0:
HS
LS
ln w¯
β
+ H
S
LS
1
β
>
∂εK¯T
∂w¯
(
1 + H
S
LS
w¯
)
+ εK¯T
HS
LS
⇐⇒ H
S
LS
ln w¯
β
+ H
S
LS
1
β
>
1
w¯ ln (w¯)
( 1
σ
− εK¯T
) (
w¯σ
T
µ (1− εK¯Tσ)− 1
)
+ H
S
LS
1
ln (w¯)
( 1
σ
− εK¯T
) (
w¯σ
T
µ (1− εK¯Tσ)− 1
)
+ εK¯T
HS
LS
.
Here, I employed ∂εK¯T
∂w¯
from Section 2.7.2. Using (2.18) and simplifying results in
ln w¯ + 1 >
(
w¯σ
T
µ (1− εK¯Tσ)− 1
) 1
σ
− εK¯T
εK¯T
+ βεK¯T
⇐⇒ εK¯Tσ(ln w¯ − βεK¯T ) > w¯σ
T
µ (1− εK¯Tσ)2 − 1.
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As the left hand side is larger than zero, the above inequality holds if the right hand side
is smaller than zero:
w¯σ
T
µ (1−εK¯Tσ)2 < 1 ⇐⇒
w¯σ
T
µ(
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
)2 <
(
T
µ
σ ln w¯
)−2
⇐⇒ w¯σ Tµ−w¯−σ Tµ >
(
T
µ
σ ln w¯
)2
.
Taylor expansions are applied to the last inequality where manipulations imply 2 +
1
6
(
T
µ
σ ln w¯
)2
+ · · · > T
µ
σ ln w¯. This holds for all T
µ
σ ln w¯ and, consequently, dw¯/dT > 0.
Proof of productivity increase:
The derivative of firm productivity with respect to the technology barrier reads as
∂φ
∂T
= φ
(
εK¯T
T
− (1− α) ln w¯
µ
+
(
HS
LS + w¯HS +
αT
µw¯
)
dw¯
dT
)
using endogenous wages and as well as ∂εK¯T
∂T
and defining α ≡ (1−σεK¯T )w¯
σ Tµ −1
(1−σεK¯T )(w¯
σ Tµ −1)
, where
0 < α < 1. Furthermore, εK¯T
T
− (1− α) ln w¯
µ
= 0 if and only if
σεK¯T
(1− σεK¯T )(w¯σ
T
µ − 1)
T
µ
− εK¯Tln w¯ = 0
⇐⇒ εK¯Tln w¯
σ T
µ
ln w¯ − (1− σεK¯T )(w¯σ
T
µ − 1)
(1− σεK¯T )(w¯σ
T
µ − 1)
= 0
which holds as 1− σεK¯T =
σ T
µ
ln w¯
w¯
σ Tµ −1
. Consequently, ∂φ
∂T
> 0 since dw¯
dT
> 0.
Proof of total labor income increase:
With the definition of εK¯T and rearranging, the low-skilled wage (2.17) can be rewrit-
ten as wL = ΓT κ−
1
σ (ln w¯)− 1σ
(
1− w¯−σ Tµ
) 1
σ (Ls + w¯Hs)
1−β
β where Γ = β
(
1−β
f
) 1−β
β
(
µ
σ
) 1
σ .
Plugging this into total labor income (A = wLLs + wHHs) results in A =
ΓT κ− 1σ (ln w¯)− 1σ
(
1− w¯−σ Tµ
) 1
σ (Ls + w¯Hs)
1
β . The first derivative with respect to T reads
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as
∂A
∂T
= A
κ− 1σ
T
−
dw¯
dT
σw¯ ln w¯ +
w¯−σ
T
µ
1− w¯−σ Tµ
(
T
µw¯
dw¯
dT
+ ln w¯
µ
)
+
Hs
β
dw¯
dT
Ls + w¯Hs

= A
κ− 1σ
T
−
dw¯
dT
σw¯ ln w¯ +
T
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
(
dw¯
dT
w¯ ln w¯ +
1
T
)
+
Hs
β
dw¯
dT
Ls + w¯Hs

= A

1
T

T
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
− 1
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−εK¯T
+κ
+
dw¯
dT
w¯ ln w¯

T
µ
ln w¯
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
− 1
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−εK¯T
+
Hs
β
dw¯
dT
Ls + w¯Hs

= A
 1
T
(
κ− εK¯T
)
+
dw¯
dT
w¯
 1β
Ls
w¯Hs
+ 1
− εK¯Tln w¯
 . (A2.14)
The skill premium equation (2.18) can be rearranged to Ls
w¯Hs
=
ln w¯
β
−εK¯T
εK¯T
which implies
that
∂A
∂T
= A
 1
T
(
κ− εK¯T
)
+
dw¯
dT
w¯
 1
β
εK¯T
ln w¯
β
− εK¯Tln w¯
 = Aκ− εK¯T
T
> 0
since κ > εK¯T . This holds if and only if firms are technologically restricted. Otherwise,
κ = εK¯T and
∂A
∂T
= 0. Moreover, PI ≡
(∫M
0 p
− β1−β
i di
)− 1−β
β
is normalized to one, involving
Yi =
(
pi
PI
)− 11−β A
PI
= p−
1
1−β
i A. This is plugged into the utility function of the representa-
tive household (u =
(∫M
0 Y
β
i di
) 1
β ) that also constitutes a measure of economy’s welfare.
Straight forward manipulations imply u = A and, consequently, ∂A
∂T
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂u
∂T
> 0.
2.7.6 Proofs for Heterogeneous firms
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof of an increase in the skill premium and in the technology gap:
The proof applies the concept of implicit differentiation. First, rewriting the skill premium
equation (2.20), using (2.10) and setting Nh = T (i.e. only h-firms are restricted), results
in
J(w¯, T ) ≡ T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ
−
(
fh
fl
) 1−β
β
= 0.
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Second, the derivative of J(w¯, T ) with respect to T , holding w¯ constant, is calculated:
∂J(w¯, T )
∂T
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ
[
κh
T
− ln w¯
µ
+ (1− σεK¯T )−1
∂εK¯T
∂T
]
.
Using (A2.6) and manipulating leads to
∂J(w¯, T )
∂T
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ 1
T
[
κh − 1
σ
+
(
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
)( 1
σ
− εK¯T
)
+
( 1
σ
− εK¯T
)
− T
µ
ln w¯
]
which can be, factoring out w¯σ
T
µ − 1 and using εK¯T = 1σ −
T
µ
ln w¯
w¯
σ Tµ −1
, further simplified to
∂J(w¯, T )
∂T
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ κh − εK¯T
T
> 0
since εK¯T < κh as long as the technology choice of the h-firm is restricted. Third, the
derivative of J(w¯, T ) with respect to w¯, is calculated:
∂J(w¯, T )
∂w¯
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ
[
− κl
Nl
dNl
dw¯
+ −T +Nl
w¯µ
+ ln w¯
µ
dNl
dw¯
+ (1− σεK¯T )−1
∂εK¯T
∂w¯
]
.
Using dNl
dw¯
from Proposition 2.1 and (A2.7), the above derivative becomes
∂J(w¯, T )
∂w¯
=
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ 1
w¯ ln w¯
[
κl − 1
σ
+
(
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
)( 1
σ
− εK¯T
)
+
( 1
σ
− εK¯T
)
− T
µ
ln w¯
]
which can be, factoring out w¯σ
T
µ − 1 and using εK¯T = 1σ −
T
µ
ln w¯
w¯
σ Tµ −1
, further simplified to
∂J(w¯, T )
∂w
= T
κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ κl − εK¯T
w¯ ln w¯ < 0.
Here, εK¯T > κl as otherwise the technology choice of the h-firm would not be restricted.
As a consequence,
dw¯
dT
= −
∂J(w¯,T )
∂T
∂J(w¯,T )
∂w
= w¯ ln w¯
T
κh − εK¯T
εK¯T − κl
> 0
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and it holds that
∂
(
T
Nl
)
∂T
= κh−κl
Nl(εK¯T−κl)
> 0.
Proof that the productivity gap is constant:
From (2.10),
φ∆ =
T κh
Nκll
w¯−
T−Nl
µ
(
1− σκl
1− σεK¯T
) 1
σ
.
Taking the first derivative with respect to T leads to
∂φ∆
∂T
= φ∆
κh
T
− κl
Nl
dNl
dw¯
dw¯
dT
− 1
w¯
T −Nl
µ
dw¯
dT
− ln w¯
(
1
µ
− 1
µ
dNl
dw¯
dw¯
dT
)
+
∂εK¯T
∂T
1− σεK¯T
 .
Calculating the derivative of εK¯T with respect to T without holding w¯ constant implies
∂εK¯T
∂T
=
(
T
µw¯
dw¯
dT
+ ln w¯
µ
)
(1− σεK¯T )w¯σ
T
µ − 1
w¯σ
T
µ − 1
.
Using this, dw¯
dT
from above, and dNl
dw¯
from Proposition 2.1 results in:
∂φ∆
∂T
= φ∆
κhT − κlT κh − εK¯TεK¯T − κl −
ln w¯
µ
(
1 +
κh − εK¯T
εK¯T − κl
)
+ ln w¯
µ
(
κh−εK¯T
εK¯T
−κl + 1
) (
(1− σεK¯T )w¯σ
T
µ − 1
)
(1− σεK¯T )(w¯σ
T
µ − 1)
 .
Employing the definition of εK¯T and rearranging directly implies
∂φ∆
∂T
= 0. Employing a
different approach, the results of Proposition 2.3 in combination with dw¯/dT show that
∂φ∆
∂T
= ∂φ∆
∂T
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w¯=const.
+∂φ∆
∂w¯
dw¯
dT
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof of ∀fh
fl
≤
(
fh
fl
)∗
, Mh > 0, Ml = 0:
Let’s denote the largest fh
fl
that ensures Mh > 0, Ml = 0 by
(
fh
fl
)∗
. For any
(
fh
fl
)∗
+ δ,
(δ > 0) l-firms enter and Mh > 0, Ml > 0. Thus ∀fhfl ≤
(
fh
fl
)∗
,
Ml =
(1− β)(εK¯TLS − w¯HS( ln (w¯)β − εK¯T ))
fl(εK¯T − κl)
= 0 ⇐⇒ w¯Hs = εK¯TL
s
ln w¯
β
− εK¯T
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where the last equation determines the skill premium in an economy populated only by
h-firms.
Proof of ∀fh
fl
≥
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
, Mh = 0, Ml > 0:
Let’s denote the smallest fh
fl
that ensures Mh = 0, Ml > 0 by
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
. For any
(
fh
fl
)∗∗ − δ,
(δ > 0) h-firms enter and Mh > 0, Ml > 0. Thus ∀fhfl ≥
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
,
Mh =
(1− β)(w¯HS( ln (w¯)
β
− κl)− κlLS)
fh(εK¯T − κl)
= 0 ⇐⇒ w¯Hs = κlL
s
ln w¯
β
− κl
where the last equation determines the skill premium in an economy populated by κl-firms.
Proof of the existence of the interval
((
fh
fl
)∗
,
(
fh
fl
)∗∗)
:
From Proposition 2.3, ∂φ∆/∂w¯ < 0. Consequently, the right hand side of (2.20), fhfl ,
can only be decreased if and only if the skill premium is increased. Thus,
(
fh
fl
)∗
<(
fh
fl
)∗∗ ⇐⇒ w¯∗ > w¯∗∗. Mh = 0 implies a closed economy populated by l-firms and
Ml = 0 one by h-firms. As Proposition 2.5 states that dw¯/dκ > 0, w¯∗ > w¯∗∗ and,
consequently,
(
fh
fl
)∗
<
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
. This implies the existence of the interval
((
fh
fl
)∗
,
(
fh
fl
)∗∗)
.
Note that whether h-firms are restricted or not by T is not important for the existence
of such an interval. Nevertheless, as T reduces the gains from technology for potential
h-firms, it lowers
(
fh
fl
)∗∗
.
Proof of Proposition 2.8
Proof of an increase in welfare
Following the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 2.5, a country’s welfare increases
if A rises and, moreover, the low-skilled wage (2.24) can be rewritten (with the def-
inition of εK¯T ) as wL = ΓhT
κh− 1σ (ln w¯)− 1σ
(
1− w¯−σ Tµ
) 1
σ (Ls + w¯Hs)
1−β
β where Γh =
β
(
1−β
fh
) 1−β
β
(
µ
σ
) 1
σ . Plugging this into total labor income (A = wLLs + wHHs) results
in A = ΓhT κh−
1
σ (ln w¯)− 1σ
(
1− w¯−σ Tµ
) 1
σ (Ls+ w¯Hs)
1
β . Following again the reasoning in the
proof of Proposition 2.5 (in particular dA/dT (A2.14)) results in
∂A
∂T
= A
 1
T
(
κh − εK¯T
)
+
dw¯
dT
w¯
 1β
Ls
w¯Hs
+ 1
− εK¯Tln w¯
 = A
T
κh − εK¯T
εK¯T − κl
 ln w¯β
Ls
w¯Hs
+ 1
− κl

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where I employ dw¯/dT (see Proposition 2.6). As a consequence,
∂A
∂T
> 0 ⇐⇒
ln w¯
β
Ls
w¯Hs
+ 1
> κl ⇐⇒ w¯Hs
(
ln w¯
β
− κl
)
> κlL
s.
Since the latter inequality holds if high productivity firms enter the economy (see the
proof of Proposition 2.7), ∂A
∂T
> 0 is true in the heterogeneous firms equilibrium.
Proof of the derivative of wL with respect to T
The first derivative of the low-skilled wage (2.24) with respect to T implies
∂wL
∂T
= wL
κh
T
− T
µw¯
dw¯
dT
− ln w¯
µ
+
∂εK¯T
∂T
1− σεK¯T
+ 1− β
β
Hs dw¯
dT
Ls + w¯Hs
 .
Plugging in ∂εK¯T
∂T
from Proof 2.7.6 and dw¯
T
from Propositon 2.6 and subsequent manipu-
lating directly leads to ∂wL
∂T
= wL
T
κh−εK¯T
εK¯T
−κl
(
1−β
β
w¯Hs
Ls+w¯Hs ln w¯ − κl
)
.
Proof of the derivative of wH with respect to T
Since wH = wLw¯ the derivative of wH with respect to T is easily calculated as
∂wH
∂T
= ∂w¯
∂T
wL +
∂wL
∂T
w¯
= wH
T (Ls + w¯Hs)
κh − εK¯T
εK¯T − κl
(
Ls ln w¯ + w¯Hs
(
ln w¯
β
− κl
)
− κlLs
)
> 0
where w¯Hs
(
ln w¯
β
− κl
)
− κlLs > 0 if Mh > 0.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Intermediates’ Value
Added on the Structure of Global
Production Processes0
3.1 Introduction
Most processes in manufacturing industries consists of a large number of intermediate
stages, a phenomenon already described in Smith (1776)’s famous pin factory example.
Today, production processes not only imply that workers specialize within a plant, but also
involve specialization of countries in intermediate stages of a good’s production, referred to
as vertical specialization by Hummels et al. (2001). Moreover, global supply chains exhibit
a great variety in the sequence of intermediate product flows and organizational structures.
Since production of large passenger airplanes, i.e. Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner and Airbus’
A380, involves one of the most complex production processes it has attracted attention in
the recent literature on the organization of global value chains (Antràs and Chor, 2011).
Moreover, a comparison of Boeing’s and Airbus’ flows of intermediate products reveals
important differences in the structure of production processes.
Boeing procures almost 70%1 of 787’s parts from external and/or foreign suppliers and
0This chapter is based on joint work with Carsten Eckel.
1See e.g. Newhouse (2008).
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is doing final assembly in its main factory in Everett, Washington. Completion of a par-
ticular intermediate stage, e.g. the construction of a wing or a large part of the fuselage,
is carried out by an external supplier, independently of other steps. The structure of
Boeing’s airplane manufacturing exhibits, hence, parallel processes which are integrated
in the overall sequence of production studied in more detail by Antràs and Chor (2011).
In contrast, production of the A380 involves subsequent shipping of the airplane’s semifin-
Figure 3.1: Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit
Structure of the Production Process of Airbus’ A380. Intermediate parts are shipped and processed
following the Itinéraire à Grand Gabarit.
ished goods throughout Europe while they are consecutively being upgraded (see Figure
3.12). In brief, the production process involves first that the front and rear sections of
the fuselage are shipped from Hamburg to Saint-Nazaire, France. There, sections like the
nose are added and the resulting bigger pieces are shipped to Toulouse where the plane is
assembled. However, for being painted and furnished, the almost finished plane is flown
to Hamburg Finkenwerder Airport3. As a consequence, A380’s production process is of
2Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Transport_A380_en.svg, December 2011
3In fact, these stages account only for a fraction of the shipping process which is labeled ‘Itinéraire à
Grand Gabarit’ and include a more or less subsequent shipping throughout Europe.
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a more sequential nature than that of Boeing’s Dreamliner. The example of the aviation
industry is in line with the more general observation that production structures can be
characterized by the kind of alignment of two different intermediate production stages:
sequential versus parallel4.
Our main contribution is to develop a simple theory of endogenous production structures
that provides a more detailed understanding of firms’ decisions to choose a rather sequen-
tial or a more parallel nature of their production processes. Figure 3.2 illustrates a firm’s
Figure 3.2: Sequential Versus Parallel Structures of Production
Sequential:
a b
λ−1 λ−1
Parallel:
b
λ−1
λ−1 σλ−1
a
ax bx PY
ax
bx
SY=
choice on the structure of production. First, intermediate stage xa is carried out using
a units of labor and facing a probability of making mistakes during the process of λ5.
After having completed the first step, the intermediate is either shipped and processed
in another plant or combined with the second intermediate where both approaches yield
the final product, YS, respectively, YP . Here, and throughout this chapter, S indicates se-
quential and P parallel production. In the first (sequential production) case, components
are added in a second intermediate stage xb which requires b units of labor and where
the almost completed product faces a risk of destruction during the intermediate stage of
λ. In the second (parallel production) case, the second intermediate step xb is completed
simultaneously to the first, using b units of labor and with a risk of being destroyed during
the process of λ. The final product is assembled subsequently without any labor costs,
but with a probability of failure during assembly of σλ, where 0 < σ < 1.
Since labor is the only factor of production, a and b constitute the respective value added of
each stage. Whether a firm chooses optimally a sequential or parallel production structure
4See e.g. p. 680 and 681 in Fabozzi et al. (2008) for a description of different product flows.
5Although we denote λ as the probability of making mistakes, i.e. the risk of destroying the product
at this stage, it represents also a measure of general productivity.
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is determined by the trade-off between the potential loss in sequential structure’s second
step and the risk of losing both intermediates during parallel’s assembly process. The
greater the first step’s relative value added (a
b
), the more inclined is a firm to choose the
parallel structure to avoid complete loss in the second step within a sequential production
structure. A higher probability of making mistakes reduces the respective threshold of
relative value added. In contrast, a greater probability of complete loss during assembly
favors the adoption of sequential production processes.
Embedding the firm-level choice on optimal production structures into a framework of
perfect competition in closed economy shows that country differences in failure rates
may lead to disparities in the organization of production processes across countries. An
economy where firms face higher probabilities of making mistakes in production chooses a
parallel production process for lower relative value added. Countries which are less prone
to mistakes keep a sequential organization for higher relative value added. This result
holds irrespective of country-level labor endowments.
In open economy, countries differ with respect to their labor endowments and the proba-
bility of making mistakes. Perfect competition on all markets results in an efficient global
production structure. A sequential global value chain emerges if relative value added of
intermediates does not surpass a threshold. Countries of lower failure rates specialize in
later stages of the global production process implying Ricardian comparative advantage
among nations (Ricardo, 1817). However, as in Ricardo’s approach, only the country
that completely specializes gains in terms of welfare. If relative value added is relatively
great compared to the failure rate, the potential loss of the almost finished product at the
final stage outweighs welfare gains from Ricardian specialization. In this case, production
processes are parallel and the specialization of countries on a single intermediate stage is
redundant. However, the combination of country-specific destruction risks during assem-
bly and no labor costs of the latter imply that assembly is always done in countries with
low failure rates.
The economic literature explains wage differentials across countries in the presence of
trade largely by differences in country-level and factor-specific productivities. See Trefler
(1993) for an early and Maskus and Nishioka (2009) for a recent contribution of how
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the factor-price equalization theorem can be reconciled with factor price disparities by
considering country- and factor-level differences in technologies and productivities. In this
vein, the efficiency of a country’s workforce depends on the nature of (global) production
structures. In our model, we correct wages for differences in country-level productivities
that result from specific production structures. We show that the implied efficient wages
equalize across countries.
The economic analysis of global value chains is at the heart of a vivid discussion. Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) build a model where reducing offshoring costs implies produc-
tivity and welfare gains for all factors. In later work (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2011), they show that tasks with higher offshoring costs are produced in countries with
higher wages and greater aggregated output. Antràs and Chor (2011) analyze the optimal
extend of integration along the value chain. Our study is most closely related to Costinot
et al. (2011)6’s who focus on the impact of country-level differences in the probability of
making mistakes on the structure of global production processes. In their model, a sequen-
tial global value chain emerges endogenously where less productive countries concentrate
on earlier intermediate production stages and more productive economies on later steps.
Our model replicates this sequential production structure across countries if relative value
added of intermediates does not surpass a threshold. However, organizational structures
in Costinot et al. (2011) are exogenously determined to be either sequential or parallel
such that there exists no endogenous choice on the shape of production processes. We
add to the literature an endogenous firm-level choice on the structure of production that
depends on a trade-off between relative value added at risk and the probability of making
mistakes. Furthermore, Costinot et al. (2011) implicitly assume that relative value added
of intermediate production stages (a
b
) is necessarily one. However, we show that different
values of a
b
may have a crucial impact on the structure of local and global value chains.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the firm-level decision on the
optimal structure of the production process. This is embedded into a perfect competition
framework in closed economy in Section 3.3. The impacts of firm-level choices on the
organization of the global value chain are analyzed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
6They build their model on work by Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993) who introduced production that
is sequential and subject to mistakes.
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3.2 The Production Process on the Firm Level
Each firm produces the final good Y with labor only, taking wages and prices as given.
Production requires two intermediate stages and, depending on the structure of the process
(see Figure 3.2), subsequent assembling. Abstracting from any contracting issues7 we stay
agnostic with respect to the ownership structure.
3.2.1 Optimal Firm-Level Production Structure
The intermediate product xa is manufactured with probability 1−λ using a units of labor
implying that a1−λ units of labor are required to produce one unit of xa. Similarly,
b
1−λ
units of labor are needed to complete one unit of intermediate input xb. While the labor
requirements of the two intermediate stages are identical across production structures the
process differs with respect to the input xb. Within a sequential structure, one unit of
intermediate product xa is processed into the final product YS using b units of labor and
exposing the value added of the first and second stage to a loss that occurs with probability
λ. In contrast, if a firm chooses a parallel production structure intermediates xa and xb
are produced within independent processes with the respective unit labor requirements of
a
1−λ and
b
1−λ . Subsequently, they have to be assembled to the final product. Although we
assume that labor input of assembly is negligible compared to intermediate stages (and
therefore set labor requirements to zero), the final product will only be accomplished with
probability 1− σλ. We impose 0 < σ < 1, as assembly involves usually less far-reaching
activities than actual production. Nevertheless, the final product will be identical across
production structures.
Since we assume perfect competition on output markets, a firm’s profit maximization
implies setting prices equal to marginal cost. Furthermore, a firm’s linear cost struc-
ture involves that marginal cost equal minimum unit cost to produce the final good Y .
Since either production process would deliver an identical final output, a firm’s decision
is reduced to choose between a sequential or parallel production process. The implied
7See e.g. Antràs and Chor (2011).
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minimum unit cost functions are
kS =
aw
1−λ + bw
1− λ (3.1)
kP =
aw
1−λ +
bw
1−λ
1− σλ (3.2)
where kS are minimum unit cost of sequential and kP minimum unit cost of parallel
production. An optimal choice involves to minimize costs, i.e. to compare minimum unit
cost of a parallel or sequential production process: kS ≷ kP .
Proposition 3.1 The higher the relative value added of the first intermediate production
step the more inclined is a firm to choose parallel production. A smaller probability of
making mistakes during intermediate stages and a higher risk of failures during assembling
imply that firms rather choose sequential processes.
The proof simply involves comparing minimum unit costs (3.1) and (3.2). As a result,
the firm chooses a parallel production process if and only if kS > kP implying that
a
b
>
σ(1− λ)
1− σ . (3.3)
Otherwise, it chooses a sequential structure. In the case of a
b
= σ(1−λ)1−σ , the firm is in-
different between a sequential and a parallel production structure. Since this case does
not add insight to our analysis, we abstract from it throughout this study8. Figure 3.3
illustrates the fundamental trade-offs driving a firm’s choices9. A decrease in the value
added within the second intermediate stage (i.e. a lower labor requirement b) in graph (I)
induces an increase of the relative value added of the first step, a
b
. Accordingly, the range
for which sequential production is optimal, becomes smaller. In (I), this implies a shift
of the threshold level of value added towards lower values of a. Graph (II) illustrates the
impact of a lower probability of making mistakes, λ′ < λ, involving a higher threshold
value of failure rates σ(1−λ′)1−σ >
σ(1−λ)
1−σ . As a consequence, a sequential production process
is optimal for higher relative value added and the respective threshold is shifted towards
8The most simple remedy to an exclusion would be to assume that whenever a firm is indifferent it
chooses a parallel (or, equivalently, a sequential) production process.
9Note that we do comparative statics with respect to λ and b. The choice of a instead of b would not
alter the results since the effects are driven by relative value added.
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Figure 3.3: Firm-Level Comparative Statics
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Impact of higher relative value added and a lower probability of making mistakes on a firm’s choice.
higher labor requirements a. Or, although the failure rate of assembling decreases pro-
portionally to the intermediates’ probability of making mistakes, its absolute decrease is
smaller since λ − λ′ > σλ − σλ′ ⇐⇒ 1 > σ. Consequently, the risk of losing products
during assembling outweighs the risk of destruction during the second intermediate step
for higher relative value added a
b
, implying a higher threshold value of a since b is assumed
to be constant in this case.
3.2.2 An Application to the Aviation Industry
We pick up our example of the aviation industry from the introduction to illustrate firms’
endogenous choices on the structure of production processes. In the introduction, we
established that Boeing’s production of the 787 (Dreamliner) exhibits a more sequential
structure than the manufacturing of Airbus’ A380. This directly relates to our firm-
level analysis of optimal production processes from above. It implies that either Boeing’s
production structure involves lower relative value added within later intermediate stages
or that it is exposed to higher failure rates within intermediates’ production.
Since the 787 and the A380 are rather close substitutes10, the relative value added within
the production of comparable parts (e.g. wings, engine) should not differ significantly.
10This is true from our global perspective. We are aware that both aircraft differ with e.g. respect to
the maximum of passenger numbers and, though less, range (787-9: 290, 15700km; A380-800: 853, 15200
km).
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However, the economic literature tends to acknowledge that firms are more able to reduce
mistakes in production processes if their organizational structures are more integrated11.
Moreover, while Airbus adds about 75%12 of the work done in the manufacturing of
the A380, Boeing contributes only 30% in the manufacture of the 787. Thus, we can
sensibly assume that the probability of making mistakes in the Dreamliner’s intermediate
production stages is higher than that within the intermediate steps in the process of
making A380s. Or, Boeing’s tendency to outsource large chunks of 787’s production
requires to structure production in a rather parallel manner as it faces higher failure rates
from external suppliers. In contrast, Airbus opts for a more sequential structure of its
production process since its more integrated value chain implies lower probabilities of
making mistakes in intermediated stages.
Note that we abstract in this example from different failure rates across countries since
assembly as well as intermediate production stages are carried out to a large extend in
countries with a similar level of productivity, i.e. similar probabilities of making mistakes.
Here, the ownership structure13, and not the location of plants within different countries,
implies disparities in the probability of making mistakes.
3.3 Equilibrium in Closed Economy
We assume perfectly competitive factor and output markets. As a consequence, it is
sufficient to analyze a representative firm’s choice to determine a country’s structure of
production processes. In this vein, firm-level decisions on the optimal production structure
are embedded in a general equilibrium in closed economy. In particular, the representative
firm produces a final good exclusively with labor and a representative consumer supplies
labor inelastically, spending the earnings to finance consumption. However, the firm’s
choice on the structure of the production process has direct repercussions on labor demand
11Antràs and Chor (2011) describe Boeing’s subsequent acquisition of its problematic supplier Vought
Aircraft Industries as an example where integration reduces mistakes that hamper the supply chain.
12While Boeing has asked its partnering suppliers to carry all non-recurring costs in exchange for
intellectual property rights, Airbus shares only 25% and keeps the rights on core technologies (Horng,
2007).
13We are aware that the ownership structure may itself be endogenous. However, within the context of
our analysis different ownership structures have no impact on the optimal decision of production processes
since we abstract from contracting problems.
110
The Impact of Intermediates’ Value Added on the Structure of Global
Production Processes
and, thus, wages. Since firm’s decisions depend on the fact whether (3.3) holds we have
to distinguish equilibrium results accordingly.
3.3.1 Equilibrium given a Parallel Production Process
Here, we assume that a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ . Consequently, the parallel organization of production
maximizes profits14 and output. Equilibrium quantities of intermediate stages are required
to be equal in production, xc,a,P = xc,b,P , where c denotes variables in closed economy.
Analogously, this involves equal effective labor demands across intermediate steps:
Lc,a,P
a
= Lc,b,P
b
. (3.4)
where Lc,a,P (Lc,b,P ) denotes labor demand for the production of intermediate xc,a,P
(xc,b,P ). Moreover, the parallel production structure represents a production function
à la Leontief (1941) since (3.4) requires a fixed factor input relation. Nevertheless, at this
stage our analysis is not hindered since both intermediate steps are done by using the
same type of factor input, labor.
Aggregating labor demands of intermediate production stages implies labor market clear-
ing, L = Lc,a,P + Lc,b,P , where L denotes a country’s labor endowment. Plugging
the Leontief-style factor input relation from (3.4) into the former condition results in
Lc,a,P = aLa+b which involves the production of xc,a,P =
(1−λ)L
a+b since
1−λ
a
units of labor are
required to produce one unit of xa. However, as assembly is prone to make mistakes with
a probability of σλ aggregate production of the economy amounts to
Yc,P =
(1− λ)(1− σλ)L
a+ b . (3.5)
Since the final good is sold on a perfectly competitive market its price p equals marginal,
respectively minimum unit costs: p = kc,P = wc,P a+b(1−λ)(1−σλ) . The price of the final good
is normalized to one (p ≡ 1) and labor receives the wage
wc,P =
(1− λ)(1− σλ)
a+ b . (3.6)
14Note that profits are zero since there is perfect competition.
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Note that perfect competition on output and factor markets involves Yc,P = wc,PL and,
consequently, the marginal productivity of labor equals the wage rate. Productivity of
labor hence directly relates not only to intermediate-specific input requirements (a and b),
but also to country-level failure rates (λ and σλ) that imply country-level productivities.
Proposition 3.2 When parallel production is optimal, the wage level as well as the ag-
gregate output decrease in the probability of making mistakes during intermediate stages
and assembly. Furthermore, higher labor input requirements imply lower wages and less
final goods.
The probability of making mistakes represents a measure of a country’s productivity15.
Necessarily, aggregated output is lower for lower levels of productivity. Or, more illus-
trative, if a higher rate of intermediates is destroyed within the production process less
final products are accomplished. Moreover, the marginal productivity of labor decreases
and, hence, the wage rate. In the same vein, higher labor input requirements decrease
labor’s marginal productivity and also its wage level. Furthermore, aggregated output is
decreased as less intermediate inputs are completed.
3.3.2 Equilibrium given a Sequential Production Process
Within this section, we assume that a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ such that the optimal decision of the repre-
sentative firm implies a sequential organization of the production process. The equilibrium
relation of intermediate inputs is, as a consequence, required to be xc,a,S(1− λ) = xc,b,S.
Since the only factor of production is labor the latter relation involves the following equa-
tion of labor demands
(1− λ)Lc,a,S
a
= Lc,b,S
b
. (3.7)
where Lc,a,S (Lc,b,S) denotes labor demand for the production of intermediate xc,a,S (xc,b,S).
Similar to the case of a parallel process, the sequential structure implies a Leontief pro-
duction function since the relation of factor inputs is a fixed ratio. However, as both inter-
mediates are produced with a unique type of labor this does not constitute a drawback at
this stage of the analysis. The respective labor demands of the production of intermediate
15See e.g. Costinot et al. (2011).
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inputs are aggregated and imply that the labor market is cleared: L = Lc,a,S + Lc,b,S. In
combination with the factor input relation of intermediate steps from (3.7) this results
into Lc,b,S = b(1−λ)La+b(1−λ) . However, for the completion of the second intermediate stage
1−λ
b
units of labor are required, implying that
Yc,S =
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) (3.8)
units of the final good are produced. Similar to the parallel case, minimum unit cost
equal marginal cost, p = kc,S = wc,S a/(1−λ)+b1−λ , and the final good’s price p is normalized
to one. Consequently, the wage reads as:
wc,S =
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ) . (3.9)
Note that the marginal productivity of labor equals the wage rate. The former relates
directly to intermediate input-specific factor requirements a and b and the country-level
probability of making mistakes, λ. In contrast to the parallel production structure an
assembly of intermediate inputs is not required and, accordingly, σλ does not determine
Yc,S and wc,S. However, the failure rate λ exhibits a multiplicative impact on the wage rate
and output since the value added of the first intermediate input is exposed to destruction
within the first and second intermediate production stage.
Proposition 3.3 When sequential production is optimal, the wage rate and aggregate
output decrease in the probability of making mistakes as well as in the required labor
inputs for the production of each intermediate good. However, factor requirements of the
first intermediate stage have a stronger negative impact, both in relation to the second step
in sequential and to the first stage in parallel production.
The wage rate as well as final good production is higher in sequential than in parallel
production if and only if sequential production constitutes a firm’s optimal choice.
The proof is given in Appendix 3.6.1. A higher probability of making mistakes implies a
lower country-level productivity similar to the parallel production structure. This leads to
a decrease in the aggregated output and the marginal productivity of labor which equals
wages. Analogously, higher factor input requirements at either stage of the production
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process involve a lower productivity of labor and, consequently, lower wages and less
output on the country-level. However, the impact of increased factor input requirements
of the first intermediate stage (a) differs not only with respect to the second step (b) but
also in comparison to its role in parallel production. First, since first step’s value added is
at risk both in the first and second intermediate stage, an increase in a involves a stronger
negative impact on productivity than a rise in the labor requirement b that is only at
risk in the second step. Second, the above disparity of the impact of first step’s labor
requirements applies also when comparing the sequential process to the parallel structure.
Within the latter production process, the labor input a is exposed to the same probability
of making mistakes than the value added implied by b, namely λ during the intermediate
stage and σλ during assembly.
A natural outcome of perfectly competitive factor and output markets is that firm-level
decisions coincide with efficient aggregated output and wage levels. As a consequence,
the wage rate as well as aggregated final good quantities are higher in a sequential (par-
allel) production structure if and only if the firm chooses optimally a sequential (parallel)
production process.
3.3.3 Endogenous Production Processes in Different Closed
Economies
Our focus in the previous sections was to analyze under which conditions parallel and
sequential production structures emerge on the country-level. For the following study
of how globalization shapes and changes production processes we need to embed this
country-level analysis within a world populated by several economies. Since intermediate
production stages of the final good can be carried out within at most two different coun-
tries the assumption of two countries is sufficient for the analysis of endogenous production
structures on a global scale. Therefore, we assume two countries that exhibit different
probabilities of making failures in intermediate production stages (λ, λ∗) and different
labor endowments (L, L∗), but are symmetric with respect to labor input requirements
(a, b) as well as to the assembly-specific parameter of failure (σ). ∗ denotes foreign vari-
ables and parameters. Without loss of generalization, we assume λ∗ > λ. However, we
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will allow for L∗ ≷ L. An immediate result of disparities in failure rates is that firms’
optimal choices on the production structure differ across countries since the threshold in
(3.3) implies σ(1−λ)1−σ >
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ .
Lemma 3.1 Given that the domestic and foreign economy are closed,
• domestic and foreign firms choose parallel production if and only if a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ .
• domestic and foreign firms choose sequential production if and only if a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
1−σ .
• domestic firms choose sequential and foreign firms parallel production if and only
if σ(1−λ∗)1−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ .
For relative value added within the range of a
b
∈ (0,∞)\
(
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ ,
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
)
, there exist
no disparities in the organization of production processes between countries in closed
economy. In contrast, for a
b
∈
(
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ ,
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
)
, firms in the foreign country produce in
optimum parallelly while sequential production is most efficient in the domestic country.
Since the probability of making mistakes constitutes a measure of country-specific pro-
ductivity we consider the domestic country as a more productive country while the foreign
country represents a less productive country.
Lemma 3.2 Wages and aggregated output are always higher in the domestic than in the
foreign country.
The proof is given in Appendix 3.6.1. A higher marginal productivity of labor implies
higher wages and a greater aggregated output in the more productive country. Intuitively,
more final goods are accomplished at home than abroad as the probability of failure, i.e.
the risk of destroying the good at any intermediate production stage, is lower.
3.4 Production Structures in Open Economy
In open economy analysis, we assume that labor is immobile across countries while final
goods can be freely traded without any costs. Moreover, intermediate inputs can be freely
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traded and production plants of intermediates can be located within any country without
costs16.
3.4.1 Global Production Processes
The global production structure depends on factor endowments (L, L∗), factor input
requirements (a, b), the failure parameter of assembly (σ)17, and country specific proba-
bilities of making mistakes (λ, λ∗). Their relations determine the structure of production
on a global scale as well as whether a country completely specializes in the production of
a single intermediate stage. We define global sequential production as a process where at
least one country completely specializes in one intermediate production stage. In contrast,
parallel production processes do not necessarily imply that countries specialize.
Our analysis of how country-level disparities in failure rates shape the global organization
of production implies that the representative firm of each country chooses endogenously
its optimal production process. On the other hand, perfect competition on product and
labor markets involves efficiency of market outcomes (i.e. firm-level decisions result in
the highest attainable output). As a consequence, firms’ optimal production structure
and corresponding localization decisions are congruent with the production process that
generates the efficient output level. In this vein, firms optimal decisions are revealed by
a comparison of aggregated output levels that are generated by every feasible production
process given parameters and endowments.
In closed economy, domestic firms choose a parallel production structure if and only if
a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ and foreign firms decide on parallel processes if and only if
a
b
> σ(1−λ
∗)
1−σ .
While λ∗ > λ implies that σ(1−λ)1−σ >
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ it also involves that the probability of making
mistakes during assembly is higher abroad than at home: σλ∗ > σλ. Since trade in
intermediate inputs and final goods is costless and assembling does not incur labor costs,
assembly is always carried out in the domestic country. This pattern however changes
the threshold of a sequential versus a parallel production process abroad while it has no
16See e.g. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2011) for an analysis of the impact of offshoring costs that
differ across tasks.
17Note that although σ is equal across countries, the probabilities of making mistakes in assembly
differ since σλ∗ > σλ.
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impact on the domestic country’s trade-off. Similar to the analysis that leads to the closed
economy threshold (3.3) firms in the foreign country will choose a parallel production
structure in open economy if and only if
k∗S > k
∗
o,P
⇐⇒
aw∗
1−λ∗ + bw
∗
1− λ∗ >
aw∗
1−λ∗ +
bw∗
1−λ∗
1− σλ
⇐⇒ a
b
>
σ(1− λ∗)
λ∗
λ
− σ .
Note that since σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ the threshold of parallel versus sequential production
(abstracting from localization and specialization decisions) shifts to the left on the axis
of relative value added, a
b
(see Figure 3.4).
Proposition 3.4 Optimal firm decisions imply that the structure of the production pro-
cess is
• sequential global and sequential domestic ⇐⇒ a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ .
• sequential global ⇐⇒ a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ .
• sequential global and sequential foreign ⇐⇒ a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ .
• sequential global and parallel foreign ⇐⇒ a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ .
• parallel in both countries ⇐⇒ a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ .
The proof is given in Appendix 3.6.2. The proposition implies a two-dimensional matrix of
relative value added’s thresholds of failure rates and relative endowments that determine
five distinct cases of the organization of global production processes. Figure 3.4 illustrates
these cases and opposes them to the situation of closed economies. Assume that relative
value added of intermediate inputs equals relative factor endowments, a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L
, while
the ratio of a
b
implies a sequential production structure, a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ . Then, the foreign
country completely specializes in the first intermediate stage while the domestic country
completely specializes in the second step. Since the domestic country exposes the almost
accomplished product in the second stage to a smaller risk of total loss it has therein a
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Figure 3.4: Overview of (Global) Production Processes
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Ricardian comparative advantage. Nevertheless, productivity in both production stages
is higher at home than abroad as (1− λ) > (1− λ∗).
Within the upper left corner of the open economy matrix, a global sequential production
process emerges since a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ . Moreover,
a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
involves that along with a
complete specialization on the first step abroad some domestic resources are employed in
an additional sequential production process at home. For a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
, a global sequential
structure emerges with a complete domestic specialization on the second intermediate
step. Supplementary, foreign firms engage in sequential production within their country
if a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ and decide on a parallel process if
a
b
> σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ . Note that the respective
threshold decreases compared to closed economy since assembly may be carried out in the
domestic country at a lower probability of making mistakes. Since markets are perfectly
competitive, intermediate inputs are shipped towards the domestic country without any
costs and selling the final good at the world market price implies some subsequent re-
exporting.
In the case of a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ , the choice of parallel production processes is optimal for
domestic and foreign firms. Moreover, both types of intermediate inputs are produced
in each country. As long as a
b
6= L∗(1−λ∗)
L(1−λ) , there exists no globalization with respect
to the production of intermediate stages since disparities in labor productivities would
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prevent market clearing of inputs. Or, in contrast to a sequential production structure,
high relative value added implies that cross-country differences in labor productivities do
not any more determine the production structure and, consequently, location decisions.
Nevertheless, as assembling requires no labor inputs and 1 − σλ > 1 − σλ∗, it will be
carried out in the domestic country. In the special case of a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L(1−λ) , the location of
intermediate inputs production is undetermined while assembly is still concentrated in
the domestic country. However, an analysis of domestic and foreign wage levels and the
corresponding marginal productivities is required to get a more detailed understanding of
how global production processes are shaped.
3.4.2 Wage Levels and Efficient Wages
Firms consider disparities in wages across countries in their decision on global production
structures and the corresponding localization of plants. Moreover, the shape of global
production processes determines the efficiency of domestic and foreign labor. A sequen-
tial global specialization in intermediate production stages e.g. implies a comparative
advantage of domestic over foreign labor with respect to the second step. Since domestic
labor is endowed with a higher productivity in every intermediate stage it also exhibits
an absolute productivity advantage. However, relative scarcity of labor across countries
resulting from specialization patterns may well counteract the effects of comparative and
absolute advantages in production technologies. In general, free movement of production
plants implies equal efficient wages across countries, involving that wages equalize after
correcting for production structure-specific differences in technologies. Since the latter
depend largely on global production processes we will analyze separately (efficient) wages
for each case of Proposition 3.4. Note that we abstract in this section from indexing wages
above the notion of being open economy foreign or domestic wages to save on notation.
This implies that computed wages hold only within each of the following subsections.
Wage levels resulting from a global and domestic sequential production process
A relative value added greater than relative weighted factor endowments, a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
, and
smaller than the domestic threshold of sequential versus parallel production, a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ ,
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implies a sequential global production structure. Supplementary to the global special-
ization in intermediate stages, resources in the domestic country are used for sequen-
tial production. Perfect competition on the world market of the final good implies that
kGo,S = ko,S = p where o denotes open economy variables and G specifies the globalization
of intermediate production stages. p is the world market price which is equal across coun-
tries and normalized to one. As a consequence, ko,S = kS = 1 determines the wage level
in the domestic country
wo =
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ) (3.10)
which equals the domestic wage in closed economy (3.9). Plugging the domestic wage
rate into kGo,S =
aw∗o/(1−λ∗)+bwo
1−λ = 1 results in the following foreign wage rate
w∗o =
(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
a+ b(1− λ) . (3.11)
a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
implies that the foreign country completely specializes in the first interme-
diate production stage while the domestic country produces both types of inputs. Hence,
domestic country-specific productivity amounts to 11−λ and foreign country-specific pro-
ductivity to 11−λ∗ . Efficient wages thus equalize if
wo
1−λ =
w∗o
1−λ∗ which holds given (3.10)
and (3.11).
Wage levels given complete specialization within a sequential global produc-
tion process
While a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ implies a global sequential production process
a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L
involves
complete specialization of intermediate production stages across countries. Since λ∗ > λ,
the domestic country specializes in the second intermediate stage to minimize the global
risk of destroying the almost accomplished product. Complementary, the foreign country
specializes in the first step. The world market price p equals marginal costs (kGo,S = p = 1)
where kGo,S =
aw∗o/(1−λ∗)+bwo
1−λ and, consequently,
wo =
1− λ
b
− a
b
w∗o
1− λ∗ . (3.12)
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However, the above equation determines factor prices only up to a negative relationship
between domestic and foreign wages while country-specific levels are undetermined since
there exists no ‘second’ labor market (see e.g. the determination of the wages given in
(3.10) and (3.11)). Moreover, Ricardian specialization in intermediate stages implies a
Leontief-style production function. Calculating the impact of marginal deviations from
a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L
given a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ does not provide a remedy to undetermined wage levels
since a slightly higher domestic labor supply or a marginally greater foreign endowment
involves a different global production process.
Wage levels resulting from a sequential global and sequential foreign produc-
tion process
Here, a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ determines that any production structure that emerges will be sequen-
tial. Since a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
, the domestic country completely specializes while the foreign
country additionally produces with a sequential structure. Perfect competition on the
world market of the final good implies that kGo,S = k∗S = p = 1 where k∗S = 1 determines
the wage level in the foreign country
w∗o =
(1− λ∗)2
a+ b(1− λ∗) (3.13)
which equals the foreign country’s closed economy wage ((3.9) for the foreign country).
Subsequently, using (3.13) in kGo,S =
aw∗o/(1−λ∗)+bwo
1−λ = 1, the domestic wage is computed as
wo =
a(λ∗ − λ) + b(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
b(a+ b(1− λ∗)) .
Since the domestic country completely specializes in the second intermediate step, the
calculation of its headstart in productivity has to take into account its comparative ad-
vantage in the second stage. The foreign country produces 1−λ∗
a
units of xa with one unit
of labor and the domestic country has an advantage in producing one unit of xb out of
one unit of labor of 1−λ
b
− 1−λ∗
b
. As a consequence, the domestic comparative advantage
amounts to
(
a
1−λ∗
)
/
(
b
1−λ−(1−λ∗)
)
= a
b
λ∗−λ
1−λ∗ . Since foreign labor is employed in the first and
second intermediate stages of sequential production foreign country-specific productivity
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is 11−λ∗ and efficient wages equalize:
wo
1− λ+ a
b
λ∗−λ
1−λ∗
= w
∗
o
1− λ∗ .
Note that the domestic wage is hence augmented by its comparative advantage given
the specific (global) production structure where the final good has a higher completion
probability of 1 − λ − (1 − λ∗) if the second intermediate stage is done in the domestic
country.
Wage levels resulting from a sequential global and a parallel foreign production
structure
Since relative value added is smaller than weighted foreign endowments, a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
,
the domestic country completely specializes in the second step of a global sequential
production process. The foreign country produces the complementary first step but
employs also resources in a parallel production structure with domestic assembly as
σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ . Perfect competition on output markets implies k
G
o,S = k∗P = p = 1
and, hence, k∗P = 1 determines the foreign wage level
w∗o =
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ)
a+ b . (3.14)
Using the foreign wage (3.14) in kGo,S =
aw∗o/(1−λ∗)+bwo
1−λ = 1 results in the domestic wage
rate
wo =
b(1− λ)− aλ(1− σ)
b(a+ b) . (3.15)
Trading the final good without any costs implies that efficient wages across countries
equalize:
wo
1− λ+ σλ(1−λ)−ab λ(1−σ)1−σλ
= w
∗
o
1− λ∗ .
The foreign country-specific productivity is 11−λ∗ since foreign labor produces both types of
intermediate inputs. Domestic labor, however, has a comparative advantage in producing
the second intermediate stage in the present global sequential production process. As
a consequence, the domestic wage level (3.15) is adjusted upwards by more than its
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country-specific productivity, 11−λ . Note that the adjustment factor
σλ(1−λ)−a
b
λ(1−σ)
1−σλ is
strictly positive as a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ . Moreover, it is the higher the smaller relative value
added of intermediate steps is, i.e. the ‘farther’ a domestic country is from switching
from sequential to parallel production structures. Since the latter would require a final
assembly of intermediates, the term 11−σλ enlarges the adjustment factor the more the
higher the probability of making assembly mistakes (σλ) is.
Wages resulting from parallel production processes
Relative value added that is greater than the threshold of sequential versus parallel pro-
duction structures in the domestic country, a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ , implies that production processes
within the domestic and the foreign country are of a parallel nature. Moreover, apart from
the special case a
b
= L∗(1−λ∗)
L(1−λ) , intermediate inputs are produced within each country to co-
incide exactly while assembly is carried out exclusively in the domestic country. No costs
of trade in intermediate inputs involve k∗P = w∗o a+b(1−λ∗)(1−σλ) , while kP = wo
a+b
(1−λ)(1−σλ) is
similar to the closed economy case. Perfect competition on the final good market involves
k∗P = kP = p = 1, implying that
wo =
(1− λ)(1− σλ)
a+ b and w
∗
o =
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ)
a+ b .
Since both countries do both intermediate production stages, the domestic country does
not have any comparative advantage in a particular intermediate step. As a consequence,
the domestic country-specific productivity is 11−λ and the foreign country’s amounts to
1
1−λ∗ . Adjusting wages by country-specific productivities hence implies equalization of
efficient wages: w∗o1−λ∗ =
wo
1−λ .
3.4.3 Global Production Structures and Welfare
Globalization leads to the emergence of production structures that are optimal on a global
scale and, accordingly, to the equalization of efficient wages across countries. Since there
exist neither frictions on global goods and input markets nor on countries’ labor markets,
the efficiency gains from globalization directly translate into wage increases and, hence,
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welfare gains. However, whether wages increase throughout countries or welfare gains are
concentrated within a single country is determined by the structure of global production.
Proposition 3.5 Globalization of production processes implies that
• if a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ , domestic wages are constant and foreign wages increase.
• if a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ , domestic wages increase and foreign wages are constant.
• if a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ , domestic and foreign wages increase.
• if a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ , domestic wages are constant and foreign wages increase.
The proof is given in Appendix 3.6.2. An illustration of how the impact of globalization
is determined by factor endowments, thresholds, and relative value added is provided
in Figure 3.5. In general, globalization of production processes results in well-known
Figure 3.5: Welfare Effects of Globalization
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Ricardian effects, i.e. that wage and welfare of a country that specializes completely
in the production of a good increase. Within our analysis, this implies that a coun-
try focuses completely on carrying out a single intermediate production stage. Given a
global sequential production structure where there is supplementary a domestic sequential(
a
b
> L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ
)
or foreign sequential process
(
a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ
)
, we
observe exactly this pattern. In the former case, the foreign country completely specializes
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in the first intermediate production step and, thus, foreign wages are higher in open than
in closed economy. In contrast, domestic labor produces both types of intermediates and
its wage level is not affected by opening the economy. Similarly, in the latter case, the
domestic country completely specializes in the second intermediate stage and the domes-
tic wage rate increases through globalization. Inversely, foreign labor is employed in both
intermediate production steps and, as a consequence, its wage level is not altered.
However, the results of our model differ from Ricardo (1817)’s if the produc-
tion process throughout countries is not of a pure sequential structure. First, if(
a
b
< L
∗(1−λ∗)
L
∧ σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ
)
the foreign country produces parallel the final good,
whereas the global production structure is sequential. Although not being completely spe-
cialized on the production of a single intermediate step, the foreign workers gain in terms
of wages. They benefit from the fact that the assembly of intermediate inputs is carried
out in the domestic country with a lower risk of destroying the almost accomplished prod-
uct. Nevertheless, in line with the idea of Ricardian comparative advantage, the domestic
wage level increases since the domestic country completely focuses on the production of
the second intermediate stage.
Second, if a
b
> σ(1−λ)1−σ , neither country specializes in a particular production stage
18. In
this case, domestic production does not gain in efficiency from globalization and, thus,
domestic wage levels do not increase. Nevertheless, foreign production benefits from
the less failure-prone assembly of intermediate inputs in the domestic country and, as a
consequence, the foreign wage level rises. Apart from gains of shifting assembly to the
domestic country, there are no benefits from opening the economy if parallel production
structures prevail. Nevertheless, since globalization increases the foreign threshold of
sequential versus parallel production there exists a substantial range of relative value
added where foreign workers gain in terms of wages. Summing up, globalization is most
beneficial for sequential production structures as e.g. in the case of Costinot et al. (2011)’s
analysis, whereas the positive impact given parallel processes is less clear cut.
18Note that countries could specialize if ab =
L∗(1−λ∗)
L(1−λ) . In this case, they would be indifferent with
respect to specialization.
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3.5 Conclusion
We introduce a new model of endogenous firm-level decisions on the optimal structure of
production processes. Production of the final good requires two intermediate stages that
are either carried out parallel or sequentially. Within each intermediate production step,
there exists a probability of making mistakes that would destroy the product. A sequential
structure implies that a specific intermediate step is done first and the resulting product
is processed in a second step to the final good. The parallel process implies simultaneous
production of inputs that are subsequently assembled to the final good. Whether firms
choose the former or the latter process depends on the trade-off between relative valued
added of intermediate inputs and the probability of making mistakes in intermediate steps
and assembly. A sequential production process is chosen if the relative valued added of
the first step is rather small, or, if the probability of making mistakes within intermediate
stages is relatively petite. In contrast, a rather high relative valued added of the first
step, a high failure rate within intermediate steps, or a low probability of loosing the
intermediates during assembly involves the choice of a parallel production structure.
In open economy, a variety of different production patterns emerge that depend on relative
factor endowments, relative value added, and country specific probabilities of making mis-
takes. In this study, we show that the case of complete specialization across intermediate
production steps as in Costinot et al. (2011) constitutes a special case that is character-
ized by a low relative value added of the first intermediate production steps. For higher
relative value added, a global parallel production structure emerges where country-specific
probabilities of making mistakes lose their impact on endogenous localization decisions.
As a consequence, welfare effects of the globalization of production processes depend on
the specific value added of intermediates and on the probability of making mistakes within
countries. In particular, high relative value added of the first production step precludes
the emergence of sequential production processes on a global scope, excluding Ricardian
welfare gains from specialization across countries.
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3.6 Appendix A3
3.6.1 Closed Economy Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2
For relative value added within the range of a
b
∈ (0,∞)\
(
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ ,
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
)
the result fol-
lows immediately from our comparative statics results in Proposition 3.2 and Proposition
3.3. For a
b
∈
(
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ ,
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
)
, the foreign country produces parallelly while the domestic
country chooses sequential production. From (3.9) and (3.6) for the domestic and foreign
country, respectively, we show that
wc,S > w
∗
c,P
⇐⇒ (1− λ)
2
a+ b(1− λ) >
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)
a+ b
⇐⇒ a
b
(
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)
)
> (1− λ) ((1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)− (1− λ))
where (1 − λ)2 − (1 − λ∗)(1 − σλ∗) ≷ 0. If (1 − λ)2 > (1 − λ∗)(1 − σλ∗), it immediately
follows that wc,S > w∗c,P since (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)− (1− λ) < 0 due to the fact that λ∗ > λ
and a
b
> 0. If (1− λ)2 < (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗), the above inequality becomes
a
b
< (1− λ) (1− λ
∗)(1− σλ∗)− (1− λ)
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> σ1−σ
which holds since
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)− (1− λ)
(1− λ)2 − (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗) >
σ
1− σ
⇐⇒ (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗)− (1− λ) + σ(1− λ) < σ(1− λ)2
⇐⇒ (1− λ∗)(1− σλ∗) < (1− λ)(1− σλ).
and λ∗ > λ. As a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ , it holds that wc,S > w
∗
c,P . As a result, wc,S > w∗c,P for
a
b
∈
(
σ(1−λ∗)
1−σ ,
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
)
and, consequently, wc,S > w∗c,P holds ∀ab .
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of a first stage’s stronger impact in case of a sequential structure:
From (3.9) and (3.6),
∂wc,S
∂a
∂wc,S
∂b
>
∂wc,P
∂a
∂wc,P
∂b
⇐⇒ 11− λ > 1.
The same reasoning applies to Yc,S > Yc,P as Yc = wcL.
Proof of higher wages and output levels given optimal firm decisions:
From (3.8) and (3.5),
Yc,S > Yc,P
⇐⇒ (1− λ)
a+ b(1− λ) >
1− σλ
a+ b
⇐⇒ 0 > a(λ− σλ)− bσλ(1− λ)
⇐⇒ σλ(1− λ)
λ− σλ >
a
b
which is the condition that a firm chooses optimally sequential production. The same
reasoning applies to wc,S > wc,P as Yc = wcL.
3.6.2 Open Economy Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Within this proposition we will compare different production structures given specific
relations of endowments and parameters. In particular, the world production structure
will be revealed in each case by extracting the most efficient, i.e. the highest, output level.
Recurring production structures are the following:
Computation of Y Go,S:
A global sequential production process implies that output is given by Y Go,S =
(1−λ)(1−λ∗)
a
L∗
or, alternatively, by Y Go,S = 1−λb L.
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Computation of Y ∗o,P :
In a globalized world, the foreign country is able to increase its output given parallel
production by doing the assembly in the domestic country: Y ∗o,P =
(1−λ∗)(1−σλ)
a+b L
∗.
Greater weighted domestic endowments, L∗(1−λ∗)
a
< L
b
, given that a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ
Computation of Y do,S:
Complete specialization of the foreign country in the production of xa implies in this case
that also some output of intermediate product xa is produced at home. As ab <
σ(1−λ)
1−σ
production at home is necessarily sequential. A global sequential production process
implies L∗(1−λ∗)
a
= L
f
o,b,S
b
and sequential production at home involves L
d
o,a,S(1−λ)
a
= L
d
o,b,S
b
.
Plugging both into domestic labor market clearing, L = Ldo,a,S + L
f
o,b,S + Ldo,b,S, results in
L =
aLdo,b,S
b(1− λ) +
bL∗(1− λ∗)
a
+ Ldo,b,S ⇐⇒ Ldo,b,S =
L− b
a
L∗(1− λ∗)
1 + a
b(1−λ)
and Y do,S = (1− λ)
L− b
a
L∗(1− λ∗)
b+ a1−λ
.
Proof that Y Go,S + Y do,S > Y Go,P holds:
A comparison of aggregated results reads as
Y Go,S + Y do,S > Y Go,P
⇐⇒ (1− λ
∗)(1− λ)
a
L∗ + (1− λ)L−
b
a
L∗(1− λ∗)
b+ a1−λ
>
1− σλ
a+ b [(1− λ)L+ (1− λ
∗)L∗]
⇐⇒ (1− λ∗)(1− λ)L∗ + (1− λ)aL− bL
∗(1− λ∗)
b+ a1−λ
>
a(1− σλ)
a+ b [(1− λ)L+ (1− λ
∗)L∗]
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⇐⇒ ((1− λ)b+ a)(a+ b)(1− λ∗)(1− λ)L∗ + (1− λ)2(a+ b)(aL− bL∗(1− λ∗)) >
((1− λ)b+ a)a(1− σλ) [(1− λ)L+ (1− λ∗)L∗]
⇐⇒ (1− λ∗)L∗
[
(1− λ)((1− λ)b+ a)(a+ b)− (1− λ)2(a+ b)b− ((1− λ)b+ a)a(1− σλ)
]
>
(1− λ)aL [((1− λ)b+ a)(1− σλ)− (1− λ)(a+ b)]
⇐⇒ (1− λ∗)L∗ [(1− λ)(a+ b)− ((1− λ)b+ a)(1− σλ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
(1− λ)L [((1− λ)b+ a)(1− σλ)− (1− λ)(a+ b)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
since
(1− λ)(a+ b)− ((1− λ)b+ a)(1− σλ) > 0
⇐⇒ −λa+ σλ((1− λ)b+ a) > 0
⇐⇒ (1− λ) + a
b
>
a
b
1
σ
⇐⇒ σ(1− λ)1− σ >
a
b
.
Consequently, Y Go,S + Y do,S > Y Go,P holds.
Proof that Y Go,S + Y do,S > YS + Y ∗o,P holds:
A comparison of aggregated results reads as
Y Go,S + Y do,S > YS + Y ∗o,P
⇐⇒ (1− λ
∗)(1− λ)
a
L∗ + (1− λ)
2
a+ b(1− λ)
(
L− b
a
L∗(1− λ∗)
)
>
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) +
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ)L∗
a+ b
⇐⇒ 1− λ
a
− 1− σλ
a+ b >
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ)
b
a
⇐⇒ (1− λ)(a+ b(1− λ))− b(1− λ)2 > a(a+ b(1− λ))(1− σλ)
a+ b
⇐⇒ σ(1− λ)1− σ >
a
b
and, since σ(1−λ)1−σ >
a
b
holds in this case, Y Go,S + Y do,S > YS + Y ∗o,P . As a consequence,
given the endowments and parameters, a global sequential production structure with an
additional domestic sequential production emerges.
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Equal weighted factor endowments, L∗(1−λ∗)
a
= L
b
, given that a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ
Proof that Y Go,S > Y Go,P holds:
A comparison of sequentially and parallel produced aggregated output implies
Y Go,S > Y
G
o,P ⇐⇒
(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
a
L∗ >
1− σλ
a+ b [(1− λ)L+ (1− λ
∗)L∗] ,
where plugging in L∗(1−λ∗)
a
= L
b
leads to
1− λ
a
>
1− σλ
a+ b
[
(1− λ) b
a
+ 1
]
⇐⇒ (1− λ)(a+ b) > (1− σλ) [(1− λ)b+ a]
⇐⇒ a
b
(1− λ− (1− σλ)) > (1− σλ)(1− λ)− (1− λ)
⇐⇒ a
b
<
σ(1− λ)
1− σ .
As a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ , it holds that Y
G
o,S > Y
G
o,P .
Proof that Y Go,S > YS + Y ∗o,P holds:
A comparison of global sequentially versus domestic sequentially and foreign parallel pro-
duced aggregated output implies
Y Go,S > YS + Y ∗o,P ⇐⇒
(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
a
L∗ >
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) +
(1− λ∗)(1− σλ)L∗
a+ b ,
where plugging in L∗(1−λ∗)
a
= L
b
leads to
(1− λ)(a+ b)− a(1− σλ)
b(a+ b) >
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ)
⇐⇒ σ(a+ b− λb) > a
⇐⇒ σ(1− λ)1− σ >
a
b
.
As σ(1−λ)1−σ >
a
b
, it holds that Y Go,S > YS + Y ∗o,P .
Proof that Y Go,S > YS + Y ∗S holds:
A comparison of global sequentially versus domestic foreign sequentially produced aggre-
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gated output implies
Y Go,S > YS + YS∗ ⇐⇒
(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
a
L∗ >
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) +
(1− λ∗)2L∗
a+ b(1− λ∗) ,
where plugging in L∗(1−λ∗)
a
= L
b
leads to
1− λ > (1− λ)
2b
a+ b(1− λ) +
a(1− λ∗)
a+ b(1− λ∗) ⇐⇒ λ
∗ > λ.
Since we assume λ∗ > λ, it holds that Y Go,S > YS + Y ∗S .
Greater weighted foreign endowments, L∗(1−λ∗)
a
> L
b
, given that a
b
< σ(1−λ)
λ∗/λ−σ
Since in autarky sequential production is optimal abroad and at home, two production
structures could emerge in the world, given endowments and parameters. First, the do-
mestic country could specialize in the production of xb while in the foreign some additional
production is done sequentially (Y Go,S + Y ∗do,S). Second, production could be sequentially
but separately done within each country (YS + Y ∗S ).
Computation of Y ∗do,S:
Complete specialization of the domestic country in the production of xb implies that also
some output of intermediate product xb is produced in the foreign country. A global
sequential production process implies L
∗f
o,a,S(1−λ∗)
a
= L
b
and sequential production abroad
involves L
∗d
o,a,S(1−λ∗)
a
= L
∗d
o,b,S
b
. Plugging both into foreign labor market clearing, L∗ =
L∗do,a,S + L
∗f
o,b,S + L∗do,b,S, results in
L∗ =
aL∗do,b,S
b(1− λ∗) +
aL
b(1− λ∗) + L
∗d
o,b,S ⇐⇒ L∗do,b,S =
L∗ − a
b
L
1−λ∗
1 + a
b(1−λ∗)
and Y ∗do,S =
(1− λ∗)L∗ − a
b
L
b+ a1−λ∗
.
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Proof that Y Go,S + Y ∗do,S > YS + Y ∗S holds:
Y Go,S + Y ∗do,S > YS + Y ∗S
⇐⇒ (1− λ)L
b
+
(1− λ∗)L∗ − a
b
L
b+ a1−λ∗
>
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) +
(1− λ∗)2L∗
a+ b(1− λ∗)
⇐⇒ (1− λ)
(
1
b
− 1− λ
a+ b(1− λ)
)
> (1− λ∗)
a
b
a+ b(1− λ∗)
⇐⇒ 1− λ > (1− λ∗) a+ b(1− λ)
a+ b(1− λ∗)
⇐⇒ λ∗ > λ
where λ∗ > λ and, thus, Y Go,S + Y ∗do,S emerges.
Greater weighted foreign endowments, L∗(1−λ∗)
a
> L
b
, given that σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ
Since in autarky parallel production is optimal abroad and sequential production is cho-
sen at home, three production structures could emerge in the world, given endowments
and parameters. First, there could emerge a parallel process on the global scope (Y Go,P ).
Second, the domestic country could produces sequentially and the foreign parallel while
assembling at home (YS + Y ∗o,P ). Third, a complete specialization at home emerges with
some parallel production abroad (Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P ).
Computation of Y ∗do,P :
A global sequential production process implies
L∗fo,a,S(1− λ∗)
a
= L
b
(A3.1)
and parallel production within the foreign country requires
L∗do,a,P
a
=
L∗do,b,P
b
(A3.2)
where L∗fo,a,S is foreign labor demand for sequential gloabal production and L∗do,a,P , L∗do,b,P
represent foreign labor demands in the case of foreign parallel production for intermediate
goods xa and xb, respectively. Plugging (A3.1) and (A3.2) into foreign labor market
clearing, L∗ = L∗fo,a,S +L∗do,a,P +L∗do,b,P , results in L∗do,a,P = aa+b(L
∗ −L∗fo,a,S) and with (A3.1)
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in
L∗do,a,P =
a
a+ b
(
L∗ − a
b
L
1− λ∗
)
and, thus, Y ∗do,P =
(1− σλ)(1− λ∗)
a
a
a+ b
(
L∗ − a
b
L
1− λ∗
)
.
Proof that Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P > Y Go,P holds:
Comparing aggregated production levels implies
Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P > Y Go,P
⇐⇒ 1− λ
b
L+ (1− σλ)(1− λ
∗)
a+ b
(
L∗ − a
b
L
1− λ∗
)
>
1− σλ
a+ b [(1− λ)L+ (1− λ
∗)L∗]
⇐⇒
(
a
b
+ 1
)
(1− λ)L+ (1− σλ)(1− λ∗)L∗ − a
b
(1− σλ)L > (1− σλ)(1− λ)L+ (1− σλ)(1− λ∗)L∗
⇐⇒ a
b
(1− λ)L− a
b
(1− σλ)L > −σλ(1− λ)L
⇐⇒ a
b
<
σ(1− λ)
1− σ .
As a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ , it holds that Y
G
o,S + Y ∗do,P > Y Go,P .
Proof that Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P > YS + Y ∗o,P holds:
Comparing aggregated production levels reveals
Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P > YS + Y ∗o,P
⇐⇒ 1− λ
b
L+ (1− σλ)(1− λ
∗)
a+ b
(
L∗ − a
b
L
1− λ∗
)
>
(1− λ)2L
a+ b(1− λ) +
(1− σλ)(1− λ∗)L∗
a+ b
⇐⇒ (1− λ)
(
1
b
− 1− λ
a+ b(1− λ)
)
>
1− σλ
a+ b
a
b
σ(1− λ)
1− σ >
a
b
.
Since σ(1−λ)1−σ >
a
b
, it holds that Y Go,S + Y ∗do,P > YS + Y ∗o,P .
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Within this proof, we abstract from wage indexes others than those that denote domestic,
foreign, open, and closed economy variables implying that the specific wage levels hold
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only for the explicit factor endowments and parameters.
Proof in the case of L∗(1−λ∗)
a
> L
b
and a
b
< σ(1−λ
∗)
λ∗/λ−σ :
As the foreign wage is constant only domestic wages has to be compared, where wo > wc
holds if and only if
a(λ∗ − λ) + b(1− λ)(1− λ∗)
b(a+ b(1− λ∗)) >
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ)
⇐⇒ a2(λ∗ − λ) > 0.
Proof in the case of L∗(1−λ∗)
a
> L
b
and σ(1−λ∗)
λ∗/λ−σ <
a
b
< σ(1−λ)1−σ :
As the foreign wage is constant only domestic wages has to be compared, where wo > wc
holds if and only if
b(1− λ)− aλ(1− σ)
b(a+ b) >
(1− λ)2
a+ b(1− λ)
⇐⇒ σ(1− λ)1− σ >
a
b
.
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